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ABSTRACT
This research has accomplished a clarification of what exactly constitutes semantic 
analysis using the specification language NORMA. Having clarified the essential 
elements of the language, this work has shown how the language can be put into 
practice. The technique has been exemplified on three applications. This process 
of indicating how the technique can be applied to a case is necessary if we are to 
show the practical usability.
Another important contribution has been the setting out of more precise rules for 
the constraints; the sketching out of a metaschema. Although more work is needed 
here to express the full range of metaphysical relationships that underlie any 
semantic schema in NORMA, a start has been made. This work will support the 
building of a computer system to aid the analyst.
With the large range of constraints and fundamental assumptions associated with 
NORMA, the need for a method of applying them was paramount. In this work 
we have attempted to set out a rational agenda of work comprised in the performing 
of semantic analysis, and in a manner which is easily accessible. A simple set of 
ten stages in the work spans the range of tasks that are required. At no stage has 
there existed such a straightforward introduction, rather, the tendency has been to 
point to the possibility of beginning the analysis in a number of ways.
As a further contribution this work has examined some of the examples of semantic 
analysis and identified a few ‘classic* errors. The importance of this is to focus on 
what are likely to be common mistakes that spring from an inadequate grasp of the 
language, which if corrected can lead to better results quite quickly and avoid a 
significant part of the problems associated with the ‘learning curve*.
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Certis rebus certa signa prcecurrunt 
CICERO
Certain signs are the forerunners of certain events
Often do the spirits 
Of great events stride on before the events, 
And in to-day already walks to-morrow.
COLERIDGE
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
The analysis and design of information systems has become an industry of major 
proportions, employing tens of thousands of people in the United Kingdom alone. 
Their work concerns either the creation ex-novo of information systems, or the 
reshaping of existing ones, often with the addition of computer-based support. In 
performing this work, analysts and designers make use of various specification 
techniques which permit them to represent the information structure of the 
organisation, and to proceed to develop programs to run on the technical system. 
Just as with any other analysis and design work, whether it be architecture or civil 
engineering, the professionals involved need to have a way of understanding and 
representing the structures with which they are concerned, so that they may refer 
to their plans and intentions for the future with their colleagues and with their 
clients. More often than not this way of understanding the particular domain is 
circumscribed by a special terminology, perhaps impenetrable to the lay person, and 
by a specific conceptual perspective on the problems in hand.
Techniques, technicians and academics
The techniques used can be often acquired by technicians who do not necessarily 
aspire to command the global perspective —that can be left to the academics in the 
field. However, those techniques rest on a set of underlying assumptions which do 
have to be in place to render them meaningful. In some cases these assumptions 
may be explicit, in others not. For those of us working the field of information 
systems there is undoubtedly a need for a model upon which to base our 
understanding. To be able to analyse an organisation as an information system, we 
must have a conceptual basis from which to work. This can take the form of a 
metaphor, such as the information-processing metaphor of the mind (Stamper 
1988a), or a more developed model such as is found widely in the literature. 
Beyond the models used typically in specification methods is the larger paradigm 
in which thinking in the field is anchored, where practitioners and academics
12
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subscribe, even unconsciously, to a set of metaphysical assumptions which shapes 
their theory and practice (Kuhn 1970). Such an intellectual framework is a 
prerequisite for a rich and mature professionalism capable of delivering high-quality 
outputs.
As the aim of this research is to test out a radically different approach to 
the analysis and development of information systems, manifested in the form of a 
specification language, it is appropriate to indicate the differences. Information 
systems analytical methods usually revolve around two principal pillars: data 
analysis and functional analysis. A large amount of heat is generated discussing 
which of these should take priority when performing requirements analysis. From 
our point of view they are an example of one of the laws of dialectics—the 
interpenetration of opposites—and are as irrevocably bound to one another as the 
concept of debit is to that of credit. They are both conceptual children of the same 
parent metaphysics, where the model of the information system is comprised of data 
elements which flow between functional processes wherein the data are 
metamorphosed for further reprocessing.
Such a model can only express an information system as a message and 
recording system. It cannot capture the rich world of intention and meaning within 
its formalism, primarily because it is predicated upon a set of metaphysics which 
is inadequate to cope with anything except the closed world of an objective reality.
The role of underlying philosophy
Thus growing dissatisfaction with the systems produced by such analysis and design 
methods has begun to draw attention to some of the philosophical assumptions 
behind these methods, for example in the work of the Dreyfus brothers (1986) and 
Winograd (1986). The belief in an objective reality fails to deal adequately with 
the problems of semantics: that people hold fundamentally different views about the 
world in which they live and work. This problem has been recognised before, 
however the onset of the information society has meant that the growth in large 
computer systems storing and processing billions of symbols places the problem of 
making meaning from them much higher up the agenda than before.
13
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Meaning and communication are inextricably linked. The very process of 
communication necessarily involves two persons at the least, or two agents, such 
as a company, an institution or a sovereign state. In engaging in communication 
the parties concerned want their interlocutor to respond in an appropriate fashion, 
perhaps to switch on the light, sign a contract or agree to an international treaty. 
We assume that the context of all communication is purposeful behaviour and that 
the parties are motivated by intentions.
In order for them to externalise their intentions the parties involved must 
have recourse to signs, explicit mechanisms, which permit the communication of 
intentions to take place. Here we encounter the problem of meaning: the agent who 
uses the sign to embody an intention must rely upon the interlocutor to interpret the 
sign in the way intended. For much of our communication language, natural 
language will be the medium for the signs to be expressed in, although bodily 
gesture will play its part.
So far we have referred to just two levels, the pragmatic and semantic of 
the six-level semiotic model which has been proposed by researchers working in 
this field (Stamper 1988b), and summarised in Figure 1.1. The notion of the 
semiotic approach to organisational information, incorporating for empirics what was 
hitherto known as "information theory" (Shannon 1963), is the product largely of 
Stamper, but the idea of approaching semiotic analysis from a number of levels has 
been widely espoused by many investigators working in many fields and over a 
long period of time. The Figure 1.1 model views an information system as an 
informal system of behaviour held together by norms. Responsible agents 
communicate their intentions through using signs and these signs can be analysed 
for their semantic, their syntactic, their empiric and physical qualities.
Breakdown in communication can be analysed according to the semiotic level 
concerned. A manager who finds that requesting staff to arrive punctually has no 
effect, might consider the problem from these different analytical levels. Perhaps 
at the simplest physical level the memorandum sent did not arrive and was 
mistakenly shredded instead. Or it could have been that the ink cartridge in the 
printer was beginning to run out and the finished copy was too faint to command
14
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Semiotic level Area of concern
Business
Pragmatic
Sem antic
Syntactic
Empiric
Physical
Prime tasks
Beliefs and expectations 
Meaning 
Rules and form 
Patterns and codes 
Physical objects
Figure 1.1 the semiotic model in six levels (from Stamper 1988b)
any proper attention. At the syntactic level, perhaps there were errors of grammar 
in the text which obscured the intent of the message. Coming to semantics, the 
notion of punctuality could be variously interpreted by a cosmopolitan staff. At the 
pragmatic level, in a given cultural context perhaps the notion itself of punctuality 
is inappropriate, for example where the staff work flexi-hours or work by tele­
commuting.
Any one or more of these levels could prove to be the locus for the 
manager’s problem. In offering a framework for understanding the whole process 
of realising information from signs used in a context of communication, the 
semiotic model offers a systematic basis for the development of tools appropriate 
to, and adapted for, each level. The work of Shannon (1963) can be pressed into 
service for the level of empirics, offering tools for improving the efficiency of 
codes and signalling. At the syntactic level, a great deal of work has been done 
by logicians and mathematicians which is directly applicable to information systems 
for example, predicate, modal and prepositional logic. The work of Kowalski 
(1979) has been largely built upon predicate logic, as expressed in the form of the 
logic programming language Prolog. More recently the work of Sowa (1984) has 
provided another case of classical logics being adapted for use as specification
15
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languages. For the pragmatical level the work of Searle (1984), Austin (1962) and 
Bloor (1983) amongst numerous others has provided analytical techniques which 
may be adopted by professionals in the information systems field.
This work will confine itself to that of semantics. By placing the notion of 
semantics in this context, we are able to turn our attention away from these other 
levels and focus upon problems of meaning. At the level of semantics there arc 
fewer tools available. The structuring implicit in techniques such as normalisation 
and entity-relationship analysis offer some support but these techniques arc 
inextricably intertwined with the objectivism that underlies many analysis and design 
tools. They cannot be easily employed for representing subjectively the 
understanding of a domain.
Semantic analysis, the subject of this research, provides just such a facility. 
Its importance is precisely in furnishing a tool at the semantic level which can 
permit analysts to detail the connections between the signs used in organisational 
communication and the behaviour to which they refer in the world of action. The 
analysis itself involves the application of the system specification language NORMA 
to any given problem, so that the knowledge and behaviour under scrutiny is 
reconfigured in the shape required by the formalism. In the same way as applying 
the Entity-Relationship model (Chen 1976) demands that the analyst view the 
domain in terms of the primitives of entities and relationships, so performing 
semantic analysis requires that the analyst reconfigure the domain in terms of the 
primitives of NORMA (developed in detail in Chapter 4). Ultimately the 
justification for favouring one method to another lies in its superiority as a 
specification method. Such superiority has to be proven, and this is one of the 
aims of this research.
Overview of research in this work
The model of information systems that has been proposed is one that demands 
attention to the semantics of the signs processed by the participants. So often 
ambiguity results in the misinterpreting of directives, instructions, regulations and 
so forth. In the here-and-now of face to face social interaction, when the
16
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participants work perhaps in close physical contact and share similar beliefs and 
expectations, such misunderstandings can usually be overcome. But when there are 
added difficulties of clashes in culture and of physical distance, the misinterpretation 
can be fatal for an organisation. Consequently this question is one that deserves 
the attention of the information systems academic community.
Semantics therefore plays a key role in any information system, and yet 
perhaps less attention has been devoted to it than to many other aspects.
This work introduces one tool for addressing this problem area —semantic 
analysis. With many analytical techniques the practitioner may be able to suppress 
concern with the broader underlying philosophy of the particular tool or technique 
being applied and simply concentrate upon the sometimes mechanistic working 
through of the steps: the data analyst may never acknowledge the set of assumptions 
about the world that his technique requires him to adopt On the other hand, 
semantic analysis demands constant attention to—and a deep understanding of—its 
philosophy.
Performing semantic analysis entails the application to the problem of the 
semantic constraints of the specification tool, in this case NORMA. The tool may 
have just a few constraints, such as with the Entity Relationship model, or it may 
have a vocabulary and a grammar of its own, which is complete enough to be 
called a language, as with NORMA. In either case, the task is to translate the 
information systems problem and express it in the specification formalism. We may 
work from textual material, observation or interviews. The aim is to produce a 
representation of the problem where the terms used are semantically normalised, that 
is, subjected to rigorous constraints that ensure no ambiguity exists. What we are 
doing is applying a semantic model to the information system we are analysing.
At the outset of this work NORMA had already developed from the work 
of what was then the LEGOL (Legally Oriented Language) project (Stamper 1989). 
Earlier versions of LEGOL had been developed and implemented on a computer. 
By testing each version on a wide range of business and legal problems, defects in 
the semantic models were gradually eliminated. NORMA (NORMS and
17
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Affordances), outlined in Stamper (1985b), formed the culmination of this series of 
languages.
Although the grammar of this language had been developed when this work 
began, there existed no body of case studies where semantic analysis using NORMA 
had been thoroughly applied. This work had as its objective the setting out of a 
method for applying the semantic constraints and the construction of precise rules 
where possible, and general principles where not, for the performing of the analysis. 
Unfortunately many of the LEGOL papers have been criticised for their 
impenetrability and do not provide a feasible body of support material to those 
wishing to use the methods being developed. Therefore the aim of producing 
clearer guidelines was seen as paramount. The present author’s own involvement 
with the LEGOL/NORMA project (from autumn 1986 until summer 1990) placed 
him in good position to accomplish this aim.
The research method
The research method which has been used is built around the testing of the 
theoretical structure of NORMA, and consists of four stages. First, the acquisition 
of the theoretical foundations of NORMA. Second, the application of the language 
to a number of problems, testing the ability of the language to handle different 
types of domains. Third, the synthesising of the experience of performing the 
analysis. Last, the setting of refinements to the analytical technique on the basis 
of this synthesis.
The theoretical structure of NORMA developed over the course of the 
LEGOL/NORMA project from its inception in 1973 to date, and the present author, 
as a member of the team for some four years, was able to acquire the theoretical 
background in this period. The specification language was applied to a number of 
problems and in this application stage its efficacy was tested. Testing in this sense 
meant taking the syntax of the language and using it to normalise semantically the 
terminology and sign structures which are used in each domain. What resulted 
from this testing for each application was a semantic schema and a number of
18
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norms, which could provide the basis of a specification of the information system 
requirements of the problem area.
A key question was the choosing of the problem domains. In no sense do 
they represent problems which are typical of the problems faced in the information 
systems area. It would be difficult, in any event, to say what would be a typical 
case. The applications chosen instead might be seen as idiosyncratic and varied, 
and perhaps all the more interesting for that, in their contrasts of breadth, range 
and problem character. They represent three totally different situations and in a 
way because of this prove more testing than might otherwise have been the case.
Following the application of the analysis method came the matter of 
synthesising and developing refinements to the formalism. In this regard the 
experience of the applications themselves was invaluable in permitting these 
refinements to be realised: the sketching of a meta-schema by means of norms for 
the process of analysis itself, the determining of a rational order of work, and the 
identification of common pitfalls when performing the tasks. At this point the 
research method manifests a feedback loop onto the earlier steps of determining the 
theoretical structure and its refinements.
This research method is different from using case studies, in that the case 
studies reflect the whole empirical world of the domain of inquiry. Typical cases, 
average cases or extreme cases might be taken to exemplify the domain. This 
approach is also different from action research, where the research itself results in 
changes in the world of inquiry. Instead this method allows us to refine the 
analytical tool used in application and so improve the tool itself.
The work presented in this research falls into three stages. The first, 
theoretical, part is devoted to investigating the requirements of a semantic model 
and specification language; the second, practical, part takes the language NORMA 
and applies it to three applications; the last, synthetic, part develops the rules and 
guidelines in synthesising the work of the previous two.
The work begins by examining various approaches to the question of 
meaning, whether in the database area or in what has been loosely grouped under 
the category of information systems, which includes linguists and semioticians and
19
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researchers in computers and law. Emerging gradually in this part is the stress 
being placed upon the need for a match between the metaphysics of the formalisms 
developed and those of the domain to which they are to be applied. At no stage 
is the contention made that only one particular set of assumptions is appropriate; 
it is a matter, in this as in many other arenas, of ‘horses for courses’. This section 
continues with an exposition of the semantic grammar of NORMA, suggesting how 
its structures arc particularly appropriate for the specifying of information 
requirements in business and social affairs.
The second part consists of the applications which represent three of the 
problems analysed semantically during the course of this research. In this section 
we present the results of applying NORMA to some very different domains with 
the aim of ascertaining whether the tool is applicable to problems of a disparate 
nature.
In the final part of the work there are three objectives: to develop a method 
for performing semantic analysis; to develop a set of precise rules and principles; 
to examine where common errors tend to occur in using semantic analysis and show 
how they may be corrected. The thesis ends with the implications of the research 
for the analysis and development of information systems, a number of issues raised 
by the work are described and further possible areas for research are considered.
Contributions of this research
Conventional tools used in information requirements analysis depend for their 
success upon the presumption of an objective reality, or at least a reality where the 
degree of consensus about what constitutes reality is high. This thesis argues that 
this presumption is inappropriate since it fails to account for differences in 
conceiving and understanding the world, differences which ultimately result in the 
information systems which fail to reflect the rich and diverse cultures and sub­
cultures on which it rests.
The work shows that semantic analysis can be successfully be applied to 
wide-ranging domains. It provides analysts with a method for performing it, 
together with a set of rules which provide tight constraints to operate within, and
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indicates how common pitfalls may be avoided. No literature exists yet which deals 
with these latter and so the work represents a genuine contribution to this field. 
These contributions are already enabling students to utilise semantic analysis, and 
a number of MSc projects at the LSE bear testimony to the transparency of the 
material, despite fears of impenetrability. Some progress is being made to build a 
computer program which can support the analysis, now that the rules have been 
formalised.
Overview of the thesis
Chapter 2 surveys some of the notions of meaning which abound in what we have 
loosely referred to as the ‘information systems* field. Some contributions to this 
debate from psycholinguists and legal expert systems researchers have been 
analysed, and it becomes apparent that there are many different approaches to the 
problems of semantics.
Chapter 3 addresses the same theme but this time in respect of those 
working in the database arena. Here too a variety of approaches is presented and 
compared. A fundamental problem is highlighted: the role of the objectivist 
assumptions that underlie much of research in this area. Chapter 4 introduces a 
specification language which was designed to remedy the inadequacies of the 
immanent objectivism of the standard models employed.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 document the application of this specification language 
to three applications, each one rather different from the other two. Chapter 5 deals 
with the problem of developing a schema for a body which handles behaviourial 
problems in school students. Chapter 6 attempts the same task for an organisation 
which provides welfare assistance for Italian emigrants. Chapter 7 takes up the 
same question with respect to a system for running Working Conferences for the 
International Federation of Information Processing (IF'IP), now a standard problem 
for researchers to try to resolve.
Chapter 8 sets out a method for performing the semantic analysis, based 
upon the experience gained in the applications and from teaching students. On the 
other hand Chapter 9 tackles the question of writing out precise rules for the
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analysis with a view to building a computer interpreter for an analyst workbench. 
Some more general principles are stated as well.
Chapter 10 summarises some of the common errors made by analysts when 
performing semantic analyst, drawing upon work by students and others who have 
been taught the method and then applied it themselves. The aim is to identify 
some of the more typical mistakes which novice analysts might commit.
Finally, Chapter 11 summarises the work described in the thesis, describing 
the benefits and drawbacks in the method. It discusses the implications of the 
thesis for the design of information systems and proposes further areas of research.
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Theories of Meaning in Information Systems
For many who work in the field of information systems analysis and design, the 
problem of semantics has a very low priority. For them the most pressing problems 
are others: technical, financial and strategic. The question of semantics could seem 
a matter of academic interest only. However there is another way of formulating 
the work that they are doing which bears more directly on the key issue of 
semantics: the work of information systems analysts and designers is characterised 
by the task of determining the formal relationship between the signs held in 
recording systems, such as manual filing systems and computer based information 
systems, and what goes on in the world of business and social affairs that surrounds 
them.
This problem of what signs mean has occupied the minds of scientists and 
researchers from a wide range of disciplines, and it is not our intention to encroach 
upon the terrain of others. Instead we would like to draw the focus of attention, 
at least for this present work, upon the problem of meaning in information 
systems—how signs are used to get things done in organisations—and not concern 
ourselves with the psycholinguistic aspects per se. In this chapter we examine the 
approach taken by a number of researchers whom we have grouped together loosely 
under the heading of information systems, mainly to distinguish them from those 
whose work falls more directly into the database category, dealt with in the next 
chapter. For information systems generally and for databases in particular, the 
matter of meaning is not something that can be taken for granted, at least not any 
more. Large organisations embrace many persons who do not necessarily share the 
same culture and whose perceptions of ostensibly the same phenomena vary greatly, 
and given this scenario it is essential to have an understanding, a theory, of how 
meanings are made so that better systems may be constructed on the basis of sound 
ideas about how intentions are communicated in organisations.
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Fodor and semantic theory
A great deal of work has been done by psycholinguists, for example Fodor (1974) 
and Katz (1972), in researching the domain of semantics for a theory of semantics, 
and this work is valuable for our discipline. For Locke, the seventeenth century 
English philosopher: ‘The problem of language is the problem of meaning. The 
problem of meaning is the problem of reference. And the problem of reference is 
to explain how words name things (in Fodor 1974).* Fodor tackles the problem 
of defining semantic theory by first discounting what he calls the ‘naming paradigm 
of meaning*, which Locke espouses. In this paradigm, Fodor maintains, proper 
nouns name objects, common nouns name sets of objects, verbs name actions, 
prepositions name relations, while adjectives and adverbs name properties of objects 
and actions.
As a theory of meaning for Fodor this has several shortcomings, not least 
of which is the inability to handle in the same manner terms such as ‘hello*, ‘for 
example’ and ‘and*. What about proper nouns?:
Another way to point out the implausibility of the view that a 
homogeneous relationship of naming is fundamental in semantics is 
to remark upon a striking difference between true names and all other 
sorts of words: proper nouns are undefinable. Hence, in the sense 
of ‘meaning* in which having a meaning is having a definition, 
proper nouns have no meaning. (Fodor 1974 p. 145)
This problem of individuation and identity we will turn to later in this work. Fodor 
also castigates this ‘naming paradigm’ for its apparent lack of homogeneity, which 
would demand that all names, occurrences and past events should be treated in the 
same way and yet the referents of proper nouns will have a location, a date, an 
individual history, whereas none of these things could be said of the referents of 
adjectives. The underlying problem is that of attempting to take natural language 
grammar and use it as the basis for a theory of semantics. Why should one be 
needed for the other?
Another approach which Fodor examines is that of the ‘Empiricist School’, 
typified by Hume, which distinguishes between ‘the problems of meaning and the 
problems of reference* (Fodor 1974 p. 141) Their proposal was the two-stage or
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‘mediational’ account of meaning, where between the word and its referent is the 
memory image of the referent. This is the forerunner of the ‘mentalistic’ notions 
of meaning which pervade much of our field. By mentalistic we refer to the 
approach to semantics which relates the words or signs we perceive to the mental 
constructs that each person holds for these signs. These mental constructs are seen 
as the meaning of these words or signs. As long ago as 1710 the philosopher 
Berkeley criticised this account of meaning on a number of grounds. First, the 
images that individuals have are of particulars1, rather than universals. Second, 
there is the problem of explaining away how an image can represent an abstract 
property. Third: the problem of different persons realising different images. Lastly, 
the problem of the image of words such as ‘but*.
Each of these four objections is a recurring problem for any semantic theory, 
and indeed for any knowledge representation language. First, the question of the 
metaphysics of any representation language, for example universals and particulars. 
This concerns the matter of relating instances in the world of experience of the 
agent to universal categories; how do we know that a particular bird is an exemplar 
of the whole category. Fodor’s rebuttal of the ‘naming paradigm of meaning’ 
involved his juxtaposing of two sets of metaphysical categories: the common nouns, 
proper nouns, verbs and adjectives of natural language syntax with the objects, 
actions, and properties of some unstated represesentation language. What we need 
to know is how adequate are the metaphysics for the tasks set for the languages 
used.
Second, the relationship between on the one hand the physical, social and 
legal, and on the other the semiological levels of the world. How can we make 
an accurate connection between the ‘image’ or sign and what it refers to in the 
physical and social world.
Third, the matter of subjectivism: how can we reconcile the different 
‘images’ that different persons may have which refer to the same object? This is 
the age-old problem of semantics which has to be overcome for meaningful 
discourse to take place.
1 This implies that each person has his own particular concept for any universal—cT. "templates” in Aitchison (1988).
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Lastly, the problem of metalanguage and metalevels: separating those 
elements in any expression which refer to objects in the world of discourse and 
those elements which are ‘reserved words* playing a syntactical role in the 
metalanguage. Although they are not exhaustive, each of these elements forms a 
crucial nettle that must be grasped by any formalism that may be used to represent 
knowledge. Unfortunately an explicit recognition of all these issues and a 
commitment to a proposed solution to them is rarely made.
Having reviewed some of the earlier ideas on semantics, Fodor sets out his 
own ideas on what constitutes the goal of a semantic theory of a natural language:
to explain how the semantic properties of its sentences are 
determined by their lexical content and syntactic structure. That is, 
a semantic theory of a language L may be thought of as a device 
which, given a full syntactic structural definition of any sentence in 
L and a specification of the lexical terms it contains, automatically 
predicts the semantic properties of the sentence (Fodor 1974 p. 175).
Perhaps this might be seen as the holy grail of the group of researchers who 
worked on these problems of natural language processing in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and whose work led directly to the development of artificial intelligence as a branch 
of computer science. The need to divorce language from its social setting, to define 
a universe where semantics can be as cleanly cut as syntax, to ignore completely 
the pragmatics of language, has led this research away from developing tools for 
open systems, to concentrating on domains where automatic prediction may be 
possible. We hope to show in this work the inappropriateness of this at least 
insofar as the overriding need is to develop theories and tools for tackling the 
practical problems of business and social affairs.
An important notion which arises out of the work of Fodor and Katz in their 
research into semantic theory is that of compositionality: whereby the meaning of 
complex structures may be gradually constructed from the constituent parts by 
applying the rules for deriving meaning. A good representation language should 
support this process. The same rules should apply to the analysis of any structure 
so that modularity and division of labour may be permitted.
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Winograd’s ‘Blocks World’
Another working in a similar area at the same time was Terry Winograd. His early 
work (1972) on natural language processing marked a period where it was felt that 
quite rapid progress could be made in developing machine systems to understand 
human discourse. His later disillusionment (1986) and refutation of this position 
stands in sharp contrast to the enthusiasm that he and others, such as Katz (1964, 
1972), Fodor (1974) and Schank (1973) felt at the time. Winograd’s Blocks World 
(1972) was created as a testbed for the development of natural language processing. 
It was apparent to Winograd and the others that the problems of semantics would 
always cause more trouble that those of syntactics.
In the blocks world there is a robot with a mechanical hand that can 
manipulate various objects on a table, given instructions which are interpreted by 
the program. The semantics of the Blocks World are based upon those of the 
language ‘PLANNER* which Winograd uses for knowledge representation. The 
primitives of this language are Objects, Properties and Relations—not so very 
different from those behind relational database and entity-attribute-relationship 
models. These three concepts must be used to model the object domain and 
Winograd recognises the problem of closure (to employ a term from the database 
world). For example the phrase ‘De Gaulle is old* could be represented as
OLD DE GAULLE (where OLD is a property of an object)
or
AGE DE GAULLE (where AGE is a relation between and object and its 
age).
Problems of identification are resolved by permitting relationships and objects to be 
given names: eg. #HOUSE374 or #REL76, and effectively names, used as 
identifiers, are invented for the formal system. In this way a sentence such as 
‘Harry slept on the porch after he gave Alice the jewels’ would become a set of 
assertions:
(#S L E E P :  H A R R Y : R E L 1) ( # L O C A T I O N : R E L  1: P O R C H )  
(#GIVE:HARRY:ALICE:JEWELS :REL2) (#AFTER:REL1:REL2)
We notice here that time is introduced as an individual in the discourse, for 
example with the term ‘#AFTER\ a relationship presumably, between the two
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relationships ‘#REL1’ and ‘#REL2\ and is not handled integrally by the operators 
of the representation language.
In the domain of the Blocks World, many tricky matters are avoided, since 
the room for diverging subjective interpretations is limited. There are
Objects: #ROBOT, #PERSON, #TABLE, #BOX, #HAND, #STACK, 
#BLOCK, #BALL, #PYRAMID 
Properties: #COLOR, #SHAPE, #SIZE (#HEIGHT, #WEIGHT, #LENGTH), 
#LOCATION
Relations: #SUPPORT, #CONTAIN, #PART, #RIGHT, #BEHIND, #ABOVE, 
#MORE, #ASMUCH, #OWN 
Further layers of complexity are indicated by the generic categories of PHYSICAL 
OBJECT: table, box etc. and MANIPULABLE OBJECT: block, ball and pyramid. 
In addition there are actions for the robot to perform: MOVETO, GRASP, and 
UNGRASP, and it is here where the relevance of Winograd’s work for our field is 
most felt. Essentially the underlying conception is of a hierarchy of actions, to be 
traversed in order to accomplish any given goal. The robot can only GRASP one 
object at a time and thus planning and checking the possibility of effecting the plan 
of action is necessary. Building a stack requires a clear top for part of the table, 
and objects which have the properties of supporting others, unlike the pyramids for 
example. There are elements of an ontological perspective in this approach: an 
object cannot MOVETO a location unless it is free; the HAND cannot grasp an 
object if it is already grasping another. In a sense these represent behaviourial 
limitations to the freedom of action of the robot at any time. They do not amount 
to normative or rule based parameters of the scope of action. What Winograd lays 
the basis for is the idea of a representation language that reflects the structure of 
the world it seeks to represent. So that in the world of the robot certain actions 
are only possible given certain preconditions, and in the language structures exist 
to check whether these preconditions have been met. The world is not seen as a 
flat featureless terrain, but instead as a richer context where any particular setting 
predicates the possible courses of action.
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Morris and semiosis
For studying the relationship of the semiological to the physical, social and legal 
worlds we have a great debt to pay the semioticians Morris, Peirce and Austin and 
the many who have built upon their work. As shown earlier the question of 
relating signs and images to represent abstract properties (and for that matter 
physical objects) is a continuously recurring one, and of particular significance in 
information systems analysis and design. For Charles Morris (1964) the problem 
of meaning has to be tackled from the perspective of semiosis:
the basic terms of semiotic can be introduced as follows: Semiosis 
(or sign process) is regarded as a five-term relation -v, w, x, y, z-in 
which v sets up in w the disposition to react in a certain kind of 
way, jc, to a certain kind of object y  (not then acting as a stimulus), 
under certain conditions, z. The v’s, in the cases where this relation 
obtains, are signs, the w’s are interpreters, the x’s are the 
interpretants, the y ’s are significations, and the z’s are the contexts 
in which the signs occur (Morris 1964 p2).
Monis quotes the example of the dance of the bees, where a bee which finds nectar 
on returning to the hive dances in such a way as to direct the other bees to the 
food source. In this case the dance is the sign; the other bees are the interpreters; 
the disposition to react in a certain way is the interpretant; and the kind of object 
toward which the bees are prepared to react in this way is the signification of the 
sign; and the position of the hive is the context.
Notice that the disposition to act in a particular way does not amount to the 
commission of the act itself. Whilst the bees may be intent upon returning to the 
spot where the nectar lies, there may be many circumstances which may confound 
them in their attempts. It is important also to note that the word ‘meaning’ as such 
does not appear yet in this exposition, in fact Morris suggests eschewing entirely 
the term for discussions of semiotics, or at least, he maintains, the ‘meaning’ of 
sign could be said to be both its signification and its interpretant and neither alone 
(Morris 1964 p.2). For our example, the dance of the bee and the readiness of the 
other bees to react in a particular way toward it together amount to the ‘meaning’ 
of the sign.
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What is crucially different here from commonly held notions of meaning is 
the rejection of the idea of an intrinsic meaning to a sign, which it carries 
inherently within itself when employed, and its replacement by a model which relies 
upon two agents or groups interacting in a complex exchange whose efficacy is 
tested in the actual behaviour of the parties involved. Morris’s approach permits 
the representation of differing, and therefore subjective, interpretations of signs 
employed in a particular context. What it does not and cannot do is provide an 
explanation for why the intended and the actual interpretation of the sign by two 
separate parties in a communication manage to coincide in a consistent and regular 
manner so as to allow business and social intercourse to progress. To do that we 
must analyse more deeply the part played by the context
A similar conclusion has been reached by other researchers including 
Stamper (1988a) who in rejecting the information-processing model of the mind2:
input process output
amends it firstly to:
signs encode process decode-----------signs
where
nothing flows but there is a cause-and-effect chain linking one lot of 
signs to another. Nothing is actually carried by the signs, they only 
(literally) have any significance in the context of the social groups 
of the people who interpret them:
and then to:
signs encode process decode signs
[ interpreter.......................................interpreter ]
common culture
2 This is a model or metaphor which is most pervasive in the literature, for example Marr (1982), a mathematician 
turned experimental psychologist and AI researcher. In M an’s theory of vision the brain is seen as an interpreter of signs 
performing computations rather as a computer.
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If this relationship between a sign and what the sign refers to is to be understood 
and acted upon, it requires support of the underlying common culture3 which 
ensures the degree to which this signification process is successful. Where the 
context is ambiguous and the signs may be misread or misunderstood, then effective 
communication is endangered.
Morris’s work has contributed greatly to the understanding of the sign 
function in social organisation, and in particular in applying three different analytical 
levels of semiotics to semiosis: these being pragmatics, semantics and syntactics.
By ‘pragmatics’ Morris refers to the science of the relation of signs to their 
interpreters. ‘Pragmatics’ must be distinguished from ‘pragmatism’ as must 
‘pragmatical’ from ‘pragmatic’. At this level semiotics is concerned with the habits 
of the interpreters to use particular signs under certain circumstances and, 
conversely, to expect certain circumstances to prevail when a given sign is 
employed. We can assume for the purposes of the pragmatical analysis that the 
problems of semantics and syntactics are resolved. Here we are deeply into the 
area of anthropology and culture, and having made this analytical distinction 
between the separate levels, we can draw upon the work of Searle (1969, 1984), 
Bloor (1983, 1976) and others for tools to analyse this level of expectations, 
intentionality and commitments.
Moving now to semantics, Morris addresses another range of concerns in the 
sign process: ‘Semantics deals with the relation of signs to their designata and so 
to the objects which they may or do denote’ (Morris 1955 p99). The overlapping 
of cultural reference groups: ethnic, linguistic, social class, regional, organisational 
and professional, for example, ensures that numerous possible semantics can be 
intended and applied in any given communication. Advertising for British Airport 
Authority4 has drawn attention to the varied use of ‘body-language’ employed in 
different ethnic contexts. Unless the interlocutors relate the signs correctly to their 
designata in a particular context then considerable misunderstanding may ensue.
3 we might use the term "thought community" to refer to both sub-cultures and larger social groupings
4 An example would be the BAA advert in The Economist, October 16th 1990.
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Particular signs (especially linguistic signs), through constant practice and 
rehearsal, have different significations in each cultural reference group. We can use 
our knowledge of these different reference groups to apply different meanings in 
their context. When our friends tell us to be over for dinner at a certain time, we 
understand that this implies a degree of leeway, perhaps 15 minutes on either side 
of the time agreed, before eyebrows are raised. Were we to apply the same 
meaning of punctuality to appointments with our superiors at work, we might find 
more than raised eyebrows to contend with. The semiotic level of semantics is 
concerned with the investigation of this area of meanings and with the search for 
tools to aid us in the process of navigation through this minefield.
Syntactics concerns the formal conception of language, with the manipulation 
of symbols regardless of their meanings. As the study of these syntactical relations 
of signs to objects or to interpreters, it is the best developed of all the branches of 
semiotics, and draws the attention of logicians and linguists, as well from the 
information systems field. The work of Winograd (1972), Fodor (1974) and 
Chomsky (1980) sought to test whether it was possible to define grammars, rules 
for the use of language, which were context-free, in other words where the context 
of use of language was immaterial and the syntax would provide sufficient guide 
to the use and meaning of expressions. If this quest had proved successful the 
course of Artificial Intelligence might have been different; machines could make 
sense of human language since the mere application of syntactic rules would lead 
to accurate interpretation. We hope to explain in this work the extent to which 
such fine intentions were misplaced.
Gibson’s Theory of Affordances
Gibson’s (1977) work in the ‘direct perception * school of psychology has provided 
some important theoretical insight into the way we might approach the question of 
subjective worlds. This school uses the word ‘affordance’ for whatever behaviour 
some feature of the world makes available to an organism. So that the water in 
a farmyard pond affords swimming (or drowning!), whereas the dry land of the 
farm track affords walking and running. The agent concerned, a dog, perceives the 
world in terms of these affordances. The dog does not have to run or swim in
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order for the farm to afford these behaviours, they are inherent in the dog and the 
environment. When the dog actually runs or swims, it realises those potentials in 
the world. Both of those actions are vital to the animal’s survival and it perceives 
them as invariants in a complex and dynamic physical process. Gibson’s notion 
of perception rejects the mind-body dichotomy, which has plagued many linguistic 
and psycholinguistic investigations into semantics, and holds that the agent perceives 
invariants through the whole of its sensory faculties.
What is important here is the stress upon direct knowledge of the world 
through action. The agent in its environment has a vast range of affordances, 
mechanisms which have been rehearsed so that they have become invariants in the 
flow of experience. This range of possible behaviours can be viewed as a 
schematic backdrop for any actual realised instances.
Stamper, as we shall see in Chapter 4, has taken this theoretical structure 
and used it as a support, in parallel to that of the theory of semiotics, to construct 
NORMA—a logic of action. At a social level, in Stamper’s (1985a) reworking, 
the agent might be not one individual but a socially cohesive group of individuals 
whose invariants are complex pieces of behaviour, represented in the norms of that 
group. By adding to this the notion of semiological affordances, signs that stand 
for affordances of direct experience, the resulting theoretical construct provides a 
very complete logic for the representation of knowledge.
Minsky’s Frames
Marvin Minsky has been one of the most influential contributors to the field of 
knowledge representation. His development of the notion of ‘frames’ (Minsky
1975) has laid the basis for a generation of formalisms in the area, and as such 
deserves attention in this chapter. In particular the recent advances in object 
oriented programming languages, with their ability to handle text, graphics, and any 
structures capable of being produced by computer systems, have lent more credence 
to the suitability of frames as semantic models for knowledge representation. 
Minsky (1975 p.246) tells us:
A frame is a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation, 
like being in a certain kind of living room, or going to a child’s 
birthday party The top levels of a frame are fixed and represent
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things that are always true about the supposed situation. The lower 
levels have many terminals—slots that must be filled in by specific 
instances or data. Each terminal can specify conditions that its 
assignments must meet.
The assignments for each of the terminals may be smaller sub-frames. Assignment 
conditions are specified by markers requiring the assignment to be a person or an 
object or they might point to a subframe of a certain type. Each frame corresponds 
to objects, actions and attributes of interest. Each frame has in turn a set of slots 
representing other frames closely related to it. Additionally, frames have unary 
predicates specifying what frames may fill other slots (guests must be people, food 
at party must be edible, attractive etc), and n-ary predicates among the slots (no 
alcohol at children’s parties). Slots may have defaults for likely fillers if no other 
information is forthcoming and procedures or ‘daemons, which when appropriate 
calculate some value. These daemons act as rather as pre- and post-triggers’. 
Complex conditions can specify relations among the things assigned to several 
terminals or slots.
Minsky uses the example of a child’s birthday party as an illustration, and 
points out the inadequacy of any dictionary definition such as *a party assembled 
to celebrate a birthday’ to provide the full flavour of the event. The frame would 
include terminals and their assignments such as: dress: Sunday best; present: must 
please host, must be bought and gift-wrapped; games: hide and seek, pin tail on 
donkey; and so forth. In developing his exposition Minsky (1975 p.253) reinterprets 
the central concept: *A frame is a collection of questions to be asked about a 
hypothetical situation: it specifies issues to be raised and methods to be used in 
dealing with them.* He draws a parallel between the collection of questions at 
terminals of the frame and what Schank (1973) refers to as ‘conceptual cases*. 
Certain cases or collections of questions are then generic to each frame terminal, 
so for a narrated or perceived action they might include the search for the agent, 
the intention, the side-effects, the recipient and the instrument.
What emerges is not so much a semantic model, relating signs in the 
formalism to behaviour in the world of social and business affairs, but rather (as 
Minsky himself states) a data-structure for representing situations within a computer
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system. The structure is geared to supporting the storage and manipulation of data 
(objects) and has little to say about what those objects mean. They may refer to 
persons in the world outside the computer, or to operations performed within the 
computer. Problems of conflicting views of the world, of individuation and 
identification are not addressed. However the freedom to link together frames 
containing totally different data elements: text, graphics and pieces of executable 
program, is most attractive and valuable for those developing computer systems 
today. A frame has little explicit semantic theory to guide the analyst in deciding 
what shall be considered frames, slots, predicates and daemons, and therefore suffers 
from the same arbitrariness noted in other representation languages.
The stage-prop-actor (SPA) approach to legal representation
In the area of legal representation computer models have long been used, for 
example Cory (1984), the LEGOL project (Crooks 1981, Mason 1980, Stamper 
1978, 1980) and more recently Susskind (1987) the question of what models to 
employ is coming to the fore. Criticism has been levelled at the shortcomings of 
purely rule-based systems (Leith 1988), and models have been developed to permit 
the representation of legal knowledge in a more satisfactory manner.
The stage-prop-actor model proposed by researchers at the Catholic 
University of Leuven (Goossenaerts 1988) has the same aims as those of the 
LEGOL project from where the central thrust of this work comes, the development 
of a language for the representation of legislation and the structure of rule-base 
organisations, but whose construction of a semantic model is based upon the 
techniques of object-oriented programming and frames. Since the model has many 
similarities with NORMA, whose applicability in information systems analysis and 
design is the subject of this work, more space is devoted to its consideration than 
might have been the case otherwise.
For the Leuven researchers, an underlying conception of the task facing a 
representation language can be encapsulated in what they refer to as the 
‘representation square’ (Figure 2.1), where (A) is abstraction, (E) encoding and (R) 
reconstruction. Hence primitive entities are abstracted from physical systems 
(although the term ‘social system’ might be more appropriate). These abstracted
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Figure 2.1 The representation square
entities are encoded, and then reconstructed into a representation of the legal 
system. In the SPA model these primitive legal entities are called sites, objects and 
causers. They are encoded into the constructs stage, prop (from stage-property) and 
actor. Sites and objects are manipulated by causers of human and other nature. 
Goossenaerts et al. give examples of sites as: countries, villages, houses, prisons, 
safes and airports; causers as: citizens, companies, courts, armies, engines and dogs; 
and objects as: goods, forms, guns, houses and people. A single physical entity 
may be in different roles at one time: a passenger in plane is a passive object with 
respect to the plane, a causer when talking to his or her neighbour and a site for 
his or her heart.
Two distinct types of stages are defined: actor-stages that model the sites 
or rooms where people work and act and the prop-stages that model the contents 
of the rooms, permitting ‘the organized preservation of the props’. Prop-stages are 
connected to some of the actor-stages. Indexed-stages are defined for the cases that 
many similar props are to be preserved, or many actors with similar access-rights 
to distinct stages are required. For example, consider the catalogues in a library 
in the library case the authors make use of. Each book has a unique number and 
is classified according to its title, author and keywords, so that indexed prop-stages 
book!,title!,authors! and keywords are defined. For Hemingway’s book ‘The Old
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Man and the Sea’, the indexed objects are shown in Figure 2.2 (the choice of 
fishing as an index term seems peculiar)
book/12321
airthors/ernest hemingwaytit le /th e  old man and the sea keywords/fishing
Figure 2.2 Illustration of indexed stages
In applying the SPA language, the first step is to describe the active legal 
entities and their responsibilities. The next step connects actor-stages to the 
responsibilities. Actions can only be taken from within specific actor-stages. The 
third step considers the passive legal entities or props. Instances of this type are 
held in a prop-stage which is connected to some of the actor-stages. Finally, 
detailed descriptions of the props, with information on their contents and on the 
authorities that are required to use them.
The SPA approach has a number of elements that compare favourably with 
other modelling methods. It attempts to address the question of developing a logic 
for social behaviour. Its exponents do not come to the problem with a ready-made 
solution but instead have constructed the logic from analysing the requirements of 
good representation languages, giving particular attention to the properties of 
conceptual and computational efficiency and of expressive adequacy. The emphasis 
is upon action—what actions may be performed by whom, under what conditions, 
and with what consequences: ‘When legal entities are informed on the actions that 
are enforceable as consequences of their actions, they may choose more consciousl 
among the existing alternatives’ (Goossenaerts 1988 p.2).
The notion of an actor upon a stage with certain props available may be 
compared in the LEGOL/NORMA approach to that of an agent in a given 
environment affording certain behaviourial opportunities. Stress is placed upon the 
authority and responsibility for each action. In the research post case that is 
developed by Goossenaerts (1988), for example, the rector of the university is found
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to have responsibility for creating new posts, accepting an application and opening 
a vacancy.
In the SPA approach it is possible to define elements of what might be 
called ontological control, where at any point options of particular behaviour are 
limited by what has been done thus far. For example in the research post case the 
options of cancelling an application can only arise after the application has been 
made.
An important point in the favour of any formalism used for representation 
of social and physical systems must be the simplicity of expressions. The SPA 
approach has only three primitives: stage, prop and actor. This economy allows the 
encoding and reconstruction to be relatively straightforward, yet supplying plenty 
of scope for rich semantics to be addressed.
Against these advantages we must set what we feel to be a number of 
distinct weaknesses of the approach. There is the problem of how to map from the 
legal/physical system into the stage-prop-actor model. What guidelines do we have 
for deciding what is encoded from the real world into these categories. We are 
given citizens as examples of causers (actors) and people as objects (props), and we 
are told that a single physical entity may be in different roles at the same time. 
Our question is: who decides when a particular role prevails? In fact all the way 
through the analysis method the analyst constantly faces the problem of deciding 
how to map into the structures available when the only authority for a particular 
interpretation is that of the analyst. The classification index of books in the library 
example (ibid p.7), into book, title, author and keyword, whilst undoubtedly being 
an eminently reputable method of classification, is certainly not the only one. The 
SPA approach gives no support to the analyst in allocating responsibility for this 
classification, nor is clear how it would cope with a change in the method.
For the actor-stage model of public, the three distinct types of actor stage 
are identified by Goossenaerts et al: the desk where the decisions are taken, the 
office (or off) where actions that follow from decisions are executed, and the public 
relations (or pub) where information from the organisation is accessible to citizens. 
This typology appears to be reasonable and to concord with a common-sense 
understanding of the case. But by what criteria do we find the referents of these
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three distinct types in the real world? Are these references to physical space—in 
other words do we look for a real desk in a real office?—or are these references 
to social, i.e. legal space, in which case we need the agents and the criteria for 
deciding when we have realised these entities.
A large number of the authorities given for the research post case, and 
almost certainly for the other cases referred to, comprise roles. A role in the sense 
used here is essentially a structural element in an organisation. The role will be 
occupied, when not vacant, by a person. The method does not appear to handle 
this question of roles well. In the final event the legal responsibility for decisions 
and actions taken is held not by a role, but by the incumbent of the role. How can 
the approach permit the role-holders to be identified, especially when these latter 
will be changing from time to time, with retirements, new appointments and the 
like, and also how can we trace the responsibility for the structure of roles itself?
The approach appears to include a number of procedural elements in the 
representation, running the risk by so doing of having a specification which cannot 
cope with new ways of operating. Current organisational rules, such as those 
governing the time of expiry of the application period in the research post example, 
are incorporated willy-nilly into the specification, and exemplified in the research 
post case. However there is nothing to stop a person sending an application in for 
a post which currently does not exist. In fact many organisations hire personnel 
on such a basis. The head of a department or the rector of a university will often 
have someone in mind before the post is advertised. The real problem here is the 
inability to distinguish between the substantive behaviour: creating posts, advising 
on applicants, doing research and so on, and behaviour which concerns the 
messages processed in support of the substantive: for example, sending notifications 
to applicants, completing administrative documents and application forms and 
sending accepted applications to the involved departments. The logic governing the 
substantive behaviour is unlikely to change quickly over time, whereas the logic of 
the communication system is subject to the impact of technical, organisational and 
legal change.
Perhaps most critical of all the weaknesses we might identify in the model 
is the question of how time is to be handled. The model makes no explicit
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reference to this aspect of modelling legal and social affairs, and yet the research 
post case is riven with time considerations. If we look for example at the position 
of the existence of an instance of a person and the existence of an instance of an 
incumbency of say, a research post, then clearly if the person filling the role ceases 
to exist, the incumbency of the research post ceases also. The ‘informal description 
of the situation* states only that a contract ends when the researcher is fired, resigns 
or retires.
Schank: Conceptual Dependency
Schank’s (1973, 1975a, 1975b, 1977, 1986) long investigations into natural language 
have led him to the belief that: ‘Natural language processing must be studied in 
terms of how meaning is communicated by language* (Schank 1986). In the effort 
to understand the concepts conveyed through natural language Schank found it 
necessary to develop the theory of ‘Conceptual Dependency*. Put simply this was 
a device to respond to the need to be able to infer likely consequences from a piece 
of information. To make sense of a phrase such as ‘John gave Mary an aspirin*, 
Schank’s language MARGIE generated the inferences ‘John believes that Mary 
wants an aspirin’, ‘Mary is sick*, ‘Mary wants to feel better’, ‘Mary will ingest the 
aspirin*. The representation of meaning must be unambiguous or else little would 
be gained: the problem is that it must represent similar meanings in similar ways 
or else the system needs families of inference rules to deal with each 
representational variant. Thus the number of rules needed grows exponentially.
In order to facilitate inference, Conceptual Dependency attempted to draw 
together the elements needed to represent actions, causal relations, states and state 
changes. This theory defined initially eleven basic acts which ranged across human 
behaviour. Examples of such acts (ibid p.336) are:
PTRANS: to change the location of an object
PROPEL: to apply a force to an object, in a given direction
MTRANS: to transfer information, either within memory or between 
people
INGEST: to take something to the inside of an animate object
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With each act are associated conceptual cases which modify the actions described, 
so that for example PTRANS, modelling the verb ‘to go’, possesses five cases: 
Objective (the object whose location is changed), two Directive cases, TO and 
FROM (marking the change in location), the Actor (who effects the change), and 
the Instrumental case (for how the change is effected, eg. by PROPELling the 
object. By parsing natural language expressions in terms of mappings onto these 
conceptualisations, the features associated with each case may be fully predicted 
once a mapping has been achieved. The action of ‘eats’ maps onto INGEST and 
the expectation will be that the object is food of some kind.
These conceptual cases provide the system with the expectations about the 
elements associated with any action. In a sense they are developments of the 
grammatical cases that exist in natural language; nominative (for the actor), 
accusative (for the object) and so forth. The difference here is that different acts 
(cf. verbs) have different cases. Thus the benefit of a uniform syntax for the 
semantics is not achieved. For each new action added to the basic list, there will 
be a new list of cases to learn; making the task of analysts using the representation 
language inordinately difficult.
MARGIE was able to use previous text to generate context to disambiguate 
potentially equivocal terms. ‘He fired it’ could refer to shooting a gun or finishing 
a clay pot. If the gun were mentioned in the previous sentence then that would be 
sufficient to create the right context. The problem here is that there are aspects of 
the living situation which are not apparent to the program analysing text. Schank 
uses the example of taking off one’s shoes in a restaurant—unless you know it is 
a Japanese restaurant then the program will not understand. Associated to this is 
that without this knowledge the search for the correct inference leads to a 
combinatorial explosion of possibilities to consider.
As a solution to this problem the theory of scripts (Schank 1977) was 
developed. A script is a series of events that describes a particular context. As a 
stereotyped sequence it guides our expectations in familiar situations. So that going 
to the Japanese restaurant will include amongst the events such as entering the 
restaurants, announcing who you are to the host/maitre, also those of taking off your 
shoes, sitting on a mat, and so on. Schank claims further that scripts provide, in
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addition to detailed expectations when processing, also a basic structure for the 
series of events but separate the ‘normative features from those which are unlikely 
to vary*. Ordering and serving, according to Schank, will be invariants but the 
particular items ordered and served will vary in particular instantiations, and in 
many restaurants one does not order: there is a fixed menu. These items are 
identified as script variables, and their values are filled in as the script is applied 
to understanding a story.
Both these notions of conceptual dependency and scripts are useful testing 
out new approaches to natural language processing. Schank declares that they have 
proved successful in performance and as tools for psychological investigations. 
They go some way in the search for a formalism for representing knowledge, and 
they do so because they attempt to replicate the structures of behaviour within then- 
own structures.
The work of the researchers referred to in this chapter has had an important 
bearing on this thesis. Each made a special contribution to the understanding 
needed to grapple with the problem of semantics in our field. Fodor underlines 
the need for a semantic theory, a theory of meaning which may be used to predict 
the significance of expressions when they are employed in a specification language. 
Without such a theory we cannot explain and understand how organisations can use 
communication to direct the activities of its members in a predictable and stable 
manner. Winograd*s contribution raises the notion of situated action, that semantics 
must reflect the situation in which the language is utilised, and that in any given 
situation only a certain number of actions are possible.
Closely allied to this is Schank’s notion of Conceptual Dependency, whereby 
present behaviour possibilities rest upon previously realised actions. These two 
latter themes are reflected later in the notion of ontological dependency which 
underlies the philosophical assumptions of NORMA (see Chapter 4). Gibson 
introduces the idea of the world constructed by the agent who acts in it, and so the 
twin epistemological assumptions of action prevailing over being, and knowing 
deriving from action begin to emerge in his work; they are also incorporated by 
Stamper into the philosophy of NORMA. Morris’s contribution is to introduce the 
role of the sign and the interpreter and in so doing moves us clearly away from
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mentalistic theories of meaning. It becomes possible then to envisage the 
interpreters as also the responsible agents who shape the world they inhabit. 
Goossenaerts takes this process a little further by constructing a language with 
explicit metaphysics which are based upon the legal domain, and includes many of 
the elements outlined above: situated action with responsible agents acting in a 
world which they construct but where the options for behaviour are constrained by 
what has been realised.
Each of these themes is woven into the fabric of the specification language 
that we demonstrate with the applications in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed briefly some of the approaches used to handle the 
problems of meaning in representation formalisms. It does not pretend to offer a 
detailed survey of the whole field. What it has done is to draw attention to the 
problem of semantics for investigators coming from a wide range of disciplines. 
That they should have a great deal to teach us in the information systems area is 
not surprising: our discipline owes its existence to collateral disciplines such as 
linguistics and philosophy, and has a particular debt with regard to such theory as 
we can presume to possess. However it has emerged that the nature of the 
representation language, to be successful, must reflect the richness of the domain 
it seeks to capture in its formalism. Knowledge cannot be modelled properly unless 
the metasystem incorporates and mimics adequately the metaphysics of the object 
system: the world of business and social activities. In stating this we wish to draw 
attention to the purpose of this work, that is, to investigate the feasibility of using 
semantic analysis to develop information systems. In the next chapter the notion 
of meaning in the database field is examined, again with the same spirit of caution.
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Meaning in the database community
When switching attention away from the problem of meaning in the wider field of 
information systems generally, to the more narrow sphere of interest of databases, 
the essential task still remains: how consistently to relate signs, or in this case data, 
to reality. In this arena also there is little accepted explicit theory of meaning to 
which the many researchers subscribe.
What are widely accepted and incorporated into database theory are the 
metaphysical notions that pervade the fields of science and engineering. The world 
is seen to be composed of objects, which can be grouped together into sets. These 
in their turn may also be grouped into sets, and so set theory is being used as basis 
for semantic structuring and to develop ever more baroque assemblies. The 
relational model uses the concept of the mathematical relation and Chen (1976) 
developed the concept of entity set, relationship set and mappings amongst these 
latter and the relational model. These ideas are accepted in the database field 
unhesitatingly, where the main concern is with character-strings which can be 
grouped into tuples, which in turn may be grouped into relations. Stamper et al. 
(1990) point out that this artificial machine world cannot reflect the semantics of 
a social context. The subject of databases is intrinsically machine-oriented, saying 
nothing about the world to which the character strings refer. Whilst confined to the 
world of the machine, such a semantic theory is sufficient in understanding the 
problems of character storage and manipulation. However once the data needs to 
be related to reality this naive theory is inadequate, and in practice it is those who 
create the interface of the machine system to its social context that bear the burden 
of maintaining consistently the links:
When an explicit theory of meaning is introduced, it is almost 
invariably a naive interpretation of set theory. This assumes a world, 
exactly analogous to a database, composed of objects (which are the 
meanings of names) grouped into sets (the meanings of predicates) 
ordered in n-tuples which are grouped into sets (the meanings of 
relations). The structures generated by the designers of schemas, 
typically use concepts of entity, attribute, and relation corresponding
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to these structures, but what constitutes an entity, attribute or relation
is arbitrary (Stamper 1990).
The fundamental question of relating the outside, or user’s world to the 
symbols stored and manipulated in a computer database has been tackled by no less 
an organisation than the American National Standards Institute. They have 
determined three database modelling levels that reflect the user’s conceptual model, 
the machine’s physical model, and the mapping from one to the other. These levels 
are described as follows in the ANSI/SPARC proposal (Bums et al 1986; Jaidine 
1977) for the standardisation of database architecture:
1) External level. The user’s logical view of the enterprise without
consideration for performance of storage issues.
2) Conceptual level: The information model, providing the mapping from the
logical to the physical, or internal level, describing the semantics of 
the entities and relationships, including descriptions of connections and 
consistency constraints.
3) Internal level. An abstract model of the physical database concerned with
access paths and the storage of data.
In this categorisation the relational model (Codd 1970) and its various 
manifestations would be viewed as conceptual models. The tables or relations in 
the relational model provide the means for mapping to level 3. Models such as the 
Entity-Relationship Model (Chen 1976) can be seen as both levels 1 and 2.
It is noticeable that the description of level 2 incorporates the notions of 
entities and relationships into the baseline definition: we are effectively being forced 
to approach the world of data modelling with this terminology which embodies the 
world view outlined by Stamper and referred to above. It should come as no 
surprise that the database community shares these metaphysical notions and this 
‘theory of meaning*. Consider for a moment this line in an introduction to ADS 
(Kimura et al. 1985 p.298), a data model in which the notions of symbol and 
abstraction play an important part: ‘Symbols are used to name real world entities 
and to described the relationships among them’. The new model is being 
constructed upon the metaphysics subscribed to by Chen. The semantics of set 
theory are incorporated almost unbidden into the nascent formalism.
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In the knowledge base/database product GENERIS (1989) we are told for 
example that knowledge is represented in the form of ‘facts’ and ‘rules* and that 
facts are of the form
<subject> <relationship> <property>
where "subject” can be the name of any entity. An entity is any 
object, concrete or abstract, or class of objects. "Property" can be 
the name of any other entity, or an attribute. "Relationship" is a 
named relationship between die subject and its property (GENERIS 
1989 p.3).
So that what we have are role names for entities: subject and property are roles in 
ordered pairs of relationships. A fact such as "John Smith manages the accounts 
department" would translate into "John Smith" as the subject, "manages" as the 
relationship, and "the accounts department" as the property. But in the fact "The 
accounts department is located in London" the property becomes the subject We 
are told that a particular property may be either an entity or an attribute, and an 
example of a fact with an attribute as its property would be "John Smith has age 
32". Whilst not stooping to explicate the fundamental distinction between entity 
and attribute we are vouchsafed the vital information that attributes in GENERIS 
are of five types: integer, decimal, date, time and text; none of which are semantic 
properties but instead concern the way that the computer handles the symbols.
The underlying semantics of set theory become even clearer when we 
continue:
Every entity will in general be a member of one or more classes.
For example, John Smith may be an employee and a sportsman. The 
class membership relationship, or "generic association" is of particular 
importance in GENERIS. It is represented by any of the names: 
is a are a are
is an are an is
Examples would be:
John Smith is an employee 
Accounts is a department 
Employees are people
Using this relationship, one entity is made a member of another, ie. 
the latter becomes a class or set containing the former. No 
distinction is made by the System between entities and classes, and
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the class membership links can therefore be built up into a network 
of arbitrary complexity (GENERIS 1989 p.3)1.
What is interesting is how ingenuously this section of a technical introduction to 
a marketed product discloses the widespread and largely sub-conscious 
preconceptions of what are inadequate semantics even to the admission of the 
arbitrariness of it all. Surely a better self condemnation could not be found. It is 
quite evident that the consistent linking of these symbols to their referents in the 
world of action must be done informally by those who use the system. No support 
at all is given for meaning in the operational sense.
Another point to notice in the ANSI/SPARC framework is the implicit 
assumption that the different external views at level 1 are somehow all compatible 
with an underlying conceptual view at level 2. In other words there is the unstated 
assumption that there is a unique (and objective) conceptual level with which all 
individual views are reconcilable. Work by Marche (1990) suggests that in the case 
of deciding, in a large North American telecommunications company, the criteria 
by which an edifice may merit the term ‘building*, there were at least three 
different views of the meaning of this word: the views of the accountants, the 
maintenance staff and the property management teams. In practice the ideal 
situation of ultimate reconcilability may only prevail by extensive policing of the 
data model by the data administrators.
The relational model
A key aspect of the database concept is the integration of data. Robinson (1989) 
rightly holds that a business organisation cannot be properly modelled by ‘islands* 
of data. In the real world any organisation functions at the social level as an 
interrelated, if often complex, whole. In the common textbook example of suppliers 
and parts (eg. in Date 1986a), orders are related to suppliers and therefore they 
should be linked in the company’s record system. A simple list of orders without
1 Emphasis added
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the information needed to connect them adequately does not provide an appropriate 
model of the world in which the company operates.
In view of this the early database systems concentrated upon linking records 
together, usually by adding pointers to the records. When the number of pointers 
became too difficult to handle, systems were developed to make life easier for the 
programmer.
While these systems aided the programmer in reflecting some relationships 
between data items and even in addressing questions such as simple integrity 
constraints and existence dependency, (eg. CODASYL from DBTG 1971), what they 
failed to do was to remove the inflexible structuring of the data. It was this aspect 
of the pointer based system that Codd (1970) addressed in his paper introducing the 
relational database system and emphasised three ways in which the pointer based 
system led to a loss of data independence: ordering dependence, index dependence 
and access path dependence. The most serious of these was perhaps the latter, 
where to retrieve items from a pointer based system, a program must follow a chain 
of pointers or access path, with the corollary that only queries for which access 
paths exist can be answered. In effect the range of queries is limited by the skill 
and capacity of the programmer in identifying possible future query profiles, or as 
we shall see later in this work, by the system specification language used in 
specifying the requirements.
Codd’s data model in answer to these storage dependency weaknesses, he 
claimed in a later paper (Codd 1971), was: ‘the simplest possible structure 
consistent with semantic considerations’. Whilst the relational model is attractively 
simple, his claim for the semantic power of the relational model is highly 
debatable, and the following section considers these defects.
Semantic defects in the relational model
A relation is an organised collection of data, usually presented as a table, where the 
structure consists of a heading and a body. The heading consists of a number of 
attributes of an entity, and the values for the attributes are drawn from a domain. 
For example the data values might be drawn from a domain of numbers, of days 
of the week and so on. The body of the table consists of sets of tuples where each
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tuple is a set of attribute-value pairs. A relational database is a collection of (base) 
relations. Each database entity type is represented by a base relation. Facts about 
the entity type are represented by the attributes of the relation. An entity is 
represented by a tuple of the relation.
In a relational system there is only one concept available to the data 
modeller: the relation. Even in the simple and widely used Chen conceptual model 
there are two ‘primitives* available for conceptual models, the entity and the 
relationship. For the relational model both these two concepts must be encapsulated 
in the relation. Furthermore the existence of a tuple implies the existence of both 
an entity and of its properties, as attributes. Take the case of the Employee database 
(Date 1986a): a tuple for an employee presupposes that not only that there is an 
employee, but that employee is attached to a department, has a salary, a manager, 
and so on. Moreover many relational database schemas make use of ‘link* relations 
to overcome the ‘many to many* problem. In the textbook Student database 
(Hawryszkiewycz 1984) the relation combining students and subjects, called 
unimaginatively "STUD-SUBJ" defines subject groups, joining together students and 
subjects. Thus the relation may represent many things and the user must navigate 
informally a large number of semantic questions, with very little help from the 
relational model itself. In contrast to the claim of ‘making data more meaningful 
to users*, the truth is that users must grapple with the wicked problem of semantics 
often unaided.
The relational model and the notion of a key
The relational model rests upon one central concept: the notion of a key. An 
instance of any entity recorded in the relation is distinguished by the key. So that 
a student in the university database will be recognised in the internal world of the 
computer solely by the student registration number. In many databases the person’s 
name will be used as the key. Using a label as the internal identifier can work well 
up to the point where the connection can be made by the user to the entity that 
label refers to in the real world. But in the real world of social and business 
affairs we do not necessarily need to rely upon labels to identify persons and things. 
By doing so we run the risk of instabilities caused by coping with changes in
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names. The amount of junk mail that arrives through the letter-box, often from the 
same source, but addressed to one person, albeit with slightly misspelt names, 
testifies to this glaring inadequacy. By the same token, assuming a new name in 
a database creates for the person a new identity wiping past glories and misdeeds 
in one fell swoop.
Relations between entities have to be expressed by including within the 
attributes of an entity the key, known as the "foreign" key, of the partner entity. 
When manipulating the database users have to specify joins between two or more 
relations, permitting users to create relationships within the data which may be 
completely nonsensical, and certainly not envisaged by the database designer.
The relational model and redundancy
Closely related to this matter of retrieval by unique key in the relational model is 
the aim of reducing redundancy2. The reason for this being to remove insertion, 
update and deletion anomalies, achieved when each data item which is not a 
determinant appears in one and only one relation. In the Employee database, 
EMPNO (employee number) will be included in the relation:
WORKS-IN (EMPNO DEPTNO) 
rather than the employees actual name, because the name of the employee is 
functionally dependent upon the number. Thus even though many of the queries 
will be looking for the names of employees, the relations queried directly will not 
contain their names, and more complex queries will be needed to obtain them. The 
storage and processing requirements of the relational data model in effect impose 
an arbitrary view of the user’s world upon the schema. From the standpoint of 
maintaining the stability and integrity of the database, within the limits of the 
relational model, this may be a price that database users are prepared to pay, but 
do we really need to put users into such a straitjacket?
2 There is extensive literature on this subject see for example Codd (1972) and Bernstein (1976).
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The relational model and atomic data
The relational model requires that all data in the model be ‘atomic*; in other words 
that it cannot be split into smaller parts. A common example taken for illustrating 
this weakness is the question of the ‘name* attribute. If we take as an attribute the 
notion of ‘name*, how do we handle first names and surnames? It is possible to 
take the two fields FIRST-NAME and SURNAME collectively as NAME, but then 
queries requiring the full name of persons would need a query based upon the two 
attributes and a logical connector, quite complex for a simple retrieval. In a sense 
the problem here is rather different from that posed by Jackson (1989) - can the 
model support part/whole distinctions? The ability to be able to divide things into 
parts, whether they be oranges, houses, organisations or orders, is something that 
most users will have as part of their normal range of competence.
The relational model demands that the entities stored in the relations be 
‘atomic*, but just as in nuclear physics so in the world of social and business 
affairs, deciding what cannot be divided any further is no simple question. Any 
data model should support our ability to divide things into parts and to record the 
authority for each such division. The notion of being able to arrive by analysis at 
an indivisible unit of social reality for representation in a database is comforting, 
but unrealistic.
The relational model and many-to-many relationships
A classic problem of data analysis and design is the question of many-to-many 
relationships. The relational model does not support such relationships and 
consequently database designers take refuge in a ‘link* relation. In the PARTS and 
SUPPLIERS case, we have the relation:
SP(S#.P#.OTY)
modelling the relation between PART and SUPPLIER, so that a PART is supplied 
by many suppliers and a SUPPLIER supplies many PARTS. In this case the SP 
can be deemed to refer to shipment, and we can delude ourselves that this is an 
entity in the real world, and set about convincing the user of the same. But when 
we have to stretch the imagination even further, say with the relation
ST-L(ST#,L#)
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from the STUDENT and LECTURER case, where many STUDENTS have many 
LECTURERS and LECTURERS teach many STUDENTS. The creation of the link 
file STUDENT-LECTURER resolves the problem as far as the storage and 
processing of data goes, but the meaning of the data held in this link file may not 
be clear to the user. In addition to this uncertainty of the significance, there is the 
more general criticism of the inability of the model to represent faithfully the user’s 
world. Such a device permits the designer to present a schema that reflects more 
the technical limitations of the eventual software than the requirements of the user.
The relational model and handling time
On the question of how databases handle time, the relational model has no facility 
for dealing with time. Using Chang’s concept of ‘time-varying relations of assorted 
degrees’, Clifford (1983 p.214) argues that ‘the model itself incorporates neither the 
concept of time nor any theory of temporal semantics*. The concept of time is 
crucial to many databases which need to reflect the changing flux of events in the 
real world. Unfortunately where the relational model should deal with time in a 
uniform and consistent manner, instead it is left to the analyst to decide when it is 
appropriate to use time attributes.
This work will return to the subject of the handling of time repeatedly since 
it is such a fundamental notion. The loss of valuable data through destructive 
updates is a serious criticism of the relational model and one which has had a good 
deal of attention from researchers.
The relational model and aggregation
Users often desire to treat different elements in their social and business affairs as 
aggregates, subsets or groups. The relational model cannot support this requirement 
without resorting to the creation of a new relation. A relational database with 
entities such as CAR and TANK modelled as relations would not be able to use the 
notion of ‘vehicle’, a natural enough way of economically referring to a large class 
of similar entities without having to add the new relation VEHICLE to the schema. 
Such a modification can only be done by threatening the integrity of the rule of
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"one entity, one relation", and the attendant dangers of redundancy, duplication and 
inaccuracy.
Many of the latest ‘semantic data models*, a term widely in currency, eg. 
Balfour (1988) and Peckham (1988), attempt to correct this defect, together with 
other related ones, and these are reviewed below.
The relational model and type/occurrence confusion
Another defect of the relational model pointed out by Jackson (1989) is the inability 
to distinguish between types and occurrences. A company which keeps details 
about a range of cars that it offers to employees to choose from, might well have 
a relational database with two relations: CAR which would contain an entry for 
each car in the car park and CAR-TYPE containing a list of the available car-types. 
By doing this the data about generic features of types, such as engine size and 
service interval, can be separated from the details about particular cars, such as 
petrol consumed, tyres replaced, and so on. The relation CAR-TYPE contains data 
about universals, type abstractions, whereas CAR contains data about actual extant 
particular cars. This distinction is not clear to the user of the database and altering 
the entries in one relation has veiy different implications from doing so in the 
other.
When referring to types we want to stress the similarities between instances 
of say a Ford Fiesta, and the attributes of the Ford Fiesta will describe a model car, 
model in every sense of the term. When we come to refer to a particular car, we 
are interested in the differences between that car and others like it and we may find 
that the actual values for the attributes, say of engine size or actual service interval 
vary somewhat from those described at the type level. As we have seen, the 
relational model has little to offer in support at this level of abstraction.
Codd’s extended relational model
In light of the many criticisms of the semantics of the relational model, the 
extended relational model (also known as the RM/T model) introduced in 1979 
(Codd 1979), was developed as an answer. Although some of the defects are 
addressed, some remain valid.
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The extended model still models the world in terms of entities, defined as 
‘any distinguishable object* where the object may be abstract or concrete. Of 
course the question of who does the distinguishing is still left unanswered. No 
place is given to the knower of the knowledge, it is simply assumed that these 
objects form part of an objective reality. Relationships are represented as entities 
also, but explicitly in this model, as opposed to the implicit treatment via foreign 
keys, in the earlier model. Any entity will fit into any entity type, so that a 
publication is an instance of the PUBLICATION entity type. Entities of the same 
type have the same attributes and entities can have sub-types and super-types, hence 
PUBLICATION is a super-type of BOOK, but DATABASE-BOOK is a sub-type 
of BOOK.
Three types of entities are discussed by Date (1986b): characteristic entities, 
associative entities and kernel entities. The syntax of RM/T allows the class of an 
entity to be identified and can support the integrity of the database by restricting 
manipulations to entities of that class, providing more flexibility and ‘richness*.
RM/T has one very important advantage over the earlier model: it does not 
identify internally an instance of an entity by use of a key, but instead uses an 
internal surrogate number to perform that task. The unique surrogate number is 
generated internally and although can be addressed by users it cannot be modified 
by them. Surrogates permit the database to address uniquely the record for every 
instance of every entity in the system, without the problem of having artificially 
to impose a unique key value for each particular, where a ready-to-hand set of 
unique key values is not available. One is reminded of the problem of allocating 
unique numbers to members of the public, who in any case often fail to remember 
them, just in order to accommodate the social reality to the requirements of the 
technical system3.
Relations in RM/T describe entities. Two types of relations are maintained 
by the system, E-relations and P-relations. E-relations indicate the existence of an 
entity, but no more, whilst P-relations record the values for the properties of an 
entity. Hence even when no other details are known, the mere existence of an
3 This criticism is just as valid for manual systems such as the DHSS and Inland Revenue that rely(ed) on unique 
artificial numbers
54
Chapter 3: Meaning in database community
entity may be recorded. Take for example the case of a person travelling to work 
each day on the same train. That person will almost certainly be able to recall the 
same individuals who use the train, and yet not know the names, addresses or any 
of the usual details that a database will store. In a standard relational model it 
would be difficult to record the existence of such fellow travellers without having 
these details. The E-relations concern the recording of the existence of the entities 
alone, while the P-relations address the matter of the properties of these entities. 
The RM/T model obviates the need to know a priori identifying particulars of 
entities since it does not rely upon them to manipulate the data.
In the E-relations therefore there is only the single attribute to contain the 
surrogate number for an entity instance. The E-relation device is used to permit the 
definition of entity subtypes:
CREATE E-RELATION PUBLICATION;
CREATE E-RELATION BOOK SUBTYPE OF PUBLICATION;
When the system adds to the E-relation ‘BOOK’ a surrogate value, it will do 
likewise in the publication E-relation.
Values for instances of entities are held in the P-relations. All such relations 
must have a surrogate attribute, in order to identify it as a tuple that belongs to a 
particular entity instance. In Figure 3.1 the surrogate number *5678’ is the identifier
B O O K
B O O K * * *
1 2  3 - 4 -  
S  © " 7  S
Figure 3.1 E-RELATION ‘BOOK’
to the system for the work by Balzac ‘La Cousine Bette’, but by using the 
surrogate number this name is not needed to manipulate the record. Any one entity 
may be modelled by more than one P-relation. Take for example the entity BOOK
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with attributes TITLE, AUTHOR, PUBLISHER, ISBN. This could be created in 
the following manner.
CREATE E-RELATION BOOK (see Figure 3.1);
CREATE P-RELATION BKT FOR E-RELATION BOOK (see Figure 3.2 
for this relation with two entries);
PROPERTIES (TITLE DOMAIN (TITLE),
AUTHOR DOMAIN(AUTHOR),
PUBLISHER DOMAIN(PUBLISHER));
BKT
BOOK# AUTHOR PUBUSHER TITLE
1234 Jane Austen Penguin Emma
5678 Balzac Le Monnler La Couslne Bette
Figure 3.2 P-RELATION ‘BKT’ (book title)
CREATE P-RELATION BKNO FOR E-RELATION BOOK (see Figure 3.3) 
PROPERTIES (IS BN DOMAIN(ISBN));
BKNO
BOOK# ISBN
1 2 3 4 0-14-043010-5
Figure 3.3 P-RELATION ‘BKNO’ (book number)
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Data abstractions and the Semantic Data Models
After years of focusing upon the benefits of the relational model, compared to the 
preceding hierarchical and network models, the attention of the database community 
seems to be shifting towards what the literature refers to as ‘semantic data models* 
(Peckham 1988), and the RM/T model figures amongst these. As a better way of 
storing data, the relational model has begun to overshadow its competitors and yet 
concern exists that it does not allow users to incorporate a richer set of semantics 
into the database.
Schema
Much of the difficulty encountered with databases at the semantic level derive from 
the problems of the schema (or metadata) and the metaschema. Schemas in 
databases have the function of reflecting the world of the user in such a way as to 
allow him to report the changing facts about the world within its framework, 
because enterprises change continuously and need constantly to be able to record 
the new states of affairs. Unfortunately the mismatch between the structure of the 
database model required by the computer for efficient performance and storage and 
the way in which the user of the system may in fact envisage his reality gives rise 
to problems.
At the underlying metaschema level there is the problem of what kind of 
structures can be represented with any given model. Schemas that are constructed 
on the basis of entity-relationship primitives are wedded, like it or not, to the 
strengths and limitations of that meta-level.
As a way of overcoming the rigidity and inflexibility of the relational model, 
conceptual models such as SDM (Hammer 1981), TAXIS (Mylopoulos 1980), 
Functional Data Model (Shipman 1981), the Event Model (King 1984), and the 
Format Model (Hull 1988) seek to offer greater diversity and richness, over and 
above the basic concepts used to model elements of entity and relationship (Chen
1976), which seem to have become the ‘sine qua non* of database modelling. 
These additional constructs, usually referred to as abstractions, include: 
generalisation, aggregation, association and classification. Also the requirement of
57
Chapter 3: Meaning in database community
time-handling has become a vital question which many models do not consider at
all, and those that do (Clifford 1983) provide partial solutions.
On examination these ‘richer models,’ whilst undoubtedly offering the analyst
and database designer more structures to reflect the world of the user inside the
machine system, still suffer from the inadequacies of the paradigm (the lack of an
explicit common commitment to this notion prevents the use of the word ‘theory’)
as the basis for these models, and as we have seen, for the relational model itself.
Thus a pervasive consensus appears to underlie all these models proffered
in the field of database semantics, a consensus which has its provenance in the
domain of classical logics, where particular metaphysical assumptions about the
nature of reality prevail. Amongst these assumptions are the notions that:
everyone inhabits a common world ... 
comprising discrete objects ... 
with definite identity ... 
classifiable into distinct sets ... 
employing truth-functional semantics.
Whereas for the platonic mathematician the world conjectured from these premises 
will suffice for his purpose, for those of us working in a world made up of people 
drawn from very different backgrounds, faiths, cultures and traditions, starting from 
such a priori principles is proving an inappropriate basis for the construction of 
database systems.
The semantic models (and others) referred to have a common aim of 
providing a richer structure for modelling and each of them offers extra support 
from these abstractions, but always from within the limitations of the current 
orthodoxy of beliefs and assumptions.
Generalisation
Probably the first abstraction to extend the basic range of entity and relationship 
offered by the widely used Chen model, and one which has been emphasised by the 
TAXIS model, is that of generalisation referring to: ‘the means by which differences 
among similar objects are ignored to form a higher order type in which the 
similarities can be emphasised’ (Peckham 1988). Peckham uses the example of 
PUBLICATION as the generalisation and BOOK, JOURNAL_PAPER and
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CONFERENCE_PAPER as specialisations. The use of such an abstraction greatly 
adds to the economy and power of expression, reflecting as it does linguistic 
practice in human affairs. In this particular example we could imagine many 
features, such as ‘author* for instance, common to all these.
Insofar as we want to treat a group of such entities as a 
generalisation/specialisation unit, this facility will aid us in our work. However 
once we begin to examine carefully the differences between the members of this 
unit, or rather once we need to emphasise the differences, we find ourselves 
encumbered with that structure. What was apparently convenient now becomes a 
liability. Notice in Figure 3.4 that the relationship between the several entities 
PUBLICATION, BOOK, CONFERENCE.PAPER and JOURNAL_PAPER prevailing 
here and now, could present a threat to the future stability of the schema should the 
business (or in this case the library) decide to recast the mould. How, for example, 
would an unpublished work be recorded in this schema?
PUBLICATION
BOOK
JOURNAL
PAPER
DATABASE
BOOK
CONFERENCE
PAPER
Figure 3.4 Generalisation (Peckham 1988 p. 156)
59
Chapter 3: Meaning in database community
Aggregation
Aggregation permits viewing relationships formed between lower-level types as 
higher-level types. In the relational data model such aggregation comes about 
through aggregating attributes to form relations. Models such as SDM and TAXIS 
may aggregate entity types or relations to form higher order entity types. Peckham 
(1988 p. 156), pursuing the library case, illustrates aggregating two entities such as 
TITLE and AUTHOR to produce the higher order entity PUBLICATION.
The notion of aggregating a title with an author to form publication 
transgresses fundamentally the ontology of this domain: a publication could not 
come into existence without an author, and if published will have a title also. The 
failure to handle roles well underlies the problem. In many of the schemas we find 
in the textbooks PERSON has no place, whilst of course there exists a large number 
of roles filled by persons. It scarcely makes sense to suggest the aggregation of 
title and author to permit publication when for these first two terms to have any 
significance we should already be able to point to the existence of a publishable 
work (such as book or journal paper). A person will achieve the role of an author 
when he has completed a piece of work which qualifies him in the eyes of the 
body concerned as worthy of the ascription. For a libraiy, in contrast to a body 
which organises conferences, would be handling material not yet published, 
publications would form the bulk of the items and so the authors in question will 
have published works in any case. In passing, we may note that writers must first 
produce the material, and then the work itself enters into a role of its own, once 
a publisher decides to make it a publication.
Classification
Many semantic models treat classification as a form of abstraction considering a 
collection of objects as a class of higher level objects, often of the type is instance 
o f relationship (Mylopoulos 1980). In the library sample database Peckham (1988) 
give the example of the object class BEST_SELLING_BOOK which consists of all 
BOOK objects with sales greater that 10,000. But how will the database look if 
for some reason the library decides to change the definition and threshold of 
bestseller sales to 15,000 perhaps because of sudden increases in overall book sales?
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Will all those books originally entered as bestsellers suddenly lose this status if 
their sales lay between the 10,000 and 14,999 mark? Will the database treat 
equally records from the two different criteria?
In this case we might present the criterion for this classification as a rule, 
possibly superseded in the course of time. An agent can choose to treat a subset 
of entities according to a particular rule or norm as a separate class, but the 
conceptual model should contain mechanisms which can handle the dynamics of any 
system of rules. Different users of the system might have differing standards for 
what constitutes a bestseller and the conceptual level would admit of only one.
Association
Association refers to the form of abstraction which treats relationships between 
member objects as higher level set objects, often manifested in the is a member of 
relationship, and supported by many semantic models including RM/T. For example 
(Clifford 1988 p.173) the set of DATABASE_BOOKS of AI_BOOKS as an 
association of BOOK objects. Some predicate such as TOPIC=DATABASE will 
usually determine the membership of the set, or the user could equally specify some 
other criterion.
The universal BOOK comprises two different sets of books. It would appear 
that books first belong to their set of database or AI books and only secondly to 
the BOOK set. Surely this again transgresses the ontology: first a book then a 
member of a set of books. This membership, as with classification above, could be 
handled simply by a rule.
Neither may we feel certain that all users of the library will necessarily 
divide the books into the same groupings. One department may treat a book as a 
database book, another may decide to place it in the knowledge base category. 
Instead of having to decide arbitrarily for all users of the library the denomination 
of a particular acquisition, a better approach would permit the library to define 
categories. Not only should we make available the criteria laying behind them, 
users and user groups should maintain their own definitions perfectly well. Each 
book could then fall into different groupings simultaneously.
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Inheritance
Repeated information within the database schema arises from the derivation of one 
entity type from another. In the above case, conflict can occur where a specialised 
object inherits the same property from two higher level objects. For example
p erso n
review er
literary-figure
Figure 3.5 multiple inheritance (Clifford 1988 p. 163)
Figure 3.5 shows the L1TERARY_FIGURE which includes both writers and 
reviewers. LITERARY_FIGURE acts as a specialisation of both WRITER and 
REVIEWER and therefore inherits properties from both. Since both writer and 
reviewer will have a stipend attribute a problem occurs because the reviewer’s 
stipend would refer to the remuneration for reviewing a book, whereas the writer’s 
stipend would refer to the sum advanced by the publisher. Put simply the term 
stipend would have two different meanings, which the model has to handle by 
prohibiting the use of multiple inheritance or in some way providing resolution of 
the conflict.
Dynamic Modelling and the Handling of Time
Increasing dissatisfaction with the inability of data models to handle time has led 
to more emphasis upon this feature. Dynamic elements refer to those aspects of the 
database which undergo changes: as we have seen this includes both the data held 
and the schema in which they reside. In short a data model must have an
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underlying assumption about time and reality. Clifford and Warren (Clifford 1988 
p.215) rightly state:
Most conventional databases are static, representing a snapshot view 
of the world at a given moment in time: changes in the real world 
generally are reflected in the database by changes to its data, thereby 
"forgetting" as it were, the old data.
Underlying this "destructive updating", as it has been called, we find the 
metaphysical assumptions of a timeless and unchanging Platonic reality, a world 
entirely relevant to many fields of academic endeavour such as mathematics. If we 
counterpose this ‘world view* with one that suggests that existence provides a key 
notion for understanding what we choose to call reality, then we may begin to 
consider every object as having a ‘lifespan*. This quintessential idea of existence 
pervades all the objects we might include in a semantic schema.
The pemiciousness of ‘destructive updating’ reveals itself in high focus in 
the field of the law. So often a piece of legislation has the effect of altering or 
reforming legislation passed previously. However these reforms rarely have the 
effect of removing retrospectively the rights (or duties) set out before. In paying tax 
on capital gains, one calculates the amounts chargeable to tax for particular years 
in the past according to the regulations prevailing in those years. A database 
system which were to update destructively the basis in law for performing such 
calculations would prove of little value to taxpayers and their advisers.
Several temporal query languages have been developed already but most, 
such as TQUEL (Snodgrass 1987) and TSQL (Navathe 1987) are just extensions of 
conventional query languages. In addition there are attempts to develop models for 
temporal databases, such as RUBIS (Rolland 1987). Clifford and Warren (1983) 
suggest an approach based upon the work of Richard Montague (1973). Their 
solution rests upon the incorporation of time into the database as though it were an 
individual itself. The first step is to incorporate a method for time-stamping the 
tuples ("facts") in the database. To do this we add a new attribute, STATE, to the 
relation schema. Each of the records receives a timestamp so that a time-series 
remains of snapshots which allow the user to obtain the values for any given data
63
Chapter 3: Meaning in database community
item for any of the time intervals (say years), but we do not know the existences 
of any of the objects. In the case of John’s salary (Clifford 1988 p.219) we know 
that in 1980 it amounted to $27,000 and that in 1981 it had risen to $30,000. 
However we cannot derive the date of the change, i.e. when the value of $27,000 
for John’s salary finished its existence and the new figure came into force. This 
applies equally to John’s career profile: whilst we can track his movements from 
department to department and from manager to manager over the years, we still do 
not know at what time one state of affairs replaced another. We cannot present a 
series of snapshots snapped at arbitrary intervals (weeks, years etc) as a totally 
satisfactory method of "handling time".
Conclusions
This chapter has not attempted to perform an exhaustive review of all the literature 
on the subject of database semantics—that would be a pointless task, in that 
practically all of it remains firmly within the paradigm outlined at the outset. Our 
intention in this section was to spell out the elements of this paradigm and to show 
how they permeate the entire field of databases. Nor is there much comfort from 
the advanced semantic data models, which only build upon the same metaphysical 
ground, and suffer thereby from the same limitations. In the next chapter an 
alternative approach to modelling knowledge is introduced, one which has been 
attentive to the defects of the old paradigm and which suggests a different one.
Embodied in the tools employed in this old paradigm, for example in set theory and
9yrelational theory, there is a theory of meaning which is implicit (since it is only 
rarely explicitly referred to in the literature) appropriate for the disciplines of 
physics and engineering. Instead of tackling the problem of knowledge 
representation with the preconceptions of data representation, this new approach uses 
those of the social sciences.
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NORMA: knowledge representation language
The LEGOL/NORMA project was started in 1973 at the London School of 
Economics1 with the express aim of tackling some of the issues raised in the 
preceding two chapters. Three fundamental questions were set on the agenda for 
the project to address (Stamper 1989):
1. How do we describe a social system as an information system 
with the maximum formal precision compatible with the intrinsically 
informal nature of social interactions?
2. How do we deal analytically with the problems of semantics that 
must be solved by the systems analysts and designers with the user 
whenever a computer-based system is developed?
3. How can we improve die methodologies for analysing and 
specifying business requirements before the software engineering task 
is undertaken?
This agenda led to a series of languages (LEGOL 1, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, NORMA) to 
represent norms and norm systems, after having studied systems of legal, social and 
business norms. What became clear to the researchers was the inadequacy of 
formalisms based upon classical logics: predicate logic, prepositional logic, deontic 
logic and so on, for analysing and representing systems of norms (Jacob 1985 and 
Stamper 1985c). Classical logics serve those domains well where there is already 
a good deal of agreement about what constitutes the nature of reality. In fields 
such as law, business and the social sciences, an independent reality cannot be 
assumed (Cook 1981, Crooks 1981). Indeed much of the work in these fields is 
concerned with determining the individuality and identity of the various legal, social 
and business entities, and with articulating and comparing the different ‘world 
views’, perhaps to obtain a consensus around one in particular. For classical logics,
1 Since 1988 the project has been based at the University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
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these problems have already been resolved. They begin where the semantic 
problems have been settled.
Whilst such a departure from the usual axioms may be particularly difficult 
to accomplish for scientists and mathematicians, brought up on a diet of platonic 
principles and steeped in the values of objectivism, for those from other disciplines, 
law and the social science for example, this alternative paradigm is not so 
problematic. Since their work involves the comparison and analysis of differing 
customs, practices and interpretations, their readiness to accept a subjectivist stance 
is not surprising.
The language used in this research for specifying systems is a logic of norms 
and affordances, called NORMA. (Stamper 1988b). It differs fundamentally from 
the formalisms reviewed in the preceding chapters in one major respect: it does not 
subscribe to the prevailing objectivist paradigm. Its assumptions about the world 
are different:
‘NORMA is based upon two simple philosophical assumptions: 
there is no knowledge without a knower, and 
his knowledge depends upon what he does.
Perhaps more radically but more simply, this position may be stated: 
there is no reality without an agent, and 
the agent constructs his reality through his actions* (Stamper 
1988b p.75).
In this way a place is being given to the knowing agent, and furthermore the object 
world is seen as a world of action and not of being. The world does not exist for 
itself but is a reality constructed by knowing agents whose actions define this 
world. Such constructs are radically different from those that underpin most of 
science and mathematics, and have been developed over years in the course of the 
work of the LEGOL/NORMA project.
As a direct result these premises provide a firm platform from which to 
develop a formalism designed for the purpose. From a root and branch subjectivist 
epistemology, the premises direct us to a syntax for a language suited to the task 
of representing knowledge for business and social affairs. Thus instead of 
constructing a formalism for the specification of behaviour and the representation
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of knowledge which takes for granted a ready-made world which is the same for 
all, Stamper has begun to build upon the basis of a subjectivist platform. And the 
syntax reflects that view. The well-formed formula in NORMA always has the 
structure of
AGENTbehavior or AGENTaction
and the effect of this is to demand from the person writing the representation that 
he specify who it is who is responsible for the knowledge. In place of an absolute 
truth notion, vital for classical logic, there is a notion of responsibility. NORMA 
requires that there be a subject for every action or behaviour.
A second effect is equally instructive. Each piece of knowledge reported in 
the logic refers to actions or behaviour by the knowing and responsible agent in the 
here-and-now. The past or future worlds, or those distant in space, must be 
explained in terms of semiological constructs which serve to bind the here-and-now 
to these other realities. In a sense this requirement necessitates the use of semiotics 
in understanding organised communication and it is here where the theoretical 
contribution of Morris (1955), for example, is most felt
The Agent-in-his-environment
The world of a knowing agent is by definition complex, dynamic and interactive. 
The agent: a person, a team, a company or a whole jurisdiction, acts in and is acted 
upon by the environment. In this dialectic of flux, to be able to communicate agents 
must use invariants, so that in performing any action the familiarity with what is 
biologically and socially significant to those who share that reality permits 
predictable and stable behaviour. These invariants are informally established and 
then ultimately, where necessary, constructed by the law. We can see how these 
invariants persist, when analysed at a high level of abstraction, so that the notion 
of a ‘chair’ viewed over centuries concerns the support for a person who sits, and 
does not involve the number of legs, the material employed, or whether there are 
armrests or not. This concept of behavioural invariance provides one of the central 
cores of the theory behind NORMA. Agents in any environment have a number
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of these invariant behaviours: ways of behaving or acting. For a single agent these 
are referred to as affor dances, whereas for a group of agents the invariant behaviour 
is a norm.
In addition to NORMA is the language LEGOL (Stamper et al. 1982). 
Whereas NORMA is used for knowledge representation, LEGOL is used as a 
manipulation language. Its main operators are time based. When forming 
expressions to describe a fragment of some reality, we can combine affordances by 
the operators while, orwhile, whilenot and whenever. Notice that there is no 
negation operator, for the philosophical basis is a world of action; a person acts and 
cannot "un"act. The concept of negating can only be handled through the intentions 
behind the behaviour2. Given any affordance then others are presupposed, 
particularly the ability to perform the action and the capacity to begin and end its 
realisation. Using the special affordance of partition the agent can begin to explore 
notions of individuation: picking out one individual from a group of them. From 
these structures by using metonymy and metaphor3, signs can be evolved. By using 
one affordance to stand for a realisation sophisticated concepts of individuation, of 
time and of space can emerge.
The agent-in-his-environment has experience of a limited range of behaviour 
which may be treated as invariants. These invariants could be ‘feelings, activities, 
postures, relationships and even the objects in his world. They depend for their 
existence upon the combination of his own structure and that of his environment* 
(Stamper 1988 p.75). So an agent A could realise some invariant x, that is, in the 
here-and-now recognise the existence of an instance of x. We would write
Ax eg. John water (John experiences water)
to represent a realisation, that is, in the world of the agent A, A is experiencing 
x. Having acquired the ability to find and recognise x, the ability remains with A
2 you may act now with the intention of negating the effects of past or possible future actions
3 Metonymy refers to a change of name. We often call things instead of by their name by something connected with 
them: eg. the crown for royalty, the mitre for the office of bishop, red tape for the routine of office. In these cases the 
substituted word is a symbol Another type of metonymy is using the instrument for the agent: eg. the pen is mightier that 
the sword, ie. writers have more influence than soldiers. A metaphor is an implied comparison, as opposed to the explicit 
comparison of the simile: his answer cut her to the bone, ie. die comparison is with the effect of the knife-cut. The 
importance for information systems of these two parts of speech is their contribution to our understanding of how one thing 
may stand for another: how semiological affordances are derived.
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as an underlying realisation, even when there is no x. A person who has learnt to 
swim retains the ability to swim even when there is no suitable water. In NORMA 
one would say that the agent-in-environment has the affordance of x, or A can x, 
or:
Ax* eg. John water ability (John can recognise water)
Realising an invariant must be the responsibility of an agent who has the authority 
to determine whether it exists or not. In the simplest of cases this is when the 
agent uses his judgment to decide: a pasta cook deciding when the spaghetti is 
cooked al dente for instance. In the less simple case the authority may be given 
to a number of individuals and groups in a complex norm: as when a company is 
deciding to relocate its head office from London to some provincial spot. In either 
case we know that every affordance must have an authority as a component. This 
is shown as
Ax@ eg. John water@John (John decides what is water—for him)
which is an integral part of the affordance.
Ontological dependency
The notion of including ontology in the understanding an analysis of social affairs 
is certainly not a new phenomenon. Philosophers from Hegel to Lukacs (1980), and 
more recently Bunge (1989) have employed it as a central concept in their world 
view. Many fewer have been the researchers in the field of information systems 
who have incorporated it in their methods, but the case for doing so is forcefully 
made by Lee (1984). To maintain coherence a database schema, a representation 
of knowledge must reflect the ontological dimension of existence—we must know 
what has to exist in order for other entities to exist. This notion of ontology is a 
linchpin for NORMA.
Once an agent is realising some behaviour, some invariant, he can then 
proceed to experience other kinds of behaviour. Once he has realised water he can
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swim. The realisation of water opens up new behavioural possibilities such as y*: 
swimming, drinking, splashing, washing, drowning. And this is written as
Axy eg. John water swim (John, experiencing water, swims)
The behaviour y  cannot be realised, that is exist, unless x  is realised also. We refer 
to x  as the ontological antecedent of y, and this may be seen as a consistency 
constraint whereby the period of existence of y  is circumscribed by the existence 
of x. Every realisation achieved by an agent has a period of existence delimited 
by a start and a finish, shown as
Ax+ and Ax- eg. John water start and John water finish
(John starts and finishes experiencing water)
These existence constraints form a powerful way of enforcing consistency on the 
resulting specification.
Parts
Instead of assuming that the world is composed of ready-made individuals (which 
must be atomic for the relational database model), NORMA supports the further 
partitioning of any affordance. A part may be an agent as part of a larger complex 
agent, such as a committee of the House of Commons, or it may simply be a 
component, as with a wheel of a bicycle, or a part of a body such as a leg. In 
addition, we can add that the part/whole relationship is also an ontological 
relationship: a part cannot exist without the whole. We may recall from the 
previous discussion about atomic data in the relational model how useful it is to be 
able to distinguish elements that arise out of others. They should be recognised as 
parts of their ontological antecedents, but there may be a temptation to assert that 
parts can exist independently of the whole, as when a wheel is detached from its 
bicycle. The part however is conceived as a functional element within the whole 
and outside of the bicycle the wheel is not capable of functioning as it does 
normally. It has to be occupying the role prescribed for it in order to work as 
normal. Parts may be seen as role-components and the particular element which
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fills the role may change. A particular wheel may be capable of filling other 
roles: on a wheelbarrow for instance. The part is shown in the syntax (using the V 
to represent ‘part o f)  as
Ax.y eg. John orange slice
and y  is a part of and dependent upon x  for its existence, and just as for 
ontological dependency the same time constraints apply.
Joint realisations
Agents will be capable of performing various actions simultaneously and we can 
represent this by using the while operator. So doing x  while doing y  is symbolised 
as
A(x,y) eg. John reading while sitting
and these are two behaviours which are coterminous. Alternatively our agent may 
be indifferent to either, and we can conflate the two behaviours
A(x:y) eg. John reading orwhile sitting
and lastly the agent may be able to recognise the behaviour that maintains the 
existence of x  while y  does not exist, and this is shown as
A(x;y) eg. John reading while not sitting
Each of these operators is evidently dyadic. This is because the operators are used 
to express conjunction, disjunction and restriction of patterns of behaviour. There 
is no monadic negation operator which can be used to refute the truth of something, 
because NORMA is used to express patterns of behaviour and action and not 
propositions which may be negated.
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A restriction (the while operator) has special importance, for the realisation 
of two affordances simultaneously can provide the agent with behaviours that would 
not be possible otherwise. This is a case of joint ontological antecedents x  and y 
for an affordance z, shown as
A(x,y)z eg. John cup while water drinks
where drinking in this case requires the prior existence of both the cup and water. 
In NORMA only two antecedents are allowed and experience has shown4 that there 
is no need for more.
Related affordances
Once an agent can recognise the invariant x , he may also learn to recognise two 
related patterns of behaviour: those of the beginning and the ending of x. These 
affordances are expressed as:
Ax< and Ax > eg. John flu beginning and John flu ending
These structures permit us to reflect the intentional behaviour of an agent. We are 
able to relate other behaviour to the beginnings and endings. If John is able to 
recognise the symptoms of infection before it takes hold then maybe he can take 
steps to prevent it growing. This preventative behaviour, perhaps taking some 
antibiotics, really only has meaning in the context of such recognition. Notice that 
beginning and ending are not the same as start and finish, which are only known 
after the event
Signs are affordances that stand for realisations, and provide other derived 
affordances. If our agents wish to overcome the limitations of time and distance, 
then a mechanism is needed which can transcend the here-and-now. When an agent 
is able to carry forward memories from the past to the present, this is similar to a
4 In LEGOL 2.0 more than two antecedents were allowed but this was found to be unnecessary in later versions.
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semiological ability. Linguistic affordances (or sign types) can be used to bind 
together events at different times.
Semiological affordances
Using signs enables us to use the notion of time. We need one to achieve the other. 
Whereas classical logics assume the existence of time as part of the objective 
reality, NORMA permits only the representation of the here-and-now. All other 
reality, whether past, future, distant or just possible, has to be constructed from 
parts of the agent’s present reality. By using signs to stand for realisations, agents 
can overcome these limitations. For NORMA there are two kinds of signs: sign 
tokens and sign types. A realised instance of a sign is a sign token, such as a 
particular letter of application, whereas the pattern of the tokens are types and are 
realised as abilities to make or interpret the token. In general for information 
systems analysis we are interested in sign types, the tokens are of interest at the 
empirics and engineering level. We are concerned with the meaning of the signs. 
The term:
A”Ax" eg. John "John hungry"
implies that John realises a sign type that means John is hungry. John may wish 
to use this sign type to communicate about himself. If we wish to we may analyse 
in detail the method of communicating: speech, writing or body language, but
A"Ax"asserts eg. John "John hungry" asserts
(John asserts that he is hungry)
This can also be handled by use of the mood for prepositional attitudes, dealt with 
below. We can also use a notation that captures the idea of ‘meaning’ in the sense 
of ‘semantic value*. Given an affordance, it may be used as a sign-type, so that 
it can be regarded as the equivalent of some other sign-type which we represent as 
a function of its meaning:("[affordance]" -> "realisation")
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where we call the realisation the ‘meaning* of the affondance. The most common 
kind of affordance for which we are likely to introduce such ‘semantic norms* will 
have a literal-type as its affordance. A sign "John is hungry" may be used to refer 
to the realisation of John when he is hungry. Another important use for this will 
be found when the affordance is a rule (ie: a sign representing a norm), and the 
realisation is an interpretation. The semantic norm, in this case, is what we usually 
call an ‘interpretation*. "The Fifth Amendment" is the name of a rule in the United 
States of America whose interpretation permits a person to remain silent when 
otherwise he may incriminate himself.
Time
As has been stated above, time depends upon our ability to use signs. NORMA 
assumes that we have access to nothing other than the here-and-now, and therefore 
the start and finish of all realisations is always either in the past or the future. 
Thus :
Ax+ and Ax- eg.John hungry start and John hungry finish
is the start and finish of the realisation Ax (John being hungry) and therefore are
sign types. Sign types can coexist with what they stand for and can continue to 
exist when their referent has ceased. It is this property that permits the binding 
together of events taking place at different times.
‘In the physical world, causal chains involve a sequence of here-and- 
now interactions of material objects. In the social world (eg: tax 
liabilities today for last year’s income) semiological linkages are 
basic. Time is a key semiological construct’ (Stamper 1988b p.79).
In addition to the signs Ax+ and Ax-, NORMA provides constructs for before and 
after the existence of a realisation:
Ax\ and Ax/ eg.before John hungry and after John hungry
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John does not experience either directly and they can only be known through the 
use of signs. These extra constructs provide a range of expressive power which can 
support the writing of the norms of any type of system. We often wish to refer 
to the before and after when specifying organisational behaviour, and the language 
provides this power in its syntax.
Norms and mechanisms
As we have seen, single agents have affordances, or behavioural invariants, in any 
given context; complex agents and groups of agents have norms as their invariants. 
If we wish to describe the behaviour of a social group in terms of NORMA, we 
need to link together the various affordances to show how they interrelate. For a 
social group a norm is a kind of mechanism, a piece of behavioural repertoire 
which is constantly repeated. In the sense of an organisation the norms are in a 
way the knowledge of the organisation: how it deals with the situations it 
encounters.
The mechanisms relating one affordance to another are specified using the 
notion of x whenever or y then x:
A(x <— y) or A(y —> x) eg. John resting whenever sitting
and John sitting then resting
which is similar to a logical implication, but the existence of the norm is not 
related to the existence of the elements that comprise it, as with the truth- 
functionality of an implication. Instead the norm has its own existence, its own 
ontological antecedents, its own authority, just as with any other affordance.
Knowing about the start and finish of the norm is useful to help to 
reconstruct past situations, when perhaps different norms applied, and so we have 
extra facts about any norm:
A(x «— y)+ and A(y —» x)- eg. John’s (normal) sitting and resting
behaviour may have given way to an 
inability to rest while sitting. The start 
and finish times delimit the period when 
the normal behaviour prevails.
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One may view the norm in its physical existence as a kind of mechanism 
internal to the agent. Our concern in this work is generally with the mechanisms 
that control the behaviour of social agents (companies, learned societies, welfare 
bodies, educational authorities, and the use of the term ‘norm* therefore is highly 
appropriate. Social norms can be fairly complicated as a glance at any piece of 
legislation will show, but so aie physical mechanisms such as talking and dancing. 
In practice the distinction between norm and affordance is not as great as might as 
first appear.
Determiners, measurement, individuality and identity
A very important additional notion for the specification of systems is that of 
determiners. These are the affordances of quantity and quality that permit us to 
compare one instance of a realisation with others. Determiners may be seen as a 
general form of measurement, in that they function to partition instances of 
realisations along various criteria. The two basic forms of measurement employed 
are fundamental and pointer measurement. With fundamental measurement two 
elements are involved: a system of norms for performing the measurements, 
involving comparisons with a standard measure, and the encoding of the results into 
a system of labels, often numerically interpreted algebra. Whereas for pointer 
measurement there is solely a mechanism which will assign numerical values to the 
realisation. Weight and height are examples of the fundamental measurements, 
whereas intelligence quotients and prioritisation are typical of the latter.
Most important of all are determiners of individuality, discreteness and 
identity. So often when writing norms we need to refer to individuals in a variety 
of different contexts and we want to maintain the reference to those individuals 
selected from one context to another. When recording facts about particular 
individuals, we use the notion of individuality which presupposes that we are able 
to recognise the uniqueness of each discrete individual. This is essential when we 
want to represent examples of ontological relationships where the antecedents are 
individuals. In a marriage, for instance, the two antecedents will be individual
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persons. This individuality must be represented, and in NORMA it is achieved by 
use of the hash sign (#). Symbolically:
Ax#y eg. John cup weight (John can distinguish cups by weight)
indicates that x has a determinant y. Because such frequent use is made of identity, 
it is symbolised simply by the hash sign. The expression Ax# implies that an agent 
can realise individuals of the genus x. Similarly
A person# eg.John person#
(John can recognise individual persons)
says that the agent can identify persons. Weight and height however do not 
discriminate individuals—there will be many persons who have a given height or 
weight. The weight of 82 kgs would discriminate from the totality of actual 
persons the subset who weigh that amount.
Determiners and measurements are treated in a uniform way. Both afford 
values to joint antecedents: the standard and what is being determined, according 
to a system of norms, such as a measuring procedure. The validity of the values 
rests on the actual measuring process conforming with the rule. At the highest 
level of abstraction there is:
affordance#determiner eg. person#weight
where the determiner gives the name of the measuring procedure: height, weight, 
length, density and so on. In NORMA time constraints apply to manipulations of 
determiners. The expression for adding together the weight of two persons would 
be evaluated by checking that the two coexisted. NORMA would not add together 
the weights of Newton and Plato, for instance, since their existence periods do not 
overlap. What could be done is to add together the values of their weights. 
Another use of determiner is:
affordance# eg.person# (individuation: a determining mechanism)
77
C hapter 4: NORMA: knowledge representation language
where the determiner is an identity.
For affordances that require individuals as antecedents NORMA expresses 
them in this way:
A(person#l, person#2)marriage ie. two persons needed as antecedents
and the two persons are discrete individuals. Here A, the knowing agent would be 
an entity capable of recognising a marriage, such as a state. Notice here that one 
to one marriage relationships are implicit in this example. In ontological structures 
of this nature we can use role names:
A (person#husband, person#wife) marriage
and the role names indicate the discrete members of the relationship. Role names 
are useful during the process of performing semantic analysis because they draw our 
attention to the relationships from which they are derived.
Generic/specific relationships
From our review of the semantic data models in Chapter 3, it is evident that the 
ability within a semantic model to exploit the economy of expression from 
hierarchical groupings and inheritance of properties is valued. In NORMA this is 
accomplished by use of the generic/specific structure, which is specified by a norm:
A ((a:b:c:d:e) f) eg. John (apple:orange:pear:plum:grape) fruit
Since this is a norm it has an authority, a start and a finish. Should there be 
different interpretations, perhaps different schools of botanical thought, then this can 
be easily represented without ambiguity. Changes in definition can be reflected in 
the time values for the starts and finishes for each norm. At a more fundamental
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level, the metaphysics of common structures can be defined for the generic 
affordance and then implied through the norm for all the specifics indicated.
A marvellous economy of expression is possible here. All the determiners 
that single out physical objects from other abstract affordances can be introduced 
at the generic level. Having declared that a physical object has determiners of 
mass, volume, surface area, height, colour, hardness and so forth, every different 
kind of specific physical object can inherit these characteristics by using the simple 
norm:
A ((person, apple, bridge) -> physical_object)
In this way the qualities of various affordances can be specified simply without 
prejudicing the possibility of changing them in the future.
Representation of data in the NORMA surrogate tables
surrogate no. type sort label antecedent antecedent
1 2 3 4 5 6
authority+ authority- start finish
7 8 9 10
Figure 4.1 surrogate table for NORMA data representation
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The radically different nature of the theory of meaning employed in NORMA is 
proclaimed in the idiosyncrasy of its representation of data. Its metaphysical 
assumptions apply to everything dealt with on the level of realised or potential 
action or behaviour. Every single realisation has common features: a start and 
finish; some authority which determines it, whether a judgment of a person or a 
complex norm; an ontological antecedent. Therefore in the database, or table of 
surrogates, a list of uniform elements may be used to represent any realisation. The 
same structure of table supports the recording of all data whether affordances or 
norms5. In the table in Figure 4.1, only the label or name of the realisation is a 
literal. Each tuple is a surrogate for some realisation and is given a surrogate 
number, or internal code, held in column 1. This internal code is then used in 
references to that surrogate from elsewhere in the table.
Column 2 holds the value for the type of affordance: whether a universal, 
a particular, determiner, determinant (the particular value for a determiner), role or 
norm. These are represented by u for universal, p for particular, d r for determiner 
and dt for determinant. This information provides the basis for semantic 
consistency checks; given we know the type of affordance, we can ensure that the 
affordances that it possesses conform with what is permitted. For instance 
particulars must have particulars as their antecedents. This matter touches on the 
meta-level of the schema and is referred to in Chapters 8 and 10.
Column 3 is for the sort of affordance: for instance, John is a sort of person. 
The surrogate number for ‘person* should be placed in this slot in the surrogate for 
John.
Column 4 contains the name or label of the person, if known. This is often 
the identifier, such as the name John, in the outside world. In the surrogate table, 
the surrogate number is used as the identifier within the machine. Given that the 
literal is not used in internal operations, changes in name cause no consistency 
problems and no destructive update. The new value for the name can be recorded 
in a new tuple without deleting the previous. Different labels for the same 
affordance in different languages could easily be made available. Notice also that
1 for a full illustration of this see the case data in Appendix A for the CRIS case.
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the label is not needed to be able to record important details about the realisation. 
For the purposes of internal manipulation the surrogate number suffices.
Column 5 is for the surrogate number of the antecedent. In the case of 
John’s hunger, John will be the antecedent of ‘hungry* and the surrogate number 
given for John will be entered.
Column 6 provides a slot for the second antecedent surrogate number. If 
John has a membership of a club, then the first antecedent would be John and the 
second would be the particular club.
Column 7 requires the surrogate number for the authority which determines 
the start of the realisation. Where John joins a club this might be the membership 
committee.
Column 8 adds the surrogate number of the authority which determines the 
finish of the realisation. Usually this will be the same as for Column 7, but not 
always.
Columns 9 and 10 are for the time/date values marking the starts and 
finishes. Any surrogate that has a start value but no finish value is still currently 
in existence. When the finish value is entered then the realisation no longer exists, 
and any dependents it may have must cease also. If John dies, his membership at 
the club ceases and so does his peckishness!
A further extension is in progress (Liu 1990) adding Column 11 for 
mood_start and Column 12 for mood_finish. Here a range of propositional attitudes 
relating to each realisation may be recorded: assertion, hypothesis, forecast, question, 
permission, prohibition, obligation, retraction, prescription. If John is predicting that 
he will be hungry then this may be recorded, in much the same fashion as the 
assertion that he is so, and the mood_start column would read A for assertion. In 
the surrogate table in Figure 4.2 the figures for the heights of the four people 
(surrogates 18-21) have been entered in a hypothetical mood for the mood_start. 
They are simply values which have been hypothesised and are not intended as fact. 
The agent responsible in each case is the person himself. Mistakes in data entry 
may be recognised as such by declaring them retracted once the error has been 
noticed, and R for retraction would be entered in the mood_finish column. Here 
too is an element of consistency and integrity checking. A genuine error can be
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Cod Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 Col 6 Col 7 Col 8 Col 9 Col 10 C o in  Col 12
surrogate type sort label an ti
£1cCO @ + start finish mood+mood-
1 u 0 SOCIETY 0 0
2 u 0 person 1 0 3 3 A
3 u 0 nation 1 0 2 2 16000000 A
4 u 0 territory 1 0 2 2 16500000 A
5 u 0 height 2 0 2 2 17000000 A
6 dr 0 citizenship 2 1 2 2 A
7 u 0 possession 3 4 1 1 A
8 u 2 Dalen, Jan v. 1 0 1 1 19400315 19851112 A
9 P 2 Luring, Pirn 1 0 1 1 19411120 A
10 P 2 James, Peter 1 0 1 1 19501230 19900101 A
11 P 2 Smith, Dick 1 0 1 1 19511225 A
12 P 3 NL 1 0 1 1 6001212 A
13 P 3 UK 1 0 1 1 6001212 A
14 P 4 Netherlands 1 0 1 1 A
15 P 4 Surinam 1 0 1 1 A
16 P 4 England 1 0 1 1 A
17 P 4 Wales 1 0 1 1 A
18 Pdt 5 1J7
8 0 8 8 19891220 H
19 dt 5 1.80 9 0 9 9 19891220 H20 dt 5 1.77 10 0 10 10 19891220 H
21 dt 5 1.78 11 0 11 11 19891220 H
22 P 6 citizenship 12 8 12 12 19400315 A
23 P 6 citizenship 12 9 12 12 19411230 A
24 P 6 citizenship 13 10 13 13 19501230 A
Figure 4.2 surrogate table example
declared as such, and the mistake is consigned to the limbo of retractions —but not 
destroyed. Analysis of errors can provide valuable information for the organisation.
No destructive updating
A very important by-product of the data representation is that it obviates the 
destructive update problem. No record is destroyed. When a realisation has ceased 
to exist its finish value is entered and the surrogate remains on record. Critics 
might reproach with the observation that any system built on this basis would soon 
run out of secondary storage. The riposte would be that the decision to take 
records off-line (nb. not destroy) is something that an organisation should shoulder 
in a pro-active manner, instead of allowing the technical limitations of computer 
systems to destroy important data. In fact evidence coming from the University of 
Qatar, where the administration system has been built on this NORMA data model, 
suggests that this can work to the advantage of the users. They are able to 
reconstruct the position as it stood at any time, say in regard to a person’s
82
Chapter 4: NORMA: knowledge representation language
application, because the data model captures all the dynamics and conserves the 
records for use later.
The substantive business problem
This standard structure remains always in the background and provides a platform 
of formidable power from which to specify systems. All these structures: 
antecedents, authorities, existence constraints and so on, are automatically 
incorporated into any expression we write in NORMA. This structure is the model 
for the knowledge base expressed in NORMA, and in the foreground are the norms 
of the system that we write in LEGOL, which acts as knowledge manipulation 
language. Since the two languages have a common genesis there is massive 
expressive power in using the two together, yet great economy. The tight semantic 
control ensures that it is difficult to produce meaningless output when manipulating 
the knowledge base. Consistency and integrity are offered, not just syntactically but 
at the highest level—that of meaning and intention.
When specifying a system the semantic schema has to be produced using 
NORMA, and this is the main focus of attention for this work. Once that schema 
is in place, the business norms can be written which deal with how the affordances 
in the schema start and finish. These together amount to a specification, which can 
be animated and checked when implemented on an interpreter for the manipulation 
language. Concern with the message system may be suspended entirely for the 
language forces the analyst to home in on behaviour in the here-and-now. Building 
up a semantic schema enables the specification to demonstrate the precedence 
network of behaviours in the organisation. The schema, especially when portrayed 
in its graphical form, the ontology chart, allows one to know what behaviours are 
necessary to arrive at a particular realisation. We know what operations have to 
be performed to realise any behaviour. This is the manifestation of an operational 
theory of meaning, a theory of meaning far superior to those that underpin the 
formalisms reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2.
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Graphical notation
To make the semantic schema more readily available and understandable, there is 
a form of graphical notation which expresses most of these structures. These basic 
symbols show the relationships between the affordances. Working from left to 
right, we have a time constraint which exercises extraordinary control over the 
specification. What is on the right can only exist if its antecedents to the left exist. 
If a nation goes out of existence, then the persons holding citizenship can no longer 
be its citizens. At each node the same structure of metaphysical categories heading 
the columns in the surrogate table applies. The ontology chart, or graphical version 
of the semantic schema, functions as powerful shorthand for specification in 
NORMA. Care must be taken not to confuse the ontology chart with the Data 
Flow Diagrams (DFDs) which are so popular as a specification technique. The 
ontology chart shows a map of existence dependent behaviour and does not concern 
the flow of messages and data. DFDs, on the other hand, map the flow of data in 
the organisation and effectively seek to present it as a message system.
The surrogate table may appear as a flat table not dissimilar to those found 
in the relational database systems. However there is a depth which is given to the
Graphical notation in NORMA
ontological dependency line person -
hash for individuation person#
period for part/whole person#
eings
leg#
joint affordance or relationship 
role in relationship ()
citizenship
(citizen)
sign [”]  for realisation 
dotted line [--] for referent
^lungryy
$
/
•"John hungry'-
generic/specific box fruit
apple
orange
etc.
Figure 4.3 graphical notation symbols
representation by the ontological dimension. As we traverse the table we discover
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the profound network of antecedence which indicates precisely what has to be 
realised in the world of responsible agents before any given affordance may be 
realised. Using the tool of NORMA when specifying a domain requires us to 
supply as many as possible of the cell entries, and then with the schema firmly in 
place we can begin to write the business norms.
NORMA and the applications
In the next three chapters of this work we set out three applications of semantic 
analysis, where NORMA has been applied to three different information systems 
problem domains. The Comparative Review of Information Systems Methodology 
(CRIS) case study was occasioned by the need to develop software to support the 
great number of conferences and meetings held by the International Federation of 
Information Systems (LFiP). Given IMF’s status as a large international organisation 
there were necessarily going to be elements of considerable complexity involved. 
The intricacy of the ontology chart in Appendix A bears testimony to this 
observation. For the Italian welfare organisation the question was one of 
developing a specific office automation system to support an existing, highly 
efficient, clerical and paper based system. In the school support system the matter 
concerned not the developing of a computer data system, but of unravelling difficult 
concepts in a difficult problem area.
Our concern here is to present these applications as very different in 
character in order to show how NORMA could be used to tackle problems of a 
distinct nature. In this sense what the language is being used for is the drawing 
of a conceptual map for each case. The conceptual terrain of each problem is 
examined in an exhaustive and thorough manner and with the ontology charts and 
surrogate tables (often shortened for simplicity) we are able to elicit knowledge in 
a consistent way.
We can compare the applications by a variety of criteria, and just three are 
indicated:
Formality: The school support application is the most informal of the three and was 
regulated by few written rules and much professional practice. The Italian welfare 
office, on the other hand, was bureaucratic in the extreme. In the CRIS application
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the picture was mixed: the systems for handling conferences had been mostly 
informal and the intention was to formalise much of it to obtain benefits from a 
computer based system.
Strategic/Tactical: The school support application was largely strategic in nature, 
given that the professionals had a very free hand about how they organised 
themselves and what use they made of their resources. On the other hand the 
Italian office system was at a tactical level, concerned with fielding better the 
administrative trivia of matters whose substance lay with more august bodies to 
decide. The CRIS application might be said to lay somewhere between these two 
extremes.
Level of Articulation: The Italian office application was an example of a problem 
which was well articulated. The persons involved knew the system, as a system, 
intimately. Overriding bureaucratic requirements had ensured that the problem 
topology was reasonably transparent. In the school support application there was 
less evidence of a ‘system* as such. Instead the professionals concerned seemed 
to view what they were responsible for as primary, and were not always aware of 
a way of looking at their combined activities as a system.
Therefore, in the following three chapters we indicate how NORMA has 
been applied to three applications. Each one is rather different from the others, and 
yet NORMA proved to be entirely appropriate for the task. The superficial 
dissimilarities of the presentation belie the underlying common thread; in each 
application the same full range of syntax for the language was directed at the case. 
Only with the development of a method for applying the syntax will the results 
from different applications resemble one another, and this is the objective addressed 
in Chapter 8.
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The Schools Support Unit
The system under investigation in this chapter deals with disruptive and behavioural 
problems in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham (shortened here to 
Barking). In contrast to the typical data processing example that is often used to 
illustrate specification methods, we deal in this case with high level strategic issues 
about the use of scarce teaching and financial resources in a hard pressed authority. 
This case is presented expressly to show that NORMA may be applied to matters 
well beyond the usual boundaries of information systems analysis and design 
methods. Of particular interest is the informality which, with only a slight dusting 
of formal rules, characterises the domain.
The Barking education authority has, like most educational authorities, an 
educational psychology service, here known as the Schools Psychological Service 
(SPS), and we are interested in the work of part of that structure: the Schools 
Support Unit (SSU). There are some interesting questions about what constitutes 
a behavioural problem and how an identification of the problem at the level of the 
school proceeds to the acceptance as a case by the Service. Merely referring a 
problem to the Service does not of itself ensure this acceptance, only the 
consideration of the question. Hence we find a rich vein of issues concerning 
communication acts, as well as individuation and identification of phenomena, in 
this study. It is important to underline that the established practices of the Service 
have not been formalised and exist as conventions or norms which the staff have 
developed over a relatively short time. While the number of staff involved remains 
quite small, say a dozen in all, and the turnover is low, there is no reason why a 
complete formal system need be developed. Analysing the information requirements 
in this case meant having good access to staff members who know the procedures 
of working sufficiently well to be able to answer the questions we were prompted 
to ask when applying the language NORMA.
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Setting the scene
To set the scene we begin by outlining the steps involved in this process, each step 
requiring a decision to be made by a responsible agent in the domain. Again we 
stress that this taxonomic presentation belies the much less formal day to day modus 
operandi of the SPS and the SSU. Only after relentlessly pursuing the underlying 
logic of the workings of these two bodies were we able to devise this schedule.
1. What is a problem of behaviour?
The first step in the chain is where the referring agency, usually a school, identifies 
a behavioural problem in a student. Various semantic problems need defining and 
resolving, and we analyse these matters below. Particularly relevant to our 
approach is the vexing question of how different institutions take different positions 
upon what constitutes unacceptable behaviour. What is considered acceptable 
behaviour in one school may be beyond the pale in another: not completing a 
homework assignment in Art may be a mortal sin in St. Angela’s Convent School 
but a mere peccadillo in Dagenham High!
2. How to invoke the help of the support services?
The act of identifying does not amount to informing the body responsible. The 
referring agency refers the problem to the Schools Psychological Service (SPS) and 
this communication act does not bind the SPS to accept the case, merely to consider 
it. There will be questions concerning the nature of the problem and whether it is 
one that lies within the jurisdiction of the SPS. Important also is the referring to 
the SPS and not the Schools Support Unit (SSU), for the SPS is the body with 
overall responsibility and in fact a psychologist must be made responsible for each 
case. Only then may the SSU be involved if necessary.
3. Whether to accept the case?
The SPS decides to accept, or reject, the case, usually involving the SSU in the 
decision. At this point the SPS accepts responsibility for the attempt at resolving 
the problem and signals its intention to increase or decrease the relevant behaviours.
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4. What level of resources to throw at the problem?
Unless the responsible psychologist requires only the allocation of a remedial 
reading teacher, in which case the SSU will not be involved, the SSU and the SPS 
decide a strategy together. In general however, the Head of the SSU will be 
notified and be requested to participate.
5. What will be the nature of the control programme?
The SSU develops a behavioural management programme suitable for the particular 
problem on the basis of the information gathered and of the judgment of the 
professionals participating.
6. How to get the programme implemented?
After developing an appropriate programme the SSU has the delicate task of 
negotiating with schools, parents, students and other agencies to ensure its 
implementation.
7. How to fine-tune the programme?
After implementation of the programme, monitoring produces the feedback necessary 
to facilitate any adjustments that may be required.
8. When to withdraw support?
After a period the SSU will reach a point where it feels that it can no longer 
improve the behaviours either because the required improvement has been realised, 
or because other types of professional help may be needed.
9. How to get approval for the closure decision?
The decision to withdraw support and close the case rests with the SPS, that is with 
the psychologist originally allocated the case, and ultimately with the Principal 
Psychologist.
In effect the semantic schema for this domain must provide generic answers 
to these questions, and in particular point to the decision makers responsible in each 
case.
89
Chapter 5: Schools Support Unit
Organisational structure and responsible agents
We put as our root agent the particular state of the United Kingdom. This is 
because the affordance of local education authority (LEA) is peculiar to the UK. 
We cannot expect other countries necessarily to have the same administrative 
structures.
The UK, therefore, has an education authority as an affordance, and Barking 
and Dagenham is a particular realisation of an LEA, set up after the reorganisation 
of the London Boroughs in 1964 (see also Appendix D):
LEA#
role#
Director of Education# 
Deputy Director#
Head of Schoole Section# 
etc.
(reeponslbillty)
Incum bency
(incum bent)
p erson#1
Figure 5.1 LEA roles
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
Barking and Dagenham United Kingdom
The parts of the educational authority consists of subordinate organisational 
structures, which in turn comprise further layers of subordinate bodies. The 
building bricks of these constituent elements are offices, roles, parts of the 
organisational structure, which are filled by incumbents appointed to these posts 
for determinate periods. The Education Authority operates by means of the offices 
such as Chief Education Officer, Deputy Chief Education Officer, Chief of Schools 
Section and so on. Part of the Education Authority of Barking, another particular,
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is the Schools Psychological Service. We would prefer to use a generic title to this 
affordance, reserving the name ‘SPS* solely as the identifier for the particular 
structure in Barking. However different education authorities discharge their duties 
in this area in a different manner, and with different organisations, thus we have 
to refer to the SPS as a particular realisation of Barking education authority.
#SPSv\ role#
Senior Psychologist#  
Principal Psychologist#  
Psychologist#  
etc.
\  (responsibility)
incum bency
incum bent)
person#
Figure 5.2 SPS roles
The SPS is part of the Barking authority and is comprised of a number of 
offices: Senior Psychologist, Principal Psychologist, Psychologist, and Secretary, 
which we present specifics of ‘role*. At a level of jurisdiction below that of the 
SPS we have the SSU which is in its turn part of the SPS and comprises the 
following posts: Head of Unit, Senior Psychologist attached to SSU, Support 
Teacher and Secretary. The authority in the records for all these offices will in 
each case be the Barking education authority itself, and the contracts issued will 
cover the performance required of the incumbent, although the post holders will be 
engaged in a whole sphere of activities whose jurisdiction is less formalised. For 
example a teacher is responsible for teaching the classes he has been allocated by 
the Head Teacher, but he is not responsible for lending a hand to supervise lunch­
time activities, such as chess clubs. It may be that informal norms are so strong 
in the school that he feels obliged to undertake this duty regardless of the 
contractual position.
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#SSUN^ ^
role#
Head of Unit#
Senior Psychologist#/#SSU
Support T eacher#
etc.
\  (responsibility)
incum bency
-----(I ncum bent)
p e rso n # ----
Figure 5.3 team roles
Another example of the preeminence of informality is the team structure 
which the SPS has evolved to deal with the handling of problems referred to it. 
Teams are responsible for an ‘area*, another construct of the SPS, which has no 
currency outside its jurisdiction. An ‘area* is a notional concept which only loosely 
refers to geography and more closely reflects the catchment patterns of the various 
schools. ‘Area* then is an affordance of the SPS whilst by contrast ‘team* is part 
of the SPS, a functional and indispensable element in its operation. The team is a 
basic unit for the SPS in handling its cases and is comprised of various roles which 
make up the whole (the team) and include Psychologist(s), Remedial Reading 
Teacher, School Support Teacher and Secretary. In September 1985 the fifth team 
had two psychologists—the senior ones—to allow them a reduced caseload so as 
to discharge their other duties. The present team organisation dates from September 
1983 when some organisational changes were introduced by the then Principal 
Psychologist. The composition of the teams is prescribed by a norm or rule which 
effectively provides the criteria in the authority field of the (NORMA) record for 
that team. In September 1985 there were five teams, one responsible for each area, 
and so the record for the universal ‘responsible for* would be as follows: 
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent2
responsible for team# area#
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For the purpose of everyday organisation, Barking schools are deemed by
the SPS to be ‘in’ an area. But what about the schools? Do they depend upon the
education authority or are they ontological dependent upon the state. The 1944
Education Act vests the authority for opening and closing schools in the hands of
the Department of Education and Science, although unlike many other countries, in
the United Kingdom the local education authorities take on much of the
responsibilities that would be, if say on the Continent, held by the Ministry of
Education, and indeed the Head Teacher has had significant powers over what is
taught. Schools then are not dependent upon the educational authorities in which
they are found, and for example the demise of the Inner London Education
Authority will not imply the finish of the schools that it managed for forty or so
years. ‘School’ and ‘LEA’ are ontologically independent insofar as instances of
either do not require the existence of each other in order to exist themselves.
Instead we have portrayed the relationship between them as one of ‘maintains*
{maintains (LEA, school)}, since the term derives direcdy from the usage that
prevails in the domain. Schools which are not maintained by the local authority
might be voluntary aided, as many Church of England schools are, or independent,
as say Summerhill School in Suffolk. In addition there will be a wide range of
other institutions going by the name of ‘school’ —evening school, free school,
summer school etc.— which will conform to the criteria set by the different
authorities that see fit to recognise them as such.
For the universal ‘school’ in this domain we can specify:
Affbrdance Antecedentl Antecedent
school United Kingdom
whereas for a particular school, a realisation, we would enter the following.
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent!
Erkenwald School United Kingdom
The areas as we have seen have no such legal status, being the creation of the SPS
for expediting its operation, and so areal is a particular realisation of the SPS:
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent!
area 1 SPS
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Allocating a school to an area lies in the powers of the SPS and the ultimate 
authority would be the Principal Psychologist:
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
in area school
in area 1 Erkenwald School
Notice here how the first entry is for the universal for a school in an area, whereas 
the second entry is for a particular instance of an actual school deemed to be in an
school
role#
Head Teacher# 
Deputy Head# 
Head of Year# 
Secretary#
(responsibility)
Incum bency
(incum bent)
person;
Figure 5.4 school roles
actual area. In this way we can place the various schools into areas, with a team 
responsible for the referrals from those schools. Hence in area 1 we found in 1985, 
alongside Erkenwald also Barking Abbey and Castle Secondary Schools, together 
with all their feeder primary schools.
The schools also have a structure of posts established by the education 
authority and these include roles such as: Head, Deputy Head, Senior Teacher, Head 
of Year, Assistant Teacher and so on. Each of these offices is filled by the 
education authority when it appoints persons to the posts. As a post is filled, an 
incumbency is realised and its existence starts:
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
incumbency role(school) person
incumbency Head (Parsloes Manor) Peter Haydon
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While the incumbents change from time to time, the office remains. However the 
office can also change when the incumbent remains the same. This often gives rise 
to contract disputes when the particular duties of a teacher are altered by the Head 
Teacher of a school and the member of staff disagrees, feeling that these were not 
the duties for which he/she was appointed. For the conflicting jurisdictions to be 
resolved between the education authority and the school level, the question may be 
referred to a higher jurisdiction, that of the courts.
"m an ag « s(S P S  problam<chlld
lafairing Agant#- rfara
#S P S
sch o o l#
iroblai
parso i
(child) \ ( P » r a n t )
parenthood
 a lg n  fo r su b a ta n tiv a
 n o rm  for w h an av er
"igure 5.5 referring: a communication act
Despite the many times that ‘role* is used there is no ambiguity in the 
NORMA formalism because the particularity of each realisation is guaranteed by 
the antecedents. For Peter Haydon we know that the particular role he is appointed 
to is that of Head in Parsloes Manor School, because this is required information 
as the antecedent of ‘incumbency’. Requesting the authority that determines each 
occurrence ensures that the particularities of each realisation conform with the 
criteria in the authority for start or finish. If the role is redefined then the 
contractual position may have to be resolved —or else a visit to the courts is likely.
Another term that occurs often in the SPS world is that of ‘referring 
agency’. This latter is another construct of the SPS and the Service adopts a norm 
which prescribes who or what is a referring agency. In so doing it effectively 
defines the world it wishes to operate in. Referring agencies may refer behaviour
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problems to the teams, and while generally they will be schools or parent/guardians, 
this is not always so.
‘Parent’ is handled as a person in the relationship of ‘parenthood’ and filling 
the role of ‘parent’. The authority for realising parenthood would be the legislation 
regulating the field of births, deaths and marriages. The chart shows a line from 
the role of parent to referring agency and the arrowhead indicates that this is a 
normative and not an ontological relationship.
The key affordance of ‘referring agency’ has Barking as its antecedent and 
the SPS as its authority. The responsibility for determining what shall constitute 
a referring agency in principle and in practice belongs to the SPS, acting on behalf 
of the whole authority in this respect. The SPS has created this universal to 
facilitate the way it wants to handle the behavioural problems in the Borough. We 
might present this as an excellent example of one of the fundamental tenets of 
NORMA: that the world is composed of agents who define the world in the way 
that they are prepared to take responsibility for. In addition to schools and parents 
as referring agencies, we find also Further Education Colleges, Youth Training 
Schemes, Child and Family Centres and Officers of the Education Authority. The 
jurisdiction for referral decisions differs according to the referring agency, and could 
range from the team psychologist or the senior psychologist with responsibility for 
the SSU, to the principal psychologist.
Referring Agency Decision made by
Schools Team Psychologist
Parents
Child and Family Centres
Youth Training Schemes Senior Psychologist for SSU
Further Education Colleges 
Social Services
Education Officers Principal Psychologist
These constitute a series of simple norms governing the individuation of the agent 
responsible for deciding on whether a referral should be accepted or not. Custom 
and practice have developed so that the more mundane the referral agency the more 
the agent responsible for making the decision will be found lower down the 
hierarchy of the SPS.
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Referring agencies must denote to the SPS a ‘key worker’, or contact person, 
who will act as the representative to the SPS. For instance in a primary school 
with a dozen teachers this will often be the Headteacher, since there is little non­
teaching time available for teachers to undertake this work. In secondary schools 
the key worker may be one of the pastoral team1, a Head of Year or a Deputy 
Head. This person then becomes the main point of communication between the SPS 
and the school. Usually the referring agency has to give prior commitment to allow 
the key worker to take part in training courses run by the SPS. Given previous 
experiences of schools that waste resources by not adhering to the procedures 
established, and the key worker must notify the problem in the manner specified, 
or else the school runs the risk of not receiving help with troublesome pupils.
One final piece in the mosaic of the organisational structure is the student 
who attends the school. The relationship
attends(person# school#)
may be begging the question: can a non-attender be attending a school? Perhaps 
the term ‘enrolled at’ might be suggested but this tends to reflect the 
communication act of enrolling, which marks the start of the student attending a 
school. There are cases of students attending school without being enrolled there, 
and the bureaucratic aspects of the question remaining unresolved for some time. 
In practice the decision to refer a student will be taken by the same authority, that 
is the school, that decides whether the person normally attends, or should attend.
Identifying problems and seeking help
The SPS classifies the problems that it handles in three groups: learning, attendance 
and behaviour. Problems are identified in four ways: screening, complaint, Court 
Care Orders and attendance.
• Screening is a process of testing at set times in the life cycle of the 
student such skills as reading and writing. Often the transitions from primary to
1 Those teachers appointed not to posts of academic responsibility but to posts concerning the overall welfare of 
students, normally in the larger schools.
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secondary school occasions such procedures, however new legislation is introducing 
compulsory testing at set times in the student’s school career. Screening generally 
reveals learning rather than behaviour problems.
• Another rich vein of problems is revealed in the form of complaints 
within the agency. These may originate from subject teachers, dinner ladies, parents 
neighbours, or shopkeepers in the vicinity, all of whom may lodge such complaints 
about students with the school.
• Delinquent behaviour may be revealed by incidents involving the police 
and court, or it may go as far as a Court Care Order and the school will be 
formally involved.
• Poor attendance figures often constitute a signal of a problem and may 
be brought to light through the work of the Education and Welfare Officers of the 
form teacher who takes the register.
Although the SPS attempts to separate these problem of learning, behaviour and 
attendance for the sake of administrative convenience, in practice these three interact 
with one another and it can be difficult to separate them. In theory the behaviour 
problems will eventually involve the SSU, whilst ‘pure* learning problems could rest 
with the team psychologist and the remedial reading teacher. However the SSU will 
often be involved in these latter problems.
It is possible to specify the problem quantitatively, where an agent sets a 
standard measure and a value as determiner of the problem threshold. For example 
a figure of attendance of less than 75% might be so defined. However in all cases 
the view of the professionals has to be sought to assess whether this is a ‘suitable 
case for treatment*. Given the history of the student of the proximity of leaving, it 
may be that what would normally constitute a referral case is in fact left alone. 
Many teachers in inner city schools will recall instances of older truants well 
ensconced in paid employment who are simply left alone. The sheer numbers of 
attendance problems in some schools necessitates this kind of selection, given the 
limited resources.
What is clear is that the nature of a ‘problem* is highly contextual and 
determined only by the agents on the scene. Different schools in the same street 
will hold different views about what constitutes a problem. Ontologically the
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problem is an affordance of the person (in the role as student, in the ‘attends’ 
relationship). The authority judging the existence of the problem will be the 
referring agency itself:
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
person state
P. Johnson UK
bvr.problem person
bvr.problem PJohnson
Entries one and three are the universals and two and four are entries for 
realisations. In making the referral to the SPS the referring agency performs a 
communication act (Searle 1969). These acts for NORMA have two antecedents, 
the agent performing the act and a sign. For ‘refers’ in our schema we have as 
antecedents the referring agency and a sign that signifies the problem, giving:
refers(refening agency# "problem#(person#)") 
or put as a record:
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
refers Parsloes Manor School "behaviour problem#
(Peter Johnson)"
NORMA’s specification method permits the content of the communication act to be 
specified at the level of meaning and intention (pragmatics and semantics) without 
involving us in the detail of the language or syntax (syntactics), nor the codes or 
signals (empirics), nor yet the physical medium employed in the signalling of the 
communication.
Custom and practice has resulted in five different methods being used for 
executing the referral act: the Referral Enquiry Form, a telephone call, a meeting 
held at the school, a letter and a personal visit to Seabrook House where the SPS 
is based. The insistence by the SPS on using the Referral Enquiry Form as the 
complex sign used in performing the referral act is well founded. The Form 
contains questions which require the agency to approach parents and involve them 
in the problem. This ensures that the opinions of the parents emerge and are thus 
considered by the professionals involved. If other notification procedures are used,
9 9
Chapter 5: Schools Support Unit
the team psychologist will ensure that this stage has been reached before accepting 
the referral.
The Referral Enquiry Form constitutes part of the Borough of Barking’s 
implementation of the 1981 Education Act It forms part of a procedure specified 
in the Guide for Head Teachers on Special Education Provision, known informally 
as the "Little Red Book". One of the intentions of the Act was to move away from 
the labelling of problem children, with its attendant dangers of ‘giving a dog a bad 
name ...’ and work towards a more fluid definition of the variety of problems 
encountered and towards special provisions that might be arranged. The procedure 
also aims at giving parents details of professional views about their children’s 
problems and at giving them the opportunity to express an opinion on the 
appropriateness of the provision made for their children. For these reasons the 
Referral Enquiry Form requires that the school set out in some detail what its view 
of the problem is and what actions to date they have taken. The Form provides the 
school with its method of notification. The person responsible in the school will 
already know who is the team psychologist for the area in which the school is 
sited, as this jurisdiction is specified by the SPS. The completion and dispatching 
of the Form amounts to a formal ‘referral’.
A telephone call is an informal approach which is more often employed by 
Social Services, or the Child and Family Centre, whilst the bulk of referrals will 
come from schools using the Referral Enquiry Form. There may be problems 
which are outside those for which the Form was designed. Occasionally a school 
may experience a crisis in a behavioural problem and resort to this method. The 
call may be received by any member of the staff at Seabrook House (where the 
offices of the SPS are sited), but the team psychologist is the only person to 
commit the SPS to a referral. In most cases this mean further information needs 
to be obtained and will result in the completion of the Form or a face-to-face 
meeting.
In some of the teams, the psychologists have adopted a procedure of a 
meeting as a method of notifying problems. Meetings are held in school, on a 
regular basis, of staff responsible for behavioural or pastoral problems. At these 
meetings formal referrals can be made and the necessary information gleaned.
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Sufficient information may be contained in a simple letter to obviate the 
need for further formalities: this is also considered as sufficient for a referral. Very 
occasionally the parents might present themselves in person, with or without the 
child, at the offices of the SPS. Such actions are usually symptomatic of tense 
relationships and the case is generally viewed sympathetically.
The SPS can respond in two ways, to refuse or accept. Both these are 
communication acts and make use of signs in the same way. Take ‘accepts* for 
example:
accepts(SPS lfrefers(referring agency# "problem#(person#)")")
In this case the second antecedent of ‘accepts* is a complex sign that signifies the 
original referral, itself incorporating a sign.
Tackling the problem
In deciding to accept a problem referred to the SPS from a school, the psychologist 
will weigh a number of factors: has the proper referral procedure been complied 
with? has the school cooperated before with the SPS? has the family had dealings 
with the SPS before? how severe is the problem? To find the answers to these 
questions the psychologist will consult the Referral Enquiry Form, the past records 
of the SPS and the referring agency directly. If we consider the record for the 
‘accepts’ affordance:
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
accepts SPS "referral"
then the criteria for accepting a referral, located at the ‘Authority for Start* field, 
are embodied in the often complex norms developed over the years and exemplified 
in the questions above that the team psychologist will be considering. For the 
referral from an Education Officer, the Principal Psychologist will be examining 
other factors, some of which will concern the strategic and political matters 
undoubtedly exercising his/her mind.
Accepting the referral triggers off the start of an instance of ‘case*. The 
term ‘case*, common in professional circles, should not be confused with the
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problem of the disruptive student, but rather refers to a entity which is handled by 
the organisation, and reflects the organisation’s commitment to resolve the 
substantive problem. A case is not coterminous with the problem it concerns, and 
this fact is recognised when the SPS considers whether to continue the case (see 
below). For Peter Johnson’s behavioural problem the school involved, Parsloes 
Manor, referred the case to their team psychologist,
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
accepts SPS "referral" (Peter Johnson)
and once the team psychologist has accepted the case, the SPS will seek the 
cooperation of the SSU, generally where the problem is behavioural rather than 
learning, giving the affordance ‘cooperates on’:
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
cooperates on SSU case#
The cooperation of the SSU is not automatic and the Head of the SSU has 
the options of accepting and beginning the cooperation on the lines suggested by 
the psychologist, accepting but postponing commencement, accepting but requesting 
a different approach, or refusing altogether, subject to the final decision of the 
Principal Psychologist. In deciding which of the responses to choose, the Head of 
the Unit will first assess the problem and the embryonic strategy outlined to him/her 
by the psychologist. The factors for consideration are fivefold:
a. the present number of current cases (both quantitative and qualitative
commitment);
b. the number of staff available;
c. whether the involvement is likely to be productive (eg. competence to deal
with the problem, degree of support available);
d. whether the psychologist’s strategy suits the SSU approach;
e. the long term implication of setting precedents, in particular implying
future commitments.
We can see these elements as part of the decision making framework and in 
NORMA they provide the basic structure for the norms that govern the committing 
of resources to particular problems and hence to which institutions, or for the most 
part, which schools.
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Once again we draw attention to the role of the authority concerned in 
determining the existence of phenomena: the cooperation of the SSU in resolving 
the substantive problems facing students and schools is something which the SSU 
controls. NORMA allows us gradually to unfold this complex interactive and 
subjective reality and directs us to ask key questions where information may not be 
available at first sight.
We now turn to look at the development of methods for tackling the 
substantive problems. It is important to avoid the notion of a cookbook of recipes 
capable of handling problems which arise. Instead we can distinguish broad 
philosophical approaches to the problems and more detailed techniques which 
professionals select to deal with particular cases. The general direction chosen 
derives from several influences such as: past cases handled by the SPS/SSU, 
informal and formal discussions between professional groups, courses, specialist 
literature, visits to other institutions and discussions with colleagues from other 
authorities. The Head of the SSU2 must initiate a detailed programme to deal with 
the case, and the first step is to allocate operational responsibility to a member of 
staff:
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
allocates person# case#
The Head of the SSU will base the decision about whom to allocate the case upon 
three elements: existing commitments of staff; existence of successful relations 
between referring agency and staff; level of staff expertise in relation to case. In 
the first case where the member of staff already has a burgeoning caseload then it 
may be unwise to add to the burden. In the second case where there has been 
successful interaction previously then it is advisable to maintain the relationship. 
Lastly some problems require particular expertise and experience and therefore 
certain members of staff are either more or less suited, as the case may be.
We do not make one of the antecedents of ‘allocates* the role ‘Support 
Teacher* since the offices may change form time to time but the ‘person* and 
‘case’ will endure. To include what amounts to an organisational rule into the
2 The Head of the SSU will base the decision upon three elements: existing commitments of staff; existence of 
successful relations between referring agency and staff; level of staff expertise in relation to case.
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structure of the schema would lay it open to instability when the business, or 
service, alters its method of organisation.
To deal with the behavioural problem, the SSU uses the technique of a 
‘Behaviour Management Programme’ (BMP), which for NORMA amounts to a set 
of norms of behaviour, to which the various parties involved must follow whether 
they be students, schools parents or the SSU itself. In effect the agents involved 
agree to a ‘contract* which specifies their behaviour for the coming period, with an 
eye on improving the problem. The SSU develops a BMP for each problem that 
it has accepted as a case, but we do not make the BMP ontologically dependent 
upon a problem; as a norm it can exist even when there is no problem at all. 
Using the structure:
developed for (BMP# problem#)
rather than
developed for (BMP# case#)
we underline that the BMP is aimed at changing the perceived behaviour and not 
the administrative entity that has been developed to expedite the amelioration.
The BMP might include the student attending the SSU centre for a period 
and undertaking to improve his behaviour/attendance at school etc, perhaps the 
parents undertake to reward good behaviour in some specified way (a reward in the 
estimation of the student), and maybe the school has to make some adjustment in 
the timetable of the student, such as offering another practical subject or simply 
changing the subject teacher. Critical to the success of the approach is the 
vigilance of parties involved in monitoring the outcome of the changes and making, 
as necessary, adjustments to the BMP.
To induce schools to follow programmes and procedures established, the 
SPS/SSU can offer certain ‘carrots*. For example, as part of the programme the 
student is obliged to attend Seabrook House, thus freeing the teacher from dealing 
with a disruptive element for that time. The other side of this coin is that if the 
school does not follow procedures laid down, the student can be required to remain
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at school. Given that the school has asked for help the SPS has a strong hand in 
obtaining compliance with monitoring.
Part of the control is exercised by the regular meetings of the teams to 
review the case. Each case has a six-week review meeting which in effect provides 
one parameter of measurement of the effectiveness of the BMP. The SPS/SSU is 
measuring the extent of the behaviour modification against this dmescale. In 
addition the SSU Head, the Senior Psychologist with responsibility for the SSU and 
the teacher on the case will meet weekly to briefly review developments.
The decision to close a case, that is to withdraw further support is a delicate 
one. Limitations on resources do not permit open-ended commitment, neither can 
a school be encouraged to shirk its own responsibilities. The weekly or six-weekly 
meeting provides the setting for such decisions. Consultations between the 
psychologist and the referring agency will have taken place beforehand. Deciding 
to close a case provides the ‘Finish’ field in the NORMA record for a given case:
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
case 543 SPS
and also for many of the other realisations in the schema, including ‘allocated’, 
‘concerns’, ‘cooperates on’. On deciding to close a case the team psychologist will 
write to the referring agency and to the parents to inform them, and the SSU will 
inform the student orally. These activities constitute part of the communication 
system and do not concern primarily this analysis, which is attempting to elicit the 
substantive system, but these messages and their specifying would be the main 
concern of a traditional specification method, concentrating as it would upon the 
dataflow and not what the data refer to. This is not out of ‘wrongheadedness’ but 
simply the logic that is dictated by the tools available for tackling the problem.
Summary of SPS case
This case is different from the other two dealt with in this work in one important 
way: its informality. Investigations into the organisation of work in the SPS and 
SSU revealed almost no written procedures to describe how the information system 
is structured. Ways of working had been carefully developed over some years by 
a small group of professionals, who were close to each other both in physical and
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intellectual rapport. The nature of the accommodation allocated to the group 
accounted for the former and the methods used for recruitment explained the latter. 
Consequently the rules governing the Service were embodied in the informal norms 
that have been referred to in this report. The strong informal system ensured that 
new recruits were quickly initiated into the operational methods, with great stress 
being placed upon the responsibility of each member to undertake his duties in an 
appropriate manner.
It is difficult to envisage how traditional dataflow methods could have 
adequately specified this system in any other than a trivial fashion. The message 
passing and record keeping approach would not have disclosed the intricate network 
of responsibility which characterised the true fabric of this organisation.
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Italian welfare
The subject of this analysis is the Istituto Nazionale Confederazione Assistenza 
(INCA). INCA is an example of a ‘patronato’ of the Italian state which has the 
status of a protagonist in affairs of legal contestation, and is an affordance of 
‘state’. The concept of patronato is peculiar to Italy, being a kind of charitable 
organisation recognised and licensed by the state to act of behalf of citizens in the 
pursuit of their various claims upon the state and its departments. In general they 
are institutions sponsored by trade union and religious bodies and reflect the 
spectrum of political life in Italian public affairs. In the Rome province there were 
in July 1989 twenty recognised patronati operating.
Ontology of state
In our study of the CRIS case in Chapter 7 we also confront the question of how 
to handle the notions of ‘state’, ‘nation* and ‘Society’, and these are dealt with in 
some detail there. INCA encounters a large number of different state bureaucracies 
in the course of helping its clients. In a formal legalistic system such as one dealing 
with pension rights, it is no surprise that the state as an institution underpins most 
of the realisations. To complete the schema entry for the state of Italy, we should 
include the start date. But this may not be simple.
Prior to 1860 there was no state of Italy as such, instead there had been a 
variety of political entities including the Kingdom of the two Sicilies, the Papal 
States and the Kingdom of Piedmont Certainly we can point to the existence of 
an Italian nation, albeit divided amongst these different political structures, but the 
start of Italy as a state we might date formally to the stirring events surrounding 
the unification movement and Garibaldi’s thousand heroes. For many emerging 
nation-states the business of when the start date can be authoritatively attributed 
depends upon such diplomatic matters as who is doing the recognition, that is, 
whose authority is being sought. However for the people involved in those events 
most certainly Italy was a reality long before the ink dried on Cavour’s signature.
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In the same way for nationalists fighting today, say in Palestine, the nation already 
exists, just as it did for their Zionist predecessors in the same part of the world, 
earlier in this century.
At this very fundamental level we find it difficult to discern and identify a 
single social agent as authority to which to attribute this subjective reality, and this 
reflects the problems experienced in the world of international law and politics 
when those same issues are addressed. What we experience is a conflict in 
meaning, rooted in the conflicting jurisdictions. When Lithuania states that it is a 
sovereign state and the Soviet Union disagrees we can only conclude that the 
ultimate resolution of the conflict is a singularly political matter. In general we 
would hope to avoid being drawn into this quagmire if possible, but at least we do 
have a method of attacking such a thorny problem, should it be necessary.
Ontology of person
In obtaining their pension and other welfare rights, persons who have contributed 
to state schemes will have to be recognised by those state departments. Part of the 
bureaucratic activity will be to ensure that the person for whom the department has 
received contributions is in fact the self-same person who has made a claim and to 
whom the funds will be paid. Much of this work consists in the presenting of 
state-recognised certificates: certificate di residenza (certificate of residence), 
certificate di nascita (birth certificate), certificate di congedo (demobilisation 
certificate), and so on. The department will generally recognise this person 
uniquely in its own formal system by means of an arbitrary number allocated to 
each person at the outset of the obligation undertaken. In the United Kingdom this 
is the ‘National Insurance Number’, and in Italy the ‘numero di matricola*. 
In Figure 6.1 we illustrate a first cut at specifying the schema for this part of the 
problem. We see that both ‘department’ and ‘patronato* have ‘person’ as 
affordances. How can that be? Surely we are dealing in any case with the same 
person. Once again we confront a problem of ontology. A department has to 
establish the identity of the person with whom it has an obligation, but the 
existence of that person is not dependent upon the department We cannot specify 
a ‘person* as an affordance of ‘department’ for this reason. Our principle of
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department
/state
jjerson/ NINO.
patronato#. 
person#s^
#iname
Figure 6.1 first cut at problem
ontological antecedence guides us to the representation in Figure 6.2.
epartment
bligation#
tate#
NINo.Society person
atronato#
Figure 6.2 applying principle of ontological antecedence
The reason for making ‘person’ dependent on ‘Society’ is another tricky point, but 
we may note in passing the help provided by the application of the principle. If 
the state of Italy ceases to exist, it does not follow that instances of ‘person’ cease 
also. For ‘Society’ however this does hold.
Authority for ‘person’
The antecedent of person may not give a clue to the authority for determining the 
existence of any particular person. We can take it that Society can recognise 
persons without much difficulty, however the departments of state need to establish
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beyond reasonable doubt that the particular person making the claim for a pension, 
for example, is the actual person with whom the department has an obligation. The 
department will have a number of tests for the identity, mostly concerning the 
production of official documents. This matter concerns not ontology but authority: 
they should not be confused.
NORMA prompts us to search for the agents responsible for determination 
of existence. A number of complex administrative rules will regulate this process 
but ultimately the decision of whether to recognise a particular person as the one 
with the rights will fall to an individual or group of individuals. For instance in 
obtaining the certificate of residence from the Italian consulate, the person 
concerned will have to convince the member of staff responsible (addetto ai 
passaporti) that they in fact reside normally in the United Kingdom. Where people 
are continually coming and going between the UK and Italy, this may not be so 
simple as it might appear. Although appeals do occur, in practice the person 
responsible has almost total power of decision. In this manner it becomes evident 
the way that this formalism rests ultimately upon the informal system of human 
agents for the validation and integrity of what is recorded.
Establishing existence of realisations: Starts and Finishes
In much of the documentation of the casework surrounding the claim for pensions 
and other welfare rights, the various significant dates in the life of a person, such 
as birth and death, are very important in ascertaining eligibilities1. For NORMA 
these are can be referred to as the start and finish dates of the various affordances. 
Other terms have come into the language to denote such starts and finishes as in 
wedding:start of marriage; divorce, annulment (or death of spouse): finish of 
marriage; inauguration: start of term of office; registration: start of period of 
studentship, graduation: finish of term of (undergraduate) studentship;
commencement: start of contract, expiry: finish of contract. For these cases we can
1 DHSS Form CF(N)1278, for example, used for making the pension claim, has several questions on various dates: la. 
date of birth, 3(4) date of pension commencement, and 3(3) ceasing, and 4(2) date of marriage.
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use the ‘start* and ‘finish’ fields in our NORMA record to refer to these points in 
the existence of the realisations2.
Causal and ontological dependency
The notion of ‘married name’ has to be handled somewhere in the schema and 
would be introduced as a further possible identifier. However, whereas in Italy a 
married woman retains her own surname, in the United Kingdom in general a 
woman assumes the surname of her husband.
Marriage, a relationship between two persons, is an affordance with two 
antecedents, a joint affordance, which as mentioned previously starts with a wedding 
and finishes with death, divorce or annulment. The married name does not 
necessarily depend upon the existence of the marriage, since it may be retained after 
the end of the marriage. A widow or divorcee does not have to relinquish her 
married name.
We have to distinguish the causal relationship from the ontological. While 
we may be sure that the acquisition of a married name is occasioned by marriage, 
the relationship is purely causal. Indeed there is no requirement for the woman to 
use the married name, even in the United Kingdom.
The role of ‘spouse’ is instantiated when there is an instance of a marriage 
and, ontologically, an instance of ‘spouse’ depends upon an instance of ‘married’ 
and an instance of ‘person’. Referring to the number of antecedence (ie. whether 
antecedentl or antecedent), we may use the role name of ‘spouse* when 
manipulating the knowledge base. Using the role names in this way, as they are 
used in natural language, we can access the power and economy of this device in 
common parlance. For example we can discover who is a spouse who lives in 14 
Via Appia by directly manipulating the records of ‘spouse’ and those for ‘dwelling*.
Nationality and residence ontological questions
Nationality is conferred upon a person by a state and it may not even be exclusive: 
it is possible to hold two nationalities at the same time. Once again we have two
2 See Chapter 11 for discussion of research agenda in this particular area.
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antecedents for an affordance: an instance of ‘nationality* requires a ‘person* and 
a ‘state* to be in existence before it can exist.
Where a person is bom is a piece of information requested frequently in this 
type of casework and the affordance ‘in* with antecedents of ‘person* and ‘comune* 
seems to be the best way to present this relationship. We can contrast this with 
the notion of being resident in a particular place since this is a special concept with 
regard to taxation and voting rights. Italians who are working abroad but retain 
their residence for electoral purposes in their comune in Italy have the right to vote 
in the local municipal elections in Italy; if they transfer their residence to the UK, 
then they lose the right to vote in municipal elections, but can still vote for Italian 
national and European Community elections at polling stations organised in the UK 
by the Italian government.
For taxation purposes, an Italian (or foreign national) may be eligible to 
retain their domicile in Italy (or country of nationality) while being resident in the 
UK. This arrangement alters the tax liability considerably. The point here is that 
the term ‘resident* or ‘resident in* is extremely ambiguous and has no single 
meaning. The significance depends upon the context in which it used, and the 
authority or criteria which is being applied at that time. This must be spelt out in 
the ‘Authority’ fields, which for convenience are included only in the full Appendix 
C table. As far as the UK’s Inland Revenue is concerned Mario Rossi is resident 
in 14 Via Appia Roma. Perhaps for other purposes he is considered to be resident 
at 114, Holloway Road, N7. The possible illegality of this arrangement is for Sig. 
Rossi and the relevant authority to discover.
State, department and scheme
Hitherto we have not introduced the notion of ‘scheme’, and here we do so. In 
differentiating between ‘scheme’ and ‘department’, we are stressing the distinction 
between the bureaucratic structure designed to carry out the instructions of 
Parliament, and the creation of complex legal abstractions under which citizens 
enjoy their rights. The welfare state has been responsible for the introduction of 
many such schemes, although INCA is principally concerned with pensions and 
social insurance. Departments that have administered such schemes have come and
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gone but the obligations created have remained. In this way we may set out the 
ontology of this area as shown in Figure 6.3.
department-
dm in isters
s ta te#
sc h em e bligation#
pension
national in su rance  
etc.e rso n #
figure 6.3 schemes and obligations
The question of who administers the scheme is not fixed in any ontological fashion. 
Conceivably the responsibility for administration could be shifted to other state 
departments or private businesses, as in the case of portable pensions.
Schema and data
The starts and finishes of departments are more easily determined than those of 
state, since they usually come into existence by means of legislation. In fact their 
substantive functions are often prescribed by specific pieces of legislation, which 
they exist to implement. In the case of the DHSS some 30 separate legislative acts 
circumscribe its work.
A problem may arise here for analysts in the understandable attempt to find 
a schematic basis for the data. We would like to define a schema from the terms 
used in describing the Italian welfare system that may also serve to record data 
from the British system. What is interesting here is that while we may view the 
Italian department, INPS, as parallel to the DHSS, there is one way in which the 
INPS is different: unlike the DHSS, the INPS does not handle industrial injuries, 
there is another state department for this work in Italy, the Isdtuto Nazionale
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Assistenza Infortuni al Lavoro (INAIL). Given that we are able to separate the 
schemes administered by different departments (see Figure 6.3), we can comfortably 
handle these differences in administrative function. The correlations between the 
various bodies have been carefully established by joint agreements over the recent 
years under the aegis of the European Community.
From universal to particular
In general we want to produce a schema which contains only universals, so that in 
this way it may address the general requirements of a range of similar but 
individually different user problems. A schema for one airline should support the 
work of another airline also; and a schema for one country’s social and welfare 
apparatus should support another. But occasionally there are universals whose 
antecedents are particulars. A particular reality produces universals which are 
peculiar to it alone. In nationality law, for example, perhaps the United Kingdom 
is the only state to have developed the notion of ‘patriality’, introduced in the 1981 
Nationality Act, whereby rights to nationality are traced back through two 
generations.
statefltaly- - - - - - - - - - - - - patronato!
Figure 6.4 particular as antecedent to universal
In specifying ‘patronato’ as an affordance of ‘state’ we would be creating 
the idea that every state has such institutions, whereas from our British experience 
we know this to be false. Therefore we must show the particular state of Italy to 
be the antecedent of ‘patronato*, rather than the universal ‘state’.
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Postal and telephonic addresses: norms and names
In this section we turn to look at the problems raised in handling signs types, 
whether postal and telephonic addresses or the names used by different institutions 
to refer to schemes for national insurance in the two countries.
To expedite business by post and telephone we must handle the questions 
posed by addresses and telephone numbers. In all countries today we expect to find 
a postal authority, which may also be responsible for the telephone and telegraphic 
system, commonly referred to on the Continent as the PTT. These bodies were 
created by the states and their starts may be found in the particular legislation that 
gave them this legal status. Recently there have been reorganisations in many states 
which have separated the two functions and given them to different parastatal 
bodies. In the United Kingdom British Telecom was separate from the General 
Post Office in the Seventies, while in Italy the SIP was created from the Poste 
Italiane a little later.
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
PTT state
British Telecom UK
SIP Italy
These organisations control the sending of messages to their destination addresses. 
The addresses, whether postal or telephonic, are affordances of these bodies. A 
particular telephone number or postal address does not depend for its existence upon 
the addressee or subscriber —they are ontologically independent of each other. 
When telephone codes are rearranged or street numbers reassigned then the 
antecedence of the postal and telephonic authorities becomes apparent. For decades 
the telephone code 01 referred to the whole of Greater London area, but after the 
6th of May 1990 the codes of 081 and 071 were used to refer to Inner London and 
Outer London respectively. What constitutes Inner and Outer London for this 
purpose is defined by British Telecom, and differs from how these terms are used 
in other contexts, say, in the salary allowances for the staff of the Midland Bank 
or the Metropolitan Police.
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
tel. no. PTT
076331192 SIP
014057686 British Telecom
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Here we have the record for the affordance ‘tel. no.’ and it has as both its 
antecedent and agent responsible the PTT of the country. The other records 
indicate the existence of particular numbers, in the two countries. In the UK we 
could possible have Mercury instead of BT, but the structure in any case does not 
depend upon a rule of one telephone company only. However the relation between 
the addresses (and telephone numbers) and the person to be found at those 
addresses has to modeled and we can use for the telephone number the term 
‘contactable on*, far less elegant that its equivalent in Italian of ‘recapito*.
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent!
contactable on person telephone number
contactable on Mario Rossi 076331192
contactable on Redvers Bulwer 014057686
We should analyse in a little more detail the relationship of ‘telephone 
number* to ‘person*. It is only by convention that a given telephone number 
permits contact with a given person. By the same convention a given person would 
be located in a given room or office and here would be found the telephone. The
p e rs o n
4 js e s
o n ta c ta b le  o nte le p h o n e  h a n d s e t
I lo c a te d
P T T #  # te l. no.'
Figure 6.5 separating elements of telephonic addresses
advent of mobile telephones undermines this logic. A given number will be used 
to contact (a) particular telephone(s), and the proximity of the person to that handset 
will enable the call to be taken.
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In Figure 6.5 the rule of ontology forces the different elements involved in a 
telephonic address to be separated out. The convention or norm referred to above 
would read something like:
contactable on (person# #tel.no.) <—
while (allocated (#tel.no. handset#) 
while (uses (person# handset#)
This would translate into English roughly as: ‘when a person uses (normally) a 
telephone with a particular number, then that person can be contacted on that 
number*. In the schema the occurrences of each of these universals would be 
recorded without losing any information should, for example, the person change 
their telephone number.
Provinces and codes
A similar kind of problem is encountered with postal and other similar codes. In 
each case we have a sign type, normally a mixture of letters and numbers, which 
in a given context refers to particular geographical locations and administrative 
entities. This is the classic case of relating a sign type to its referent. An agent 
uses a sign, in given circumstances, to reconstruct in semiological terms the world 
of experience. Instead of inventing codes one could use the full name to refer to 
the realisation, but codes are designed for their efficiency and, used in their 
intended context, are more efficient.
Italy has over twenty regions and each region is divided into between three 
to five provinces. Each has a code of two letters (except for Roma, which keeps 
its full name). The code and the province it refers to are not dependent upon each 
other, the connection between them is established by the state and is specified here 
as ‘represents*. Conceivably the same code might be used to refer to other entities. 
The connection between them is strong because of consistent usage and 
reinforcement, much as we find with, say London postal districts. Thus there are 
provinces and codes:
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Affordance
province
Rieti
Milano
Antecedentl
region
Lazio
Lombardia
Antecedent
Affordance
code
RI
MI
Italy
Italy
Antecedentl
state
Antecedent
and tying them together we have the ‘represents* affordance.
Affordance
represents
represents
represents
Antecedentl
code
RI
MI
Antecedent
province
Rieti
Milano
Coordinating different schemes
Strangely enough similar questions dog the analysis for the schema for the various 
norms governing the various social welfare rights in the two countries. In 
discharging its responsibilities under obligations to contributors to pension schemes 
and the like, each state department has a series of norms or regulations which 
govern the accepting of the claims and the eventual payments. Each norm is a 
complex sign for the behaviours required in the handling of pension schemes, so 
that ‘retirement pension’ is the name of norm governing the discharging of the 
DHSS obligations in that specific area. In determining each instance of an 
obligation the authority which is used is the norm or piece of legislation governing 
that particular claim.
To simplify the problems of handling the joint jurisdictions, whereby a 
person has pension rights under Italian and UK schemes and so avoid any 
overpayments, the two states have agreed a schedule known as Tabella A/B/C which 
places into categories the various obligations in the two jurisdictions. International 
agreement between the two administrations establishes the matching of one country’s 
norms to the other’s. In this way the notion of ‘subsumes* has been created, 
whereby one norm can be said to subsume another (see Figure 6.6 ).
Let us take the particular example of the pensione di invaliditd —the name 
of the norm under which the Italian state, through its department of INPS, controls 
the fulfilling of obligations entered into in the area of invalidity pensions. Roughly
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lopartm «nt#DH SS— norm #invalid ity  pansl
lapartm ant#INPS— n o rm # p a n sio n a  di invalidfta*
itronato#INCA. -norm#A
Figure 6.6 norms subsuming other norms
speaking the British counterpart would be the invalidity pension, although great 
caution is urged since the norms are very different, and cases that pass as suitable 
for the pension in Italy are often viewed with more scepticism in the UK. For the 
INCA organisation these two different norms have to be reconciled, at least in the 
language used to expedite the cases that they give rise to, and the norm A1 
subsumes both.
INCA has taken these categories and used them to refer to the various 
obligations contained therein. INCA in its turn has norms that govern the way their 
organisation processes the handling of the claims for the rights referred to in the 
departments’s norms. These norms are the affondances of INCA —they do not 
depend upon the departments’ rules for examining claims. They relate directly to 
them, and participate with them in a ‘subsumes’ affordance.
The INCA norms, labelled A, B or C plus a number as in A 1 above, are 
drawn from the categories agreed by the Italian and British Departments in 1978, 
and for INCA they have the function of establishing degrees of difficulty associated 
with the obtaining of the pension or right. The INCA norm associated with A5 
equates the British ‘old person’s pension* with the Italian ‘pensione sociale’.
By separating the norms according to their ontological antecedence, we can 
specify them as functionally independent of each other. Where the agents
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epartm ent
dm inisterss ta te#
obligation________
pensionnational insurance etc.
chem e
erson#
orm su b su m e s
ubsum esatronato#
Figure 6.7 obligations and controlling norms
responsible decide that one norm subsumes another then this can be reflected in the 
schema. Even when this is no longer the case, the underlying structure of the 
schema is not jeopardised in any way. It remains stable and able to cope with the 
dynamics of international agreements that govern this domain.
Wholes, parts and affordances
Italy is divided, historically, culturally and administratively, into regions and 
provinces, currently 20 and 96 respectively. We make the regions ontologically 
dependent upon the state, given that we are referring to the administrative 
topography of the country, and that the state retains the right to create and abolish 
these entities. Take for example the creation of the region of Basilicata and the 
abolition of Lucania. In the United Kingdom we have more recent experience of 
the abolition of such entities as the county of Huntingdon and the Soke of 
Peterborough, Rutland and the Ridings of Yorkshire, and the creation of 
Humberside, Avon and Cleveland. This is a problematic question matter however, 
if we consider the history of the state of Italy, regions such as Lazio (Latium) go 
back considerably further in time.
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Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
region state
Lazio Italy
Lombardia Italy
When we reach the level of the smallest administrative unit, i.e. town or 
‘comune’, we confront the same dilemma as for the region. Is the town,
ontologically dependent upon the structures superior to it administratively? If the 
region for some reason finishes, does the existence of the town finish? History 
suggests that some of the towns in Italy have considerably greater longevity as 
cultural entities than the province or region, yet as part of the administrative 
structure they do not have an independent existence. For example the town of 
Poggio Mirteto, now in the province of Rieti in the region of Lazio was, prior to 
Fascism, in the province of Perugia in the region of Umbria, not a physical change 
but an administrative one.
r o v ln c e #
c o m u n e #
street#
Iw ellln g#
e s ld e n t  at
p ersons
Figure 6.8 dissecting the administrative structure
In deciding whether we are dealing with a part or an affordance, we must 
determine whether the antecedent is constituted of parts of the candidate affordance 
or whether the candidate affordance is something that may or may not be realised 
by the antecedent. Viewed from the point of administrative structures a town, a 
region, a county, are all parts of the overarching whole. Viewed as cultural, social
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and economic entities, they may well survive the demise of the state of which that 
they form part.
Finding the right terms
In general we want to adhere to the terms used in the normal discourse when 
developing a semantic schema. However a certain amount of additional terms is 
usually required to flesh out the full schema. In the case of where people live for 
example. Particular houses themselves form part of a street, and besides houses 
there may be apartments, bungalows, villas, cottages, terraces, prefabs, inhabited 
abandoned buses and so on. For the universal that encompasses all these the term 
‘dwelling’ seems to provide the best solution. Here we suggest ‘dwelling* because 
it covers the widest possible number of terms for the particulars of where people 
live. The PTT would be the authority for determining the existence of a particular 
dwelling. Experience has shown that the Post Office is willing to deliver letters 
even to gentlemen of the road who reside regularly at bus shelters. In so doing the 
Post Office is demonstrating its authority over what shall be considered an address.
Given that the structures of ‘region* and ‘province* as realised in Italy do 
not exist in the state of the United Kingdom, we must present these as parts of the 
particular state. However we would expect to find other states which are 
administrated in a similar fashion. The chart showing a section of the schema 
allows us also to record where a person was bom:
in (person# comune#)
Where the start of a realisation of ‘in’ was also the start of the realisation of that 
person then this would be the record of their birth in that comune.
INCA is a structure which exists to provide support mainly to Italian citizens 
engaged in claiming or protecting their rights. The bulk of the work in the British 
section concerns the obtaining of pensions. In addition to pensions there are many 
other benefits which assisted persons seek help and advice about. What universal 
terms can we use to refer to these rights and benefits? Using the notion of a claim 
suggests that the persons claiming feel that the state (or its department) has some
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commitments to them which they have to redeem. So that the notion for which we 
are searching has at any rate two antecedents: ‘person* and ‘scheme*. Perhaps a 
suitable generic term might be ‘obligation*, covering pensions, re-entry grants and 
the like. Many of the assisted persons using the European INCA offices may well 
have worked in more than one other country, depending upon the pattern and 
history of emigration, and it is not unusual for an Italian worker living in London 
who is approaching retirement to have worked and paid contributions in: as a coal 
miner in Toumai, Belgium; as a carworker in Stuttgart, Germany; and as a waiter 
in Soho, London. Therefore there will be several different obligations to obtain 
information upon.
Individuality and identity
In this section we find the question revolving around how to maintain the link 
between a realisation and its surrogate in the database, especially when its name, 
identifier or label has changed. Take a case of a particular dwelling: Flat 4, 100 
Via Roma, Viterbo. This example allows us to examine the problem of using the 
usual label or name as the identifier in any formal system. The record above for 
a realisation of a particular dwelling has the label Flat 4, 100 (Via Roma, Viterbo). 
What happens if the label alters because of a renumbering of the dwellings in a 
street? We will be unable to use this same record if we are also manipulating the 
records in our formal system, using the label or name as an identifier. The identity 
of any realisation does not reside in the label or name used to refer to it, but rests 
in the ability of the agent in the environment to recognise that realisation. We use 
identifiers in our world of signs, in a database perhaps, to recall the surrogate or 
record of that realisation, not the actual entity itself. What we require is a 
surrogate number which every affordance and realisation is given when it is entered 
into our knowledge base, then instead of writing the label or name of the entities 
we are manipulating, we would use this number. We saw how in Chapter 3 how 
the extended relational model (RM/T) uses the device of a surrogate number to 
obviate the difficulty of tracking occurrences by using their external ‘real world* 
identifiers.
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In practice the surrogate number is the internal identifier to the formal
system. So the effect of a renumbering would be
Surr# Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start Finish
87654 flat # Via Roma - Italy Italy 1-5-1987
87655 #4,100 87654 Poste It. Poste It. 1-5-1987 31-8-1988
87656 #4,110 87654 Poste It. Poste It. 1-9-1988
The realisation has not altered, merely its label. To be meticulous we should add 
the name or identifier as another affordance of any affordance that is capable of 
individuation and identification, thus for ‘street*, but not for ‘represents* above. 
These three tuples above record the fact that a particular flat in Via Roma, 
recognised by the surrogate of 87654, had its house/building number for the street 
altered to 100 from 110 on the 1st of September 1988.
It is entirely possible for the same realisation to have different names (cf. 
identifiers) even in an informal system, and at the same time. An example of this 
is the small Dorset village of Shroton (shortened from Sheriffstown), which is also 
known officially as Iweme Courtney. This usage of two names dates from the 
period after the Norman Conquest of Britain, where the Norman-French speaking 
community used the name of the local lord, whilst the Saxon community continued 
in their traditional usage. This dichotomy has survived to today. Two linguistic 
communities will usually employ different signs to refer to the same entity, but 
even so, a single community may use two signs to refer to one concept. A 
merging of the linguistic communities does not always mean the elimination of the 
‘redundant’ term.
Other identifiers
The INCA documentation distinguishes first names, surnames and married names3. 
We have already seen the problems associated with using the usual name or label 
to refer to, in this case, instances of persons realised. We have identified if our 
formal system an instance of a person, by the name of Mario Rossi. This person
3 One example is Modulo V, the form that the assisted person completes and signs which 
provides basic personal details to INCA and also functions as proof of the individual’s agreement 
to agency status. This latter is required by the state departments with whom correspondence will 
take place.
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has a first name and a surname, which we can record as separate affordances of a 
person, who in our formal system is identified by the surrogate number of 53. To 
avoid ambiguities we can use surrogate numbers in the records. Universals also 
have surrogates, so that 58 below records the affordance of a first name for a 
person. Number 59 is the surrogate for an realised first name, the person who is 
represented in the antecedent
Surr# Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start
58 firstname person - state state
59 Mario 53 - Italy Italy 13-6-1922
61 Maria 55 - UK UK 31-2-1934
The instances of these first names starts with the dates in the Start field. Should 
there be a discrepancy between these dates and the Start dates for the persons 
concerned (ie. their birthdates), then this reveals to us the period of time before 
they were christened.
For the surname exactly the same rules apply:
Surr# Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start Finish
64 surname person - state state
65 Rossi 53 - Italy Italy 13-6-1922
68 Potter 67 UK UK 31-2-1934
Should Maria Potter (surrogate number 67) decide to change her surname by 
deed poll to Garibaldi, then the formal system would handle it in the following 
way:
Surr# Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth* Start Finish
68 Potter 67 - UK UK 31-2-1934 31-12-1987
1067 Garibaldi 67 - UK UK 1-1-1988
Putting a date in the ‘Finish* field says that this realisation no longer exists 
for the authority concerned, the state. Of course Maria will not expect other 
linguistic communities, such as her friends at the community centre to immediately 
cease using her former surname. Using this example we may see the ambiguity of 
using the usual name as the identifier for the formal system. If Maria’s surname 
is no longer Potter then, the string ‘Maria Potter’ in the antecedent of the surname 
column does not make much sense any more. At a human level we use names to 
refer in discourse to other persons not present, but we have developed mechanisms
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for recognising the identity of persons which do not depend upon the names they 
use. Put simply, humans can cope with changes in labels, more easily than any 
formal system.
Conclusion
This application was an example of a fairly typical office casework problem. 
The parameters of the problem were well defined, insofar as the scope of work is 
delimited by the exigencies of the statutory obligations binding the assisted persons 
and the various national states. Ambiguities, where they arise, are generally 
resolved by the state departments, either singly or collectively, as in the case of the 
Tabella A/B/C agreements which determined what shall be the counterparts in one 
country to those obligations recognised in another. The ontology chart in Appendix 
C documents the majority of terms required to specify the information system 
requirements.
Another moment when semantic ambiguities and discrepancies come to the 
fore is when the Italian and British administrations differ over how to interpret their 
obligations in the facts of a particular claim. INCA handles cases of invalidity 
benefits where an Italian tribunal will deem a given industrial injury to be equal to 
a fixed percentage of invalidity and this translates to a certain pension entitlement. 
For the same injury the British tribunal will often be less generous in its 
assessment, and the persons assisted will have recourse to INCA for the appeals 
procedure.
In one case which came to light the sitting British judge seemed bent upon 
deeming the person still capable of working, and cited the case of Douglas Bader, 
a famous fighter pilot in the Second World War, who continued flying despite 
having lost a leg in an aerial battle. The defending lawyer then asked if the judge 
would like to be flown in an aeroplane with his client at the controls, vouchsafing 
at the appropriate moment the knowledge that the malady of his client was a heart 
complaint. The appellant won his case.
It is in these instances where uncertainty in the operational meaning for the 
key terms used in the relevant legislation is resolved. NORMA can take such 
questions in its stride quite naturally. There is a place for the authority for each
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term. Where the obligation to a person for invalidity is recognised by the Italian 
authorities, then we can insert them as the relevant authority. We are not faced 
with the impossible task of attempting to define only one permissible signification 
for the term ‘invalid*. Our formalism caters for any responsible agent who 
determines a particular realisation. In general, the various bureaucracies involved 
are able to correspond and reach decisions about claims on the basis of the shared 
understanding of the terminology.
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The CRIS case
In the Comparative Review of Information Systems Methodology (CRIS) example 
the International Federation of Information Processing (IFIP) Working Group 8.1 
undertook to produce for the 1988 Conference (Olle 1982, 1983) a detailed design 
specification for conference organisation, to be used as a model for testing various 
information systems design and analysis methods. In Appendix A is the preamble 
to this specification document. We have taken this, together with the knowledge 
acquired of the functioning of the organisation, as the basic material to be analysed.
The IFIP context
In working our way through the terms used in the problem definition we will 
also be adding in other terms that will be repeated often in this domain: copy, 
version, text, and the like. In so doing the scope of analysis is widened to address 
the larger question of running a conference.
‘IFIP’ is a particular instance of a society and was created as a legal entity 
of the state ‘Switzerland’. Its existence was determined by the laws of that state 
and its legal persona rests upon the existence of that state. Should the state of 
Switzerland cease to exist then so would IFIP as it is presently constituted. At 
the universal level we would look for an antecedent universal (of which Switzerland 
is a particular), such as state or nation.
But what do we mean by nation or state? In the case of a legal person 
such as IFIP, the antecedent must have the power to grant such legal status to its 
affordances, so that the rights that the legal entity enjoys are confirmed and 
guaranteed by the antecedent Similarly the history of France since 1871 has 
produced some five distinct republics, five states in all, but these states were 
arguably based upon the same French nation. Perhaps, then, ‘nation* is the 
antecedent of ‘state’, although persons play roles in both. The role of ‘citizenship’ 
is appropriate for both. In strict legal terms the citizenship of a state is guaranteed
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by its nationality laws. The citizenship of a nation is something more amorphous 
(are German speaking Rumanians citizens of the German nation?), but nevertheless 
substantive.
Behind the affordance of nation there is the most basic of all agents, the root 
agent of all behaviourial affordances, human society in its most general sense. 
Although this may be difficult for analysts to justify introducing into any schema, 
it is indisputably the sine qua non of our legal and social reality. Unfortunately we 
have the confusion of the term ‘society* used for associations of the IFIP kind. We 
will distinguish between them by capitalising for the term for human society in 
general. If the society is organised in a particular manner then it may realise an 
instance of a ‘federation*. Another most fundamental affordance is that of ‘person*, 
which is a ubiquitous term in any organisational specification, and here we make 
‘Society’ in general its antecedent.
rson#
nation#Society
itate#
society#ation#Swiss
state#Sw itzerland
society#! FI P
Figure 7.1 citizenship: nation and state
Affordance Antecedent! Antecedent!
nation Society
state nation
person Society
IFIP Switzerland
society state
federation state
citizenship person nation
citizenship person state
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‘Data processing* is the name of a specific type of learned society, which 
is at the generic level, whilst ‘national’ is a title bestowed upon any society but 
where the bestower remains, always, to be identified. In some cases it may be the 
state of provenance. If an instance of a society finishes, then so do the dependent 
instance of ‘national*. At this juncture we might ponder the choice of the term 
‘society*, since in the IFIP context it could seem very general. The term might be 
used to refer to associations of various kinds: dog lovers, Freemasons, lobby groups 
of all descriptions. For the sense used in the CRIS case, something more narrowly 
focused is required. When a body of academics and practitioners is formed to 
pursue the development of knowledge in their chosen field, perhaps the term 
‘learned society’ might be more appropriate. It conveys more forcefully the nature 
of the work in which IFIP is engaged. A word of warning though: the introduction 
of new terms should be done with great circumspection and with the agreement of 
the users. The term Teamed society* could be seen as a possible alias for ‘society’ 
in the IFIP domain.
AfTordance Antecedentl Antecedent
learned society state
national learned society
data processing society state
The text of the problem definition mentions that IFIP has members from 
"about 40 countries". ‘About 40* is a determinant, where the determiner is 
individuality, that allows the discrimination of a number of countries. This instance 
of measurement will cease to exist if the countries themselves no longer do so. 
‘Country* however is rather ambiguous as when British people use the term loosely 
to refer Wales, Scotland, England or Northern Ireland, and sometimes to the United 
Kingdom. IFIP appears to adopt the latter connotation (as per ‘state* above) but 
the International Rugby Board and the Federation of International Football 
Associations, for example, use the former!
IFIP organisation
All the ‘organisational units* (a term introduced in the explanatory note "Example 
B, Design Specification for Conference Organization"), such as ‘Technical 
Committee’, are parts of the IFIP structure. Their ontology is the same as the
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whole body, and they depend on the same realisations for their own existence, in
this case the State of Switzerland If for any reason this state were to cease to
exist, IFIP and its parts would have to reconstitute themselves under another state’s
legislation. At the highest levels in the organisation there are the General
Assembly, the Technical Assembly, the Council and the Working Conference.
Each of these higher level bodies, as we saw in pass 4, breaks down into smaller
ones that take care of day to day matters. To simplify much of the analysis and
its representation, we will use the affordance of ‘organisational unit* to be a generic
to all the specifics of IFIP organisational structures.
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
organisational units IFIP
Technical Assembly IFIP
Technical Committee Technical Assembly
Working Group Technical Committee
Task Group Working Group
Special Interest Group Working Group
This device allows us to simplify representing some of the structural features. 
Within each of the organisational units there will be found the usual offices for 
member, chair, secretary and treasurer. These latter are examples of an ‘office*, 
parts of the organisation, without whose existence the organisation would not exist. 
As with the ‘member* part of, say, the Technical Committee the office persists even 
if the incumbent is for some reason not appointed We could draw the analogy 
with the structure of a representative body such as the House of Commons: the 
demise of the sitting member for Chipping Sodbury does not imply the finish of 
that particular role of member, just the finish of that particular incumbency. A visit 
to the Chapter House of a great English cathedral supports this way of approaching 
organisations, for there we find that the representative canons for each parish in the 
diocese have their own seats in the polygonal chamber, each with the name of the 
parish inscribed in stone above. The certainty of a seat in a full meeting is 
something that some parliaments have still not yet managed to accomplish!
Persons who occupy the offices in an organisational structure can be seen 
as incumbents. This would be a general role name, instantiated when a person 
and an office jointly realise an ‘incumbency*. Take away either one and the 
incumbency finishes. Churches often have long lists of past vicars going back into
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the mists of time showing the starts and finishes of, particular realisations of 
incumbencies. In those cases it was the death of the person which finished the 
existence. In other cases it could be the removal of the office itself, as happened 
during the time of the Reformation in England.
Roles in relationships always have two antecedent: the relationship and the 
agent involved in it. For ‘member* the relationship will be ‘membership’ and the 
agents concerned will be the various data processing societies which are at any time 
currently members of IFIP. Should they, or the membership relationship itself, 
cease to exist then the instance of ‘member* would do likewise. But who may 
become members of a learned society such as IFIP? As with many of these kinds 
of organisations membership is possible both on a personal level and on a corporate 
level. A corporate body such as a company may join as may a private individual. 
The affordances ‘company’ and ‘corporate body* will be dependent on a particular 
state. It will be useful to be able to recall which persons are employed by which 
corporate bodies, perhaps when deciding from whom to seek out sponsorships, and 
so we can add ‘employs’ as jointly afforded by ‘person* and ‘corporate body*.
Corporate bodies can play an important part in funding and lending more 
status to Working Conferences by sponsoring them. In terms of sponsorship both 
Working Groups, from the IFIP side, and friendly businesses may act as sponsors. 
This gives rise to two affordances of sponsorship, both having ‘Working 
Conference* as one antecedent: ‘sponsorship* where ‘corporate body* is the second 
antecedent, and ‘sponsorship’ where ‘Working Group* is. A role of ‘sponsor’ arises 
when sponsorship takes place, with ‘sponsorship* and whichever is the role occupier 
as the other antecedent.
‘Appoint’, as every communication act, has two antecedents of the agent 
performing the act and the sign or utterance that the agent uses in the execution. 
The sign always refers to legal and social relations that the agent wishes to 
influence in some way. In this case the sign would refer to the start of the 
membership of a person of a Technical Committee, that is: "+membership(person# 
Technical Committee#)". Appointing the person will be a member society wanting 
representation on that committee. ‘National Representative* is handled as a role in
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the membership relationship, with membership and the member society as the 
antecedents.
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
office IFIP -
incumbency person office
membership learned society learned society
membership person learned society
appoint learned society "+membership(person# 
Technical Committee#)"
"+membership(person# learned society -
Technical Committee#)" -
corporate body state -
company state -
sponsorship(l) corporate body Working Conference
sponsorship(2) Working Group Working Conference
‘Each’ is a determiner of Technical Committee and therefore has this as its 
antecedent. Every affordance which may be individuated can have ‘each* as an 
affordance. Each TC has a number of ‘Working Groups’ which tackle the detail 
of the work in the area of concern. Working Groups are part of the TC and have 
the same antecedent as it. Working Groups involve themselves in various 
‘activities* and these include the organising of the "small invited conferences", or 
‘Working Conferences’. The conferences are always clearly established as IFIP 
conferences, and not some affordance of the Working Group. Whereas the WG 
takes on the task of the bringing into existence of these conferences, the antecedent 
is IF'IF itself. By using determiners such as ‘small’ and ‘invited’ for a conference 
the characteristics of the Working Conference start to become clear enough to allow 
us to discriminate it from other universals of conference.
Affordance Antecedent! Antecedent
small conference
invited conference
conference IFIP
Working Conference 1FLP
Inviting contributions to the Working Conference
Every Working Conference, as with any conference, has to have a declared subject 
as its theme in order to focus the attention of the participants. The ‘subject’ will 
generally be included in the label or title of that particular Working Conference, but 
it would be wrong to rely on this convention without analysis. The subject of the
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conference is one more way in which its particularity is established. Subject is a 
part of the knowledge domain of IFIP and to relate the Working Conference to it 
we need to introduce the harmless term ‘on*. We can therefore conceive of subject 
as participating in a relationship with conference in the realisation of ‘on’.
To organise the Working Conference there are two types of structures: the 
Organizing Committee (IFIP uses American spelling) and the Program Committee. 
These are akin to the WGs and TCs as they relate to IFIP. They form part of the 
Working Conference, parts that have specific tasks to fulfil. Every Working 
Conference, and we would suppose all other conferences, need these bodies to 
prepare the ground. Their antecedents are once more IFIP. The text reveals the 
rule that the OC should be ‘based in’ the same country in which the Working 
Conference is to held (viz. ‘held in’). The meaning of ‘based in* needs to be 
established. It could refer to the normal residence of the committee members, that 
is, that the members should be drawn from those normally resident where the 
conference is to be held. It could be referring to their nationality as well. This 
signification is borne out by the stipulation that the PC should be ‘international’, 
implying that its members should be drawn from many nationalities. Or else it 
might refer to the location of the meetings of the committee: they should be 
convened in the country chosen to hold the Working Conference. Whatever the 
precise definition may be, the antecedents of ‘based in* would be ‘Committee’ and 
‘state*. As for ‘held in’, the text specifies that conferences are held in countries, 
but on reflection the term ‘hold’ and its derivatives normally refers to assemblies 
of people, and so it would be the meeting of the conference that is indicated, rather 
than just the associated organisational activities, and this implies antecedents of 
‘meeting* and ‘state*.
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent
subject IFIP
on Working Conference subject
based in Committee state
held in meeting state
The year of 1982 saw a particular Working Conference held in a particular country, 
the Netherlands, and realised an instance of ‘on* a particular subject, ‘Information 
Systems Development Methodologies: a Comparative Review’. As with all
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particulars their antecedents are always particulars. Hence the antecedent of that 
Working Conference is IFIP.
Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent!
WC "ISDM: CR" IFIP
on ISDM: CR WC "ISDM: CR"
WG 8.1 IFIP
Getting contributions from academics and practitioners requires the 
conference organisers to engage in a kind of conversation with such persons. As 
we saw in the fourth pass at the text, this means that communication acts are used. 
The structure of such an act gives us the dependency relations directly. The ‘call 
for papers’ is a sign type whose antecedent is the Working Conference, in practice 
the PC members, and the communication act is ‘invites’. For the response to this 
invitation from the would-be contributer, the communication act is ‘accepts*, and 
the sign type is Tetter of intent*, with the person as its antecedent.
Those who write papers, or at any rate are asked to write them, will usually 
have some expertise in some area of the chosen subject for the conference. Perhaps 
they have contributed papers before for conferences of IFIP or other organisations. 
This would be represented by the affordance ‘expertise’, where the antecedents are 
‘person’ and ‘topic*. We would not expect our members to have expertise in the 
whole of a conference subject. When people contribute papers for the Working 
Conference, or act as a referee, or perform other services such as committee work, 
then we ought to be able to employ the term ‘participation*. Future IFIP 
conference organisers will be interested to know who has participated in the work 
of a Working Conference, and this does not imply that they have necessarily 
attended the conference. Participation may fall short of actually attending. Perhaps 
the paper has been accepted and even discussed, but the author could not be there 
in person. Persons can also realise ‘participation* at the level of the meeting, and 
so here we would be making a distinction between the work of the conference in 
general, and the particular work of the meeting.
Each ‘paper’ treats a ‘topic*, and one ‘version* of the paper will realise a 
‘revision’ of a previous version. In terms of the scope of the individual papers, 
they will tend to address in more detail particular parts of the chosen subject of the 
conference. For the methodology subject, aspects of analysis, design and
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Figure 7.2 inviting contributions
implementation might be considered. Papers and topics are not dependent upon one 
another and might be related through a joint affordance of ‘treats*. At the highest 
level of abstraction a particular paper might be referred to in discourse while still 
not written out. Think of how publishers refer to a book they have commissioned 
even though it still has no physical form. Such notions of literary artifacts have 
important matters of legal determination attached to them, and the final arbiter in 
any dispute regarding copyright, for example, will be the appropriate state. 
Following this line of logic we arrive, with ‘state*, as the antecedent of ‘paper*. 
A general affordance of state to cover these kinds of creative output, and one we 
should use for economy, is that of ‘work*. And one other example of a kind of 
work which is used in this context is ‘abstract*, still a piece of creative output but 
not a paper.
Some may think that the person who creates the paper should be the 
antecedent, but we cannot make the author the antecedent of paper, for the paper 
will survive the passing of the person. This would infringe the NORMA rule of 
ontology. A particular state recognises and protects such cultural phenomena, with 
the force of law, even after the demise of author, copyright holder or 
commissioning body.
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Affordance 
call for papers 
invites
letter of intent
accepts
paper
treats
revision
participation
expertise
Antecedentl
IFIP
IFIP
person
person
state
paper
version (new)
person
person
Antecedent
call for papers 
letter of intent
topic
version1 (old) 
Working Conference 
topic
Discussing papers contributed
The paper contributed by a person does not consist in the physical form of written 
text sent to the Program Committee. It could conceivably be delivered by 
electronic mail, by telephone or by dint of some passing troubadour charged with 
the job of reciting the work faithfully to the Committee. As far as the law on 
copyright goes however the work must consist in some physical form or ‘medium’, 
such as a paper hard copy or a 3.5 inch diskette, for such rights to be established. 
Thus some copy must exist but copyright is established over the work itself: the 
conference paper. At this level we are dealing with the sign-type and not the sign- 
token which may assume many forms. To have a copyright we must have a work, 
in this case a paper, in existence. The ownership of that copyright, however, must 
belong to a legal person of some kind, and not necessarily the author. A 
‘copyright* has ‘paper’ and ‘legal person* as its antecedents: legal person rather 
than just person because the owner might be a corporate body. What is recognised 
as a legal person will depend upon the state concerned.
The ‘copy* has as an antecedent ‘version (text)*. The version will have as 
its antecedent ‘paper*. In an international organisation like EF1P there will be several 
working languages and so any papers will have to be expressed in one language or 
another, hence there may be English texts, French texts and so on. Once again the 
antecedent of ‘text’ will be ‘Society* and a ‘paper’ will be normally ‘in’ a ‘text*. 
If we were to make the antecedent of ‘text* either ‘state* or ‘nation* then we could 
not cater for the eventuality of these languages outlasting these social and political 
entities, and yet still being interpreted correctly, as with Ancient Greek or Latin.
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Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent!
medium state
text Society
in paper text
version paper
copy version medium
copyright paper
ownership copyright legal person
legal person state
tofliljw rion# 
Individual 
oof potato body# 
ole.
worfc#
figure 7.3 ontology of copyright
Usually we would expect the person who wrote the paper to be the person 
who holds its copyright. But complexities can arise. Take for example the 
occasion when the paper was contributed by a limited company, a systems house 
that adopts a successful methodology of its own for developing systems. This 
company might commission two of its employees to write the paper for the 
Working Conference. To make this distinction we need a term ‘authorship* with 
antecedents of ‘person* and ‘paper’, as well as ‘contributes’ with ‘legal person’ and 
‘paper*. Each paper submitted will be reviewed by members of a refereeing panel 
whose membership is drawn from persons known to have expertise on the subject 
of the conference. Therefore ‘membership* will be part of the panel, itself part of 
the Working Conference, and such a membership will have to be jointly afforded 
by ‘person’ and ‘refereeing panel*. Members of such a panel will enjoy the role 
name of ‘referee’ by virtue of their membership, although it could happen that a
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person who reviews another paper is not a member of the panel, and would also 
earn the title ‘referee*. In the light of favourable reviews, some papers will be 
accorded the status ‘selected’, while others will be marked as ‘rejected*. Both these 
affordances have a single antecedent in ‘paper*. Experts in the conference subject 
will require expertise, and ‘expertise* needs a ‘subject* and a ‘person* to be 
instantiated.
A Working Conference typically will meet over a period of some three 
days, and will be broken up into sections to deal with the various topics covered 
by the contributions. A part/whole hierarchy may be discerned of ‘meeting* and 
‘session’, where the meetings are divided into sessions. Selected papers were 
‘grouped into’ different sessions. iH P’s CRIS88 conference was divided into 
Session 1 on "Automatic aids for analysis and design", Session 2 on "Approaches 
to automated system generation" and Session 3 on "Integrated and automated 
analysis, design and construction". During each session a number of the selected 
papers were presented, and this represents a further partition into ‘presentation*. 
During a ‘presentation*, the speaker usually would present his own paper to the 
conference, permitting a ‘discussion* to be realised. In order to be able to present 
and discuss a paper the person concerned would have to attend the meeting, or at 
any rate the session. At this point we should include the affordance of ‘attends’, 
with antecedents of ‘session* and ‘person*, although restrictions of space mean that 
some who would like to attend may not IFIP has developed the notion of 
eligibility: a person may be eligible to attend if they have qualified in some way, 
for example, by writing a paper, working on a refereeing panel or Technical 
Committee. However, eligibility in itself does not suffice, and priority is awarded 
on a pre-determined scale. Therefore we have an affordance of ‘eligibility’, and the 
antecedents can be airived at by asking the question "Of whom for what?" And 
the answers are: ‘person’ and ‘Working Conference*. ‘Priority’ is then a determiner 
of this eligibility. Top priority would be indicated by the value ‘1’ for example.
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Affordance Antecedentl Antecedent!
authorship person paper
contributed legal person paper
refereeing panel Working Conference -
membership refereeing panel person
meeting conference -
session meeting session
grouped into paper person
presentation session meeting
included paper meeting
discussion session paper
eligibility person Working Conference
priority eligibility
Includedpaper#.
irouped into
Iscusslon
W orking Conference#.^-—m eeting# ss lo n # — presentatloi
eligibility.
^  #prlorlty
person#
Figure 7.4 grouping papers for discussion
Tracking the movements of papers
During the period of reviewing and assessing the contributions people have made, 
there will be a need to send copies of papers around the members of the refereeing 
panel. Normally at least two referees will review a paper. To locate a person for 
the purpose of sending a paper we usually use the address we have for them. A 
person is located at an address. The person and the address are ontologically 
independent of one another. An address does not depend upon a person for its 
existence. So what does it depend upon? Postal addresses are affordances of the 
national postal authority, in its turn an affordance of the state. If for any reason
140
Chapter 7: The CRIS case
the name of the street changes, then that address ceases to exist. Therefore ‘located 
at* and ‘address* must be further affordances required. Addresses themselves are 
sign types used to represent physical locations. Changing the name of a place does 
not alter its geography but the terms we use to talk about that place. Rhodesia and 
Zimbabwe are simply different terms used to refer to the self-same physical 
location. An address and a physical place jointly afford ‘represents*. To complete 
this section of the schema we need to add in two further affordances ‘PTT’ (Postal 
Authority) and ‘place*, the latter having ‘state* as its antecedent.
A copy of a paper will be sent to a person, a referee for example. But 
sending the copy does not mean, unfortunately, that it will arrive. Only when a 
person has a copy can the success of the operation be secured. Here we would 
want to make sure that our schema does not assume too much. Perhaps in the 
halcyon days of the Royal Mail this assumption may have even been justified, but 
certainly not any more. Consequently we distinguish the affordances of ‘sent to* 
and ‘has*, also in this section, for both person and Working Conference in relation 
to a copy of the work.
lace#: located at 
"-- r^epresents
>TT# address#
erson
nt to
tas
nt to
lasWorking Conferences
figure 7.5 circulating copies
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Affordance
place
Postal Authority
address
represents
sent to
sent to
has
has
copy
copy
person
Postal Authority 
address
state
state
Working Conference
Antecedent!
person
copy
copy
place
Working Conference
Antecedent
Our root agent for problem domains of this large scale is ‘Society*. All our 
sophisticated social reality depends ultimately on this base. As an affordance of 
‘Society* we have ‘nation*. Who is the authority deciding whether a nation is in 
existence? Nations come and go, but over very long time periods. The notion of 
a Viking nation or a Celtic nation for most commentators no longer carries much 
weight but that of a Danish, a Welsh and a French nation, to name but a few, 
carries more conviction today.
The question of who decides upon the existence of ‘state* is ticklish also. 
One has only to cast an eye on the diplomatic dilemmas concerning the recognition 
of such entities as Palestine, Biafra or Lithuania to obtain an inkling of the 
problem. Here is not the place to dwell upon such matters. However there are 
international bodies of various kinds: for instance, the IMF, the World Bank, the 
United Nations and Amnesty International, all of which accept responsibility for 
their own definition.
A third very basic affordance is that of ‘person*. The questions surrounding 
the determination of the existence of a person —when he starts and finishes to 
exist— are vital for many business and social entities. To make a judgment about 
whether a person has ceased to exist, for example when they have been in a coma 
for years, is no simple matter.
In all these cases, ‘nation’, ‘state* and ‘person’, the judgement which is most 
relevant and critical is the one taken by the overriding body itself, IFIP. Where 
there are controversial questions to be resolved, IFIP will have to stand by its own 
decisions. If it wishes to recognise a state, with the concomitant of having its 
National Representatives appointed to Technical Committees, then it is free to so 
decide. And also carry the consequences. This is the kind of decision which
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international sporting bodies, such as the Olympic Committee, have to make 
regularly.
IFIP itself is a legal persona recognised by the state of Switzerland, and this 
is its authority. For the authority for ‘society’, ‘federation’ and ‘learned society’ 
we need only look for the ‘state’ (the universal of Switzerland) where the society, 
federation or learned society is constituted.
Many affordances have the IFIP Council for their authority. IFIP Council 
decides upon what constitutes a ‘Working Conference*, a ‘conference’, whether it 
is ‘small’ or ‘invited*. It will also decide upon the division of the knowledge 
domain of the learned society into its constituent parts: ‘field*, ‘subject*, ‘area’ and 
‘topic*. As research advances new instances will arise of whole new subjects 
which may require new Technical Committees for them. The IFIP Council will 
reserve this decision to itself. Lower down that scale the Technical Committees 
will decide upon instances of ‘areas*. For an individual Working Conference the 
Working Group which sponsors it will decide the existence of an instance of ‘on*: 
when a Working Conference is on a particular subject or not.
In the preliminary communication between the PC and the prospective 
contributors and attenders of the Working Conference, we find some interesting 
questions of authority. Initially the PC invites persons to contribute by sending out 
the ‘call for papers’, using some sign token to realise the communication act, 
usually a printed sheet of conference details. Although the receiver of the ‘call’ is 
the one to interpret the meaning of the signs thereon, the authority on whether the 
utterance exists or not must be the PC. Similarly in using that sign to realise the 
communication act of ‘invites’, once again the authority is the PC. For the person 
who ‘accepts’, a sign to embody the intention has to be in existence, in this case 
the Tetter of intent’, and then the act of ‘accepts’ can be performed.
In Appendix A, the authority columns reveal the appropriate authority for the 
start and finish of each affordance. More often than not this is the first or second 
antecedent of the affordance.
Time is a central notion in information systems work and often the 
languages or logics that we use when analysing and specifying take little, if any, 
account of it. NORMA, however, takes time as one of its central notions, where
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existence constraints are exercised upon all affordances. Every instance of an 
affordance has a start and a finish, and these are markers held in the record. 
English is full of terms that refer to these two extremes of a lifespan: birth and 
death for a person; kick-off and fulltime for a football match; commencement and 
completion for a contract.
In addition to the starts and finishes, which we come to know after they 
have occurred, there are the other concepts of beginning and ending. These relate 
to the intentions of agents who wish to bring things into existence and take them 
out. A beginning is rooted in the intention of an agent, a "twinkle in the eye" 
perhaps, which does not immediately give rise to the start of something. But 
without the beginning there would be no start.
The CRIS case does not offer many examples of this mechanism. When the 
problem definition states that "Working Groups are encouraged to organise 
conferences", we can construe this as referring to the beginning of a conference. 
Organising, in this sense, means doing the necessary to bring about the start, or 
finish, of something. A similar notion maintains in the use of preparing as in 
"preparing a list of attendees". Preparatory activities provide the necessary 
precursor to the realisation. Both preparing and organising point to the beginning 
of some realisation.
NORMA provides the analyst with an organic structure for all affordances 
and this structure includes the ability of agents to recognise the beginnings and 
endings of the realisations they afford. These constructs are inbuilt in each 
affordance in any semantic schema.
Corporate bodies
IFIP is stated to be a federation, a term usually reserved to describe constitutional 
systems. This federal structure indicates what IFIP is comprised of: large corporate 
entities, already constituted under their own local legislative frameworks. Therefore 
IFIP is a society, in its case a learned society, with a federal constitution. First a 
learned society and then a federation.
The generic of corporate body covers all the various types of incorporated 
organisations: company, society and learned society. It would also include parastatal
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bodies such as some university or a nationalised industry. If we make this grouping 
we can say, for example, that a corporate body may employ a person and describe 
the organisation more succinctly. What we have in fact is a norm:
corporate body <— company, society, learned society, university, etc.
This norm says that whenever we have an instance of the affordances to the right 
of the arrow we have a corporate body. We can illustrate this in the ontology chart 
by drawing an arrow to connect the specifics to the generic, or by drawing a 
generic/specific box:
^corporate body ^  
company 
society 
learned society 
university
Treating universals as a set means we should search for what they have in 
common, knowing that on further inspection the particularities of any realised 
instances will emerge. The affordance in common to this group in the CRIS 
example is that of ‘employs(corporate body, person)’: they can all be employers of 
persons. Differentiating them are the affordances of the various organisational units 
of a learned society like IFIP, which has ‘membership* jointly afforded from another 
learned society. When the question of copyright arises the legal question of the 
agents involved comes to the fore. Each of these bodies is answerable in law for 
its actions and can be sued in the courts. This is also true of the private individual. 
Hence we find another generic/specific categorisation of:
legal person person, corporate body
enabling us to group together these very different affordances that have similarity 
in one respect, at least in the CRIS case, they may both hold the copyright of a 
literary work.
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Organisational units
Given the very large, complex and federal fabric of IFIP it comes as no surprise 
that there are so many organisational units, often nested one inside the other. For 
the purpose of clarification we do not box them together on the ontology chart but 
separate them so their functions are more obvious. This does not hide the 
underlying genericness of the structure:
organisational unit <— General Assembly, Technical Assembly,
Technical Committee, Working Group, 
Task Group, Council, Special Interest 
Group, Trusteeship, Executive Board, 
Working Conference, committee, Program 
Committee, Organising Committee, 
refereeing panel
All these affordances have in common that they are part of another organisational 
unit, and they are comprised of a generic element: ‘office*. The various types of 
offices will be largely similar, but the particular duties will differ.
—  organisational unit= = = = j 
General Assembly 
Technical Assembly 
Technical Committee 
Working Group 
Task Group 
Council 
Special Interest Group 
Trusteeship 
Executive Board 
Working Conference 
committee 
Program Committee 
Organising Committee 
refereeing panel
It must be clear with such a wide range of different organisational entities that 
there needs to be a wide variation in the affordances that each one has. The range 
and scope of the work of each within the IFIP world runs from concern with long
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term strategic matters to the lowest level of organising a small meeting of a few 
committee members to discuss the agenda of the next business meeting. For 
convenience we group them together under this heading, in the full knowledge that 
on other counts we would treat them separately.
Office
Every organisation accomplishes the tasks in hand thanks to the holders of the 
various offices of which it is comprised. Each of the IFIP units is made up of lots 
of these offices, some more grandiose than others. By handling ‘office* generically 
on one level we can avoid over-elaborating the chart with detail. Every office 
participates in a joint affordance of ‘incumbency* with ‘person*. The rule or norm 
on which this generic structure is based would take the following form:
office <=chair, president, secretary, etc.
But the range of offices is wide. Just a few will suffice to give the flavour:
IFIP Council: president, past president, vice-president, secretary, 
treasurer, trustee 
General Assembly: member,
Technical Committee: chair, secretary, national representative 
Working Group: chair, vice-chairman, secretary, member 
Special Interest Group: president.
Work
Conferences are primarily for discussion and exchange of opinions, centred around 
the ideas first expressed in the papers submitted and selected for inclusion, but as 
we have seen, other kinds of literary works are also to be found in this domain, 
such as referees’ reports and abstracts. We have chosen to model the report as a 
paper which reviews another paper, and have then created a role for these kinds 
of papers. We would defend this since many papers themselves are reviews of 
literature.
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Abstracts are short literary works. Comparison might be made with synopses 
for books, which although also short can still be used to create copyright for 
publishers. Some abstracts may not be developed into full conference papers, 
perhaps because they are rejected out of hand by the Program Committee, or for 
reasons concerning the author’s ability to complete. Nevertheless the abstract has 
an existence of its own which needs to be recorded in the information system.
—  work —  
paper 
abstract
Papers can participate in a wide range of relationships which however 
preclude abstracts: inclusion in a session, being selected, being rejected. In this 
representation we figure them as specifics of the generic type work, and the 
economy of this specification technique, referred to in Chapter 4, means that we can 
allow ‘paper’ to inherit the generic affordances of ‘work*, while permitting 
particular characteristics to appertain solely to the former.
Conclusions
The CRIS case offers an example of a more amorphous domain to specify. 
It is not delimited by legislation, but nevertheless is most certainly under the control 
of overarching norms and internal IFIP rules. In practice many of the ambiguities 
and critical decisions will be settled at an informal level— who constitutes an 
expert in a field? what constitutes a valid acceptance to contribute? when is a 
conference session deemed to commence? did a person participate in the work of 
a conference?— are the kinds of questions handled on the spot by those with the 
responsibility to do so. Appendix A illustrates how vast the potential schema could 
be for this case, with something over 70 universals identified. Additionally a 
number of case data particulars have been provided to show what sort of surrogates 
might populate the surrogate tables. Although the complexity of the problem is 
somewhat daunting, this study shows that NORMA could take such a task in its 
stride, and the resulting specification ends as a very rich and complete blueprint 
for the ultimate development of a technical system for this case. At every point
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the syntactic structures of the semantics of the language urge the analyst on to 
investigate the fundamental parameters in time and space of each term, and provide 
a clear framework in which to record the findings.
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The Process of Semantic Analysis
In this chapter we set out a method for applying semantic analysis, on the basis of 
the experience gained in the applications and other examples. Although analysts 
may have a sound grasp of the fundamental tenets of NORMA, this still leaves the 
question of how to begin tackling a problem.
Reflections on the applications
When addressing the question of how people can learn how to use an analytical 
technique, there are two possible answers: by osmosis, that is, by sitting next to 
someone who knows and learning on the job; or by following a route already 
mapped out through the tasks. This has the effect of creating an order in which 
things have to be done. In addition to applying the technique of semantic analysis 
to exemplary problems, another of the tasks of this work was to produce such a 
order. Although the substantive aim of the analysis is to insert as many values as 
possible into the surrogate table for each application, we could say that as long as 
many values as possible are entered into that table, there is no particular merit in 
addressing that generic task in one way or another. Indeed, glancing at the 
preceding three chapters could well produce the impression of three different 
techniques, because there is little resemblance between any of them in terms of the 
order in which particular tasks were carried out, nor is there anything unifying them 
in their content. However we accept that there is a need to identify the order in 
which the elements of the analysis should be tackled, particularly where beginners 
are concerned; we need to give some guidance on how to get started. This chapter 
indicates a path that can be taken through the analysis in order to answer this 
criticism. It is a method (not a methodology) and it does not profess to be the 
only one possible. It is offered as a distillation of experience the present author has 
acquired over four years of familiarity with using this technique.
It is possible simply to sift through all the terminology employed in the 
problem domain in order to gradually piece together a full schema, but this is the
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approach that might be suitable for an experienced analyst. For the novice, pointing 
to the rich set of constraints is not sufficient. The need is to spell out a method, 
an order in which tasks should be carried out. In fact, having so many constraints 
makes it essential that there is a process laid out for carrying out the analysis.
NORMA is a tool with which we can begin to construct the schema from 
terms used in a discourse. These terms, or any non-linguistic signs, can be culled 
from the usual sources: rulebooks, regulations, documentatation and so forth. In 
addition, quite informal snippets of discourse may be taken and subjected to exactly 
the same analysis. In a number of passes at the text, illustrated in Figure 8.0, we 
apply all the rigour of the specification language to the material so that the ensuing 
schema is gradually shorn of all semantic anomalies, that is, semantically 
normalised. Each pass contains a number of operations to which we subject each 
term in the text.
In Pass 1, we want to know whether each term is worthy of further 
investigation or whether it should be dismissed for the time being. In Pass 2 we 
are concerned with universals, particulars, and individuals. Pass 3 continues with 
considering relationships and the roles of participating relations. In Pass 4 
communication acts and their components are analysed, and states of agents. We 
examine determiners and determinants, and then we follow with considering parts 
and their wholes. Pass 5 is probably the most time-consuming and critical where 
we attempt to discover the antecedents for the affordances we have identified so far. 
Some of this work has already been accomplished in the previous passes. Having 
determined the ontological antecedents for affordances, in Pass 6 we seek to provide 
the authority which determines the existence, the start and finish times, for each 
affordance, and in Pass 7 we provide the start and finish dates for any affordance 
for which we have this information. Pass 8 considers the mood of each affordance: 
assertion, hypothesis, imperative, and interrogation. In Pass 9 we are interested in 
grouping together those affordances that are specifics of generics. Pass 10 sees the 
checking of ontological dependencies and the completing of the ontology chart. In 
the figure are set out the details to be entered on record for each pass, for each 
semantic unit, or elemental unit of meaning.
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1 0  P a s s e s  a t  t h e  t e x t
Detail required To enter
P a s s  1
Agent/Affordance YorN
Agent YorN
Substantive (Substantive, (M)essage, (C)ontrol
Alias of Name of affordance
P a s s  2
Particular If Y then write P and name Universal
Universal If Y then write U
Particular Universal If Y then write PU and name Universal
Individual If Y then write #
P a s s  3
Relationship Write Label of affordance
Relation 1 Write label of first participating relation
Role 2 Write role name of above If any
Relation 2 Write label of second participating relation
Role 2 Write role name If any
P a s s  4
State YorN
Communication Act Write name of Act
Agent Give name of agent who performs Act
Sign type (U) Name universal sign type
Sign token (P) Name particular sign token
Determiner (U) Y or N, If Y name scale
Determinant (p) Name affordance determined
Part of Y or N, If Y name whole
P a s s  5
Antecedent 1 Name one antecedent
Antecedent 2 If another antecedent name It
P a s s  6
@+ Name agent responsible for determining Start
@- Name agent responsible for determining Finish
P a s s 7
Start (+) Give start date
Finish (F) Give finish date
P a s s  8
Mood start Choose mood (A)ssert!on, (Hypothesis etc
P a s s  9
Group together generics and specifics
P a s s  1 0
Check ontological dependencies and draw ontology chart
Figure 8.1 10 passes at the text in semantic analysis
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Semantic units, agents and affordances: pass 1
In Pass 1 the text is scanned to identify ‘semantic units’, and we can begin by 
separating each term.
An normally
IHP based in
working conference the
is country
required in
by which
M P the
procedures conference
to is
have to
an be
Organizing Committee held
Each word may not be a semantic unit but instead may be part of a term which is. 
Phrasal verbs such as ‘based in’ and ‘held in’ fall commonly into this category, but 
so does a term such as ‘working conference’. Here the term has a precise reference 
which is more than simply the sum of its parts. A working conference is 
something more than a conference which is working, referring to a specific form 
of activity of LFIP. Where the terms begin with capital letters, such as with 
Organizing Committee, as a proper noun, this aids us with a rule of English 
orthography which indicates the reference to a particular entity.
These constitute the elemental linguistic building blocks with which those 
involved in the organisation construct meanings and hence get things done.
Eliminated terms
In seeking to derive a schema from text supplied in natural language, there will be 
many terms that we will have to set on one side. Most of these arise because they 
fulfil a purpose when using natural language as a specification language, but when 
using NORMA to specify systems, these terms have no place. Very often these are 
terms used in syntactical manipulations: and, which, they, has, whose, of, for. They 
function as logical connectives to maintain a continuous thread throughout the text. 
The term ‘which* binds references together of the country where the conference is 
to be held to the country where the Organizing Committee is based. The pronoun
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‘they* refers to societies who have the power of appointing National 
Representatives. Employing ‘o f  is common for establishing relations between 
elements of discourse, for instance in the phrase, ‘the federation of the national data 
processing societies’, it serves to specify the particular type of federation. In 
NORMA these functions are handled by the logical structure of the language.
Most common of all is the redundancy of any part of the verb ‘to be*, for 
in NORMA instead of having states of affairs, we have responsible agents to 
determine that something exists. Being is handled by the existence parameters that 
apply to all affordances: there is a responsible agent who decides when an instance 
of anything is realised.
Existence possible: agent or affordance
As we complete the first pass at the text, we are trying to decide on what semantic 
units should be considered for later analysis. We never totally discard any piece of 
text that we have been given because it will always help to provide context for the 
terms we analyse. In addition to the reasoning provided above for not retaining 
certain terms, we may also approach the problem positively by asking whether each 
term can be realised by an agent, or in other words, can it have an existence? 
We can envisage the existences of ‘working conferences’, of ‘Technical 
Committees’, of ‘members’, of ‘papers’ and so on, but not of ‘and’, of ‘whose* and 
of ‘is*. Agents in NORMA have the capacity to realise by the affordances that 
depend upon them. Marking a term as capable of having an existence amounts to 
saying that it is a candidate affordance for the schema. Alternatively we may reject 
that term as a potential affordance. Here are some of the terms from the text that, 
at this point, we would not include in our schema:
and; are; be; for, has; have; how; in; is; of; off; on; or, they; to; 
was; which; whose; would.
Agents who can take responsibility
Later in the analysis we will want to know who is to take responsibility for what 
exists. At an early stage it is convenient to mark down who are the agents in the
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domain we are examining. Much of what is realised in this domain originates with 
these agents in any case. By agent, we might refer to a number of possibilities: 
an individual person; sets of individuals; corporate individuals, legal persons or 
groups; sets of corporate individuals, legal persons or groups. For the CRIS case 
the agents will include 1F1P itself, Technical Committees, Working Groups, Working 
Conferences, Program and Organization Committees, authors, referees, data 
processing societies and so on. Each of these will be able to take responsibility for 
deciding when some affordance has started its existence. So for example, the 
Technical Committees decide when new Working Groups come into existence, 
whereas a Working Conference decides when the meeting has begun.
Substantive, message and control system
In this first pass we can also determine another vital piece of information about the 
affordances that we are analysing. We can distinguish between substantive 
affordances that concern the central tasks of the organisation, and those that concern 
the message passing and record keeping. A third category covers the affordances 
that relate to the control system. For the CRIS case most of the terms in the 
problem definition are substantive ones: federation, society, 1F1P, committee and so 
on. However in the section dealing with ‘Business Activities’, there are a number 
of terms that refer to the message system: sending invitations, registering 
acceptances, generating lists. Such terms indicate the nature of their concern with 
procedure, rather than with the substantive tasks.
Similarly for control there are terms such as ‘ensuring’ which should be 
marked appropriately. When the design specification discusses the idea of member 
societies being allowed to appoint National Representatives, the ability of such 
bodies to realise these actions is not in question. The affordance of ‘National 
Representative’ is substantive, whilst that of ‘allowed’ refers to controlling norms.
The central affordance of ‘paper* in this conference case highlights the 
problem of distinguishing between message and substance. At one level we can 
regard a paper as a work of an author, and here we are thinking about the 
intellectual contribution that has been made. We are not concerned with the form 
of the contribution. The use of the term ‘paper’ suggests a form that has been
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common until now, but already the new methods are being used for recording and 
passing text for conferences. We must not confuse the two uses of the term ‘paper* 
and in semantic analysis our prime concern is with the substantive notion.
Among the activities of the Committees of the Working Conference is the 
grouping of papers into sessions. Once more we have an affordance which is 
substantive. When the committee members decide which papers must be discussed 
together they are performing a task central to the work of the Working Conference. 
This grouping of papers serves to focus attention on certain key issues and is an 
expression of the priorities for the Working Group, as the committee members see 
them. Approached from another direction, it is conceivable that this grouping might 
be viewed as simply part of the routine procedures for dealing with the received 
papers.
Alias
Quite often there will be two or more labels that are used to refer to the same 
affordance. Usually there will be good historical reasons for this, as for instance 
when there have been distinct language communities, each with its own usage. Or 
it might be simply a matter of convenience, so that ‘1F1P’ is a shorthand form of 
‘International Federation of Information Processing*. One is simply an alias for the 
other. Another possible example is with ‘submitter’, which is in the problem 
definition text, and ‘contributor’, which is a term suggested as a role name by the 
term ‘contributes*. Both terms connote the provision of some material to a third 
party. But are they labels for the same affordance? In this example we might 
agree that this is so, although the idea of contributing perhaps implies less 
constraints surrounding its execution than submitting. In the final analysis we 
would have to seek the opinions of those who operationalise the terms.
Here we have the result for the semantic unit ‘MP*. That it is a possible 
agent or affordance and there can be no doubt that it exists, under the aegis of the 
state of Switzerland. Further consideration leads to the conclusion that IFlP is also 
a responsible agent, in the sense that it can and does take legal, and social, 
responsibility for its actions. IFlP is not merely part of a message or control 
system but is a substantive entity in itself. As an instance of a learned society it
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Result of Pass 1
Label IFlP
Agsnt/Affordancs V
Agent V
8ubstantlvs, M, C 8
Allas International Federation
of Information Processing
Figure 8.2 results of the first pass
is a particular example and not some universal case.
Universals, particulars and individuality: pass 2
In the second pass we examine each term to decide whether it is a universal or a 
particular universal, or a particular, an instance of a universal. Finally we note 
whether it is an individual or a continuum.
Universals
Universals represent the invariants that shape the domain, and for the CRIS case 
there will be very many of them. The problem definition defines in broad terms 
the structures of the conference organisation test case. Terms such as ‘federation’, 
‘societies’, ‘National Representative’ indicate universal affordances and do not refer 
to any particular instance of one. Given that many problem definitions will 
articulated in such a general way, this is not surprising. Our schema will attempt 
to provide similar generality. A universal represents the ability to realise a 
particular instance of that behaviour. Consequently while the discourse centres on 
‘Working Groups’, ‘Working Conferences’, ‘federation’ and ‘countries’ then we are 
dealing with universals, and we mark them with a ‘U’.
Particulars
When considering particulars, we concern ourselves with an instantiation of a 
universal. So instead of talking about Working Groups in general, we might refer 
to one in particular. Hence Working Group 8.1 is a particular of the universal
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‘Working Group’. Similarly for federation there is the particular *UFIP’; for country, 
‘Netherlands’; for working conference, the 1982 instance; for topic, ‘Information 
Systems Design Methodologies: a Comparative Review’. Notice however that the 
particulars do not have to have been realised. We may talk about a particular paper 
that we want someone to write, or a particular conference that we would like to 
organise. Whether the particular has been realised or not depends upon whether we 
can find the agent responsible for its determination to confirm as much.
When marking the affordance with a ‘P* we can also indicate, if known, the 
universal of which it is particular.
Particular Universals
Handling universals and particulars is not always straightforward. Occasionally 
there are cases where a further category of particular universals may exist. Take 
for example the case of carpentry. A carpenter will refer in discourse to universals 
such as nails, screws, bolts, and nuts. But each of these categories will be 
subdivided into subsets of sizes, such as one inch, inch and a half, and so forth, 
still not referring to any one instance of them. These subsets of the universals we 
classify as types of universals, or particular universals, and in this pass we would 
indicate what the universal is, when there is a particular universal. In the CRIS 
case, there are few examples of these, but the two committees that do the 
groundwork for the Working Conference arrangements can be modelled in this way. 
Working Conferences can have committees, and the Program and Organising 
Committees are cases of these. However the PC and the OC are not particulars, 
there may be many of these in existence at various times, when for example there 
are several conferences being arranged concurrently, for example the conference on 
the topic on ‘Temporal Aspects of Information Systems’ held in France and 
sponsored also by WG8.1 was being organised at the same time as the CRIS 
conference. Therefore OC and PC are the labels of particular universals, where the 
universal is ‘committee’.
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Individuation and Identity
Certain affordances we will be able to classify as individuals, that is pick them out 
singly from a collection of similar instances of the same universal. So that we can 
distinguish one conference from another, one person from another, but not one 
instance of ‘priority’ from another. Having established the individuality of an 
affordance we can perform measures to determine partially or completely its 
identity. Often a name will be sufficient to identify successfully a person in a 
given context, but knowing their sex, weight or height, will not fully do so. Notice 
that the particularity of some affordance is established by its antecedents, but not 
its identity. We know that a particular priority has been assigned to a particular 
person, but we cannot, as such, identify this priority. Our concern here is to decide 
whether we can individuate an instance of the affordance, and if so we use the hash 
sign ‘# \
In the case of ‘Working Conference* we can establish that unless we have 
a label that indicates to the contrary, such as Working Conference CRIS 88, then 
we are dealing with a universal, and not a particular. Where there are several 
subtypes of conference, as here, then this indicates to us a Particular Universal. 
IFlP will hold other sorts of conferences which are not small and invited, as with
Results of Pass 2
Label Working Conference
Agent/Affordanoe Y
Agent Y
Substantive, M,C S
Alias
— Pass 2
Particular No
Universal conference
Particular Universal PU
Individual #
Figure 8.3 the second pass
constitutional conferences. Because we can distinguish between one instance of a
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Working Conference and another, for example ‘Computerized Support during 
Systems Life Cycle*, held in Great Britain, and ‘Temporal Aspects of Information 
Systems*, held in France, we can add the information that instances of it are 
individuals.
Roles and relationship: pass 3
Some terms indicate a relationship between two affordances, and where such a 
relationship exists there will often be role names for the two relations in the 
relationship. Where terms such as ‘held in* and ‘based in’ are employed then we 
are prompted to search for the two relations of the suggested relationship, and 
possibly two role names. We are told that an OC should normally be based in the 
country in which the conference is to be held. Incidentally, the knowledge that we 
need in order to deal with the location of OC and PC members points to the 
requirement for more analysis to provide schema support for residential information. 
Given the basic structure of a relationship, we can sketch out for ‘based in* a series 
of entries such as these.
Relationship Relationl Relation2
based in OC country
Role name Role name
? ?
The relationship necessitates two affordances to realise it, that is, an instance of this 
‘based in’ universal can only be realised when there are first instances of an OC 
and of a country. Often these relations in the relationship will have a role name 
that describes them while the relationship prevails, as in that of a husband and wife 
in marriage. But there may not always be role names. With ‘held in* we might 
posit the role of host or host country, but in the end it will be the norms followed 
by the agents themselves which will determine the matter.
Relationship Relationl Relation2
held in conference country
Role name Role name
? host?
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In examining these terms we notice that a problem arises over the precise meaning 
of ‘country’. With the sense of holding something in a place we tend to imply a 
geographical location, a territory, but country also has a connotation of a political 
entity or nation state. The two may not overlap. It would be a rash person who 
ventured to say that the political entity of country always referred to a precise 
territory. We return to this question later.
How does NORMA model the relationship between a federation and a 
society? Using the term ‘member society’ indicates the existence of a membership 
relationship: society and federation are joined in a membership affordance. IFIP is 
a learned society whose members, instead of being individual persons, are 
themselves learned societies. The notion of federation is generally applied to 
organisations whose constituent elements are ‘sovereign* bodies themselves: the 
United States of America; the National Union of Miners; the Confederation of 
British Industry. Essentially the federation is an organisational form which may 
or may not be appropriate to a given society.
Using a term that is a role name such as ‘referee* raises the questions of 
how to supply the missing terms:
Relationship Relationl Relation2
? ? 7
Role name Role name
referee ?
It is reasonable to assume that the holder of the role will be a person and hence 
we have the term for Relationl. Analysing the text further we discover that the 
referee is the person who writes the report on the work of a third person. And 
since we have tended to use the word ‘contributes’ rather than writes we ought to 
do so here also.
Relationship Relationl Relation2
contributes person report
Role name Role name
referee ?
The way that the paper relates to a report can be characterised in the following 
manner.
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Relationl Relation2
Relationship report paper
reviews Role name Role name
review subject
For the initial paper itself the idea of a person contributing a paper appears to 
reflect the underlying dependencies. Unless IFIP makes a distinction between the 
contribution of the work, perhaps where sent by a company or employer and the 
actual authorship of the paper, then the contributor is also the author, that is, they 
are aliases.
To provide schema support for tracking the whereabouts of authors, members 
of committees and so on, we need to know a little more than the country they are 
based in. A person is located at some place. The person and the place are 
ontologically independent of one another: a person ceasing to exist has no impact 
on the existence of the place. However the instance of being located at the place 
finishes. Consequently we can present this as a relationship in this manner:
Relationship Relationl Relation2
located at person place
Role name Role name
location
and we may find role names, perhaps for Relation2 ‘location’, that are appropriate.
Sponsor is another role name which we find in use in the IFlP domain. A 
sponsor is a role name in the relationship of sponsorship, although we find two 
senses of sponsor. One sponsor is always the Working Group which desires the 
conference (although there may be collaboration among WGs to act jointly): the 
other sponsor is an organisation putting either its money behind it, or its reputation. 
It is, however, an external body to IFIP. These two types of sponsorship represent 
two different meanings for the one term ‘sponsorship*, but there need be no 
confusion since the antecedents who will realise an instance of the affordance will 
differ. For the first kind of sponsorship the first relation will be Working Group, 
for the second it will be some legal person such as a company or parastatal body.
Using the term ‘national’ in referring to the data processing societies which 
are eligible for membership of IFLP could perhaps imply the existence of some 
relationship in which this term is a role name. There is often more than just one
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society of this kind, and determining which one is the ‘national’ is a matter for 
IFIP. Rather than a relationship, this affordance is a role name which applies in 
the relationship between a society and a nation, when the former is said to represent 
the latter. We would, on the other hand, expect the term ‘national’ when applied 
to a person, to refer to the relationship of nationality realised jointly by nation and 
person. For a society, this concept of nationality does not apply.
‘Author’ is common form of role name, ending as it does in ‘or’, and we 
can place it in the slot for roles. To fill the role we need a person, and the other 
relations must be some kind of work or literary output. For the relationship itself 
‘contributes’, as we have noted above is appropriate, although other possibilities 
might exist. For the second role ‘contribution’ would follow naturally.
Communication acts, determiners and parts: pass 4
In this fourth pass at the text, we are interested in a variety of NORMA structures 
that permit the representation of organisational knowledge. Part/whole relationships 
are simple enough to understand at the intuitive level: we expect to be able to 
divide anything into parts. But there can be problems distinguishing between when 
we an affordance is a part or an affordance of a realisation.
Part/whole distinction
IFIP has a large number of parts within parts of its whole. Many of these are not 
mentioned in the problem definition but they serve to illustrate this structural feature 
of NORMA. At its highest level IFIP has a General Assembly, a Technical 
Assembly, a Council and Working Conference. All these bodies are integral parts 
of IFIP. In turn these bodies have parts of their own, and each of these structures 
has parts which are the offices of chair, secretary and so on.
IFIP accomplishes much of its work through the committees, allowing the 
detailed work to be done. The outgoing President of IFIP spelled this out in 
November 1989: ‘The technical committees are the engine room of IFIP. Without 
them, IFlP would be nothing* (Owen 1989). Once it has been agreed to run a 
Working Conference then the work or the OC and PC begins to become important. 
These bodies operate as a vital organism in the fabric of the Working Conference,
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Results from P ass 3
Label author
Agent/Affordance Y
Agent Y
Substantive, M, C S
Alias
Particular
Universal U
Particular Universal
Individual #
Relationship contributes? writes?
Relation 1 person
Role 1 author
Relation 2 work? paper?
Role 2 contribution
"igure 8.4 the third pass
and must be seen as parts of the whole.
Each of these organisations has a large number of offices, positions or roles, 
which make up its structure. In just the same way the roles are part of the
organisational bodies. A committee has roles for chair, secretary, treasurer and so
\
on, and would have no substance without them. At any moment a particular role 
may have no incumbent, but it still exists independently of the persons who occupy 
it. We need to relate the two affordances of role and person by some relationship 
which ties them together. In this case we are looking for a term preferably in use 
in the organisation which captures this notion: perhaps ‘occupancy* or ‘incumbency*. 
Incumbency suggests this commitment to fulfil the duties of the role, and so we add 
this to the list of affordances.
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When learned societies such as IFIP constitute themselves, they do so with 
the aim of extending the boundaries of their particular knowledge area. Terms such 
as ‘subject’, ‘topic’, ‘field* and ‘area* allow the society to divide the knowledge into 
subsets of differing scope. A part/whole hierarchy of knowledge permits the 
organisation to focus on wider or narrower targets with its different activities. 
Possibly a hierarchy of knowledge/area/field/subject might provide the necessary 
parameters for such a ‘map*. However the terms used by one learned society to 
mark out its ‘map’ of knowledge will be different from those used by another, and 
this hierarchical order could be changed around. In the problem definition itself 
‘subject* and ‘topic’ are used interchangeably in IFIP as aliases one for the other.
‘Working Conferences which are small invited conferences on some 
subject*
and
‘In 1982, Working Group 8.1 organized a Working Conference in the 
Netherlands on the Topic ‘Information Systems Design 
Methodologies: a Comparative Review*. (Appendix A)*
This overlapping could cause problems when seeking to distinguish the scope of a 
particular contribution. Does a contributor write on a topic or a subject? 
Informally such ambiguity can be resolved, but moving to formalise the domain 
with a technical system requires that these possible anomalies be investigated 
thoroughly.
Communication act, agent, sign type/token.
Business is so often accomplished by intricate patterns of what we might 
refer to as conversations. Possibilities are sounded out by using hypothetical cases, 
offers are made and accepted and the status of mutual commitments, obligations and 
responsibilities alters. These changes are effected by means of communication acts, 
where responsible agents use sign types that can embody their intentions and 
purpose. With the sign realised as a token the communication act is then 
performed. Consequently we have three questions to answer when analysing
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communication acts: who is the agent? what is the act? and what is the sign type 
used as the utterance? If we have just one of the three elements at the outset, then 
we are driven to find the other two.
Communication act invites ...
Agent
Sign type/token
We know that we must have an agent to do the inviting and some sign type to 
embody the intention. Therefore we might continue
Communication act invites ...
Agent Working Conference#
Sign type/token call for papers
where the call for papers, or the invitation, is a complex sign that refers to a person 
contributing a paper. We are not concerned directly with the form of the sign 
token used, whether a letter, a fax message or telex, as that would draw us into the 
message level of analysis, but instead we are interested in the utterance that permits 
the communication act to be realised. This ‘call for papers* stands for the instance 
of a person contributing a paper. In effect the ‘call for papers’ amounts to a sign 
structured as ”contributes(person# paper#)"; at the time of inviting the person has 
not yet written the paper, and the rule of ontological antecedence means that the 
performing of the communication act requires a sign that refers to this affordance. 
Quite naturally many of those invited will be happy to contribute and would 
respond by accepting.
Communication act 
Agent
Sign type/token acceptance
The ‘acceptance’ is one of the semantic units in our text, and we can recognise it 
as an element in the communication act of ‘accepts’, although this word as such is 
not used. We might now adjust this threesome as follows
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Communication act accepts 
Agent person#
Sign type/token letter of intent (acceptance)
The letter of intent is the sign type which the person uses in effecting the 
communication act when accepting. Here the sign refers to the invitation. A 
person accepts an invitation, which itself contains a sign which refers to some 
future behaviour. In this case the letter of intent is a sign which refers to the 
contribution of a paper, in turn referred to in the invitation. The letter of intent 
might be reconstrued as:
"accepts(personl "invites(Worldng Conference# "contributes(personl 
paper#)"))
Another use of ‘invitation*, is the invitation to attend the conference. Here 
the distinction is clear since the sign type refers to the attendance of the person at 
the conference meeting.
Communication act invites ...
Agent Working Conference#
Sign type/token "attends (person# Working Conference#)11
Accepting this invitation involves a person, a sign referring to the invitation and the 
communication act itself. The sign will be similar to the previous one, except that 
purpose of the invitation is different.
"accepts(personl "invites(Working Conference# "attend (personl 
Working Conference#)"))
A further example of a communication act is in ‘appoints’, where member
societies of IFIP are able to appoint a National Representative to Technical
Committees. When a person is appointed the mutual commitments of the role 
holders of appointer and appointee are altered. Responsibilities and duties change.
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Results of Pass 4 (communication act)
Label of intent
Agent/Affordance Y
Agent N
Substantive, M, C S
Alias
Particular
Universal U
Particular Universal
Individual *
Relationship
Relation 1
Rote 1
Relation 2
Role 2
— Pass 4
State
Communication act accepts
Agent person
Sign type (U) Y
Sign Token (P)
Determiner (U)
Determinant (p)
Part of
figure 8.5 results for a communication act in Pass 4
Realising the act required once more the agent concerned to employ a sign which 
refers to this commencement of the new legal and social status quo. Member 
societies will use a sign which refers to the start of the incumbency of a person 
in the role of National Representative. Quite probably different societies will use 
different forms of such sign tokens to perform this function. Its semantic content 
however is circumscribed by these dependencies.
Determiner, scale, determinant
When agents discriminate amongst instances of realisation, they perform 
certain operations, or measurements, which permit this individuation. In certain 
cases the measurements may be precise and exhaustive enough to allow 
identification of unique individuals. This process can be seen as the measurement
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of the realisation on some kind of scale. For fundamental measurements, such as 
weight and height, the scale and the rules governing the measuring procedure are 
well known. For other sorts of measurement, these matters are less clear. We can 
lay down, however, the basic elements in each case of a determiner, norms for 
measuring along the scale, and a determinant, that is, the value for what is being 
determined.
In making these discriminations amongst instances of realisations the agent 
with the responsibility are applying formal rules or informal criteria. Our semantic 
analysis requires us to examine closely what such criteria are, and with the 
knowledge of who is to apply them we are able to construct a complete schema. 
For example, for the priority for each person in attending the conference there is 
a scale from 1 to 3. The procedures for making such discrimination or 
measurement will be decided by the Program Committee, and to interpret them in 
actual instances there will be identified responsible persons. The determiner is 
‘priority* and for each individual there is a determinant or value for his priority. 
Governing the measurement is the norm which regulates this evaluation.
The letter of intent acts as part of a communication act or accepting the 
invitation to contribute a work. It does not refer to any particular token used rather 
the sign type in general.
Antecedent: pass 5
As we move towards the later parts of the analysis, we require more details about 
the dependency/antecedent relationships between the affordances. Having determined 
what antecedents any instance of an affordance requires, we may turn our attention 
then to revealing the criteria, or authority responsible, for determining the existence 
of any instance. These should be found mostly among the responsible agents 
identified in the first pass.
Every affordance in a semantic schema has either one or two antecedents, 
and at this point in the analysis we want to pin these down. In each case the 
question is: what are the realisations that must exist to instantiate it? In some cases 
we have answered this already. For each relationship, for instance, the participant 
relations give us the antecedents which must exist if the relationship is to exist
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Results of Pass 4 (determiner)
Label priority
Agent/Afford ance Y
Agent N
Substantive, M, C S
Alias
Particular
Universal U
Particular Universal
Individual
Relationship
Relation 1
Role 1
Relation 2
Rote 2
------Pass 4
State
Communication act
Agent
Sign type (U)
Sign Token (P)
Determiner (U) priority
Determinant (p) #1 to 13
Part of
Figure 8.6 results for a determiner
For each determiner, in a similar manner, the antecedent is what is determined: the 
instance of the determiner depends on the existence of the determinant. With any 
affordance we have to find its ontological dependents. In the case of ‘held in’, any 
instance would depend upon an instance of a conference meeting and of a state. 
At the point when the meeting finishes, less plausibly the state, then that instance 
of ‘held in’ ceases to exist.
Authority: pass 6
Once we have elicited the affordances that populate the world of IFIP, we need to 
move on to the next stage of stating who takes responsibility for deciding the 
existence of each realisation. In some cases there will be rules which govern the 
process of deciding the start or finish of some instance. But even here the rule will
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Results from Pass 5
Label held in
Agent/Affordance Y
Agent N
Substantive, M, C S
Alias
Particular
Universal U
Particular Universal
Individual
Relationship held in
Relation 1 state
Role 1 host
Relation 2 meeting
Role 2
------Pass 4
State
Communication act
Agent
Sign type (U)
Sign Token (P)
Determiner (U) priority
Determinant (p) #1 to #3
Part of
-------Pass 5
Antecedent 1 meeting
Antecedent 2 state
figure 8.7 results for Pass 5
eventually be interpreted by some person or persons. For certain affordances the 
authority responsible is clear, while for others we may have some difficulty 
deciding. The tendency is for the affordances on the left hand side of the ontology 
chart to be more closely related to the day to day work of the organisation, and 
therefore less problematic. Above all is the consideration that the task of resolving 
who is responsible when this is not apparent, is one of the utmost importance to 
any organisation.
Start and finish dates: pass 7
In the surrogate table there are separate columns for the start date and the finish 
dates of each affordance. Part of the task of the semantic analysts is to attempt to 
complete the entries for these columns. For universals there will be great difficulty
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in giving the start dates: the concept of ‘state* goes back into the mists of time, the 
concept of ‘person* even further. We would leave these blank—they are 
conundrums to be resolved by the philosophers. With new universals we might be 
luckier. For instance, the concept of ‘patriality’ as a criterion for the determination 
of British nationality can be pinned down to the 1981 British Nationality Act. 
Occasionally we may be able to place finish dates for universals. The universal of 
‘phlogiston*, a substance believed for centuries to be behind the phenomenon of 
combustion, was finally laid to rest by the theories of Lavoisier and Priestley 
towards the end of the eighteenth century.
For particulars and especially for realisations our task is less problematic. 
Particular persons have their birthdates and these are their start dates. Where we 
do not know this information we are continually confronted by the blank entry that 
reminds what we must yet discover. When searching for this information we have 
the aid of knowing who is responsible for determining the start and finish of each 
affordance.
Mood: pass 8
For most computer based systems the general assumption is that the symbols stored 
therein refer to ‘facts’ about the world which the user deems necessary to record. 
But on the basis that the business and social affairs require the use of moods other 
than ‘fact* (assertion), NORMA requires that the mood prevailing at the start and 
finish of the existence of the affordance be stated. In many cases this may be 
assertion, but not always. Take for instance the problem of limited allocating 
conference places to the many who wish to attend. Inviting a person to attend a 
conference, stating an intention to attend (ie. accepting the invitation), and actually 
attending the conference could result in three moods: hypothesis, prediction, 
assertion, to handle the evolution of the exchange leading up to the conference.
In this pass we should pay attention to the moods for the affordances 
registered in the semantic schema. Where there are ‘conversations* of the kind 
referred to here there will be a set pattern of moods which characterise the 
changing status of responsibility and expectation. This pattern can be reflected by 
inserting universals enabling us to record the flux of events when invitations,
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acceptances and attendances materialise in their hundreds. In Figure 8.8 the gradual 
evolution of the position regarding the attendance of John is tracked1. At the start 
of 1988 the invitation goes out, and an H for hypothetical attendance is registered; 
at the start of February John accepts the invitation and a P for a predicted
type
Figure 8.8 changes of mood in handling conference attendances
attendance marks the end of the purely hypothetical state of affairs as the mutual 
responsibilities alter; at the start of the conference on the 19th of September the 
mood changes to A for assertion, marking the end of the prediction phase and the 
existence of an actual realised attendance. At each phase the surrogates reflect a 
manifest and intricate complex of interwoven duties and responsibilities.
Generic and specific: pass 9
Categorising and grouping into sets has been an important technique when 
attempting to discuss organisations in an economical way. For NORMA the 
generic/specific structure is a key feature of the specification. Analysts do not 
attempt to identify definitive generics and specifics, but instead the aim is to reveal 
the usages that are found in the organisation. What we have, in effect, when we 
discover such relationships are conventions or norms whereby a responsible agent 
consistently behaves in a manner that relates a specific to a generic. Other agents 
may do things differently.
1 For the sake of clarity the surrogate numbers have not been employed in this example
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In Chapter 7 examples found in the CRIS case study were considered in 
some detail.
Draw and check ontology pass 10
In the final pass the analyst is naturally enjoined to check the consistency of the 
analysis. For the most part this means ensuring that the elements traced in the 
semantic schema and recorded in the surrogate table follow the constraints set out 
in the syntax of the language NORMA.
It would be repetitious to return to the points covered in Chapter 4 where 
the syntactical controls over the semantics employed are itemised, but work is going 
ahead at the University of Twente on the production of the NORMA interpreter 
which will be able to do much of the checking of the semantic constraints in an 
automatic fashion. For example, the most critical question is that of ontological 
antecedence. Any affordance must have its ontological antecedents declared, and 
a module in the NORMA system will check that this has been done. Presently this 
work can be done ‘manually* and when the semantic schema is given in a graphical 
fashion this kind of checking is fairly simple to perform: the branching of the 
lattice structure require the antecedents to be stated in any case. When the schema 
becomes unwieldy this ‘manual* checking becomes more worrisome.
Conclusion
These series of passes at the text conduct the beginner analyst through the 
difficult array of overlapping considerations that must be made. Effectively this is 
a profound textual analysis, some might use the term hermeneutic process, which 
must be done if the terminology by which the actors in the domain refer to their 
behaviour is to be constrained into a formal schema. At each pass more and more 
detail is acquired and the analyst is able to complete the columns of the surrogate 
table. At the simplest level the analyst must ask whether each term is worthy of 
further consideration or whether it should be eliminated. Then the agents are 
distinguished from the affordances, and universals, particulars, and individuals are 
identified. Gradually the attention moves to relationships and roles and to the key 
notions of antecedents, taking in determiners, parts, states, communication acts and
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their related notions of signs types and tokens. To complete the surrogate table 
columns starts and finishes, authorities and moods must be supplied. Before 
checking the ontology of the schema, the analyst should be in a position to write 
the norms of the generics and specifics.
These steps account for the bulk of any semantic analysis and when 
thoroughly completed they should furnish the analyst with a battery of specification 
detail for the information systems requirements of the problem domain. Setting out 
a series of steps to follow always lays one open to the risk of being accused of 
producing a ‘cookbook’, in the manner of those recipe books that seek to reduce 
into a number of simple stages the often complex culinary activities that go in to 
turning out a wholesome meal. The risk is of ‘reductio ad absurdum’ —that the 
simplification leads to absurdity, and the subtleties of the approach are lost in the 
bleak aridity of step-following. On the other hand there is naturally a need to 
digest the indigestible into some ready-to-hand method which can provide an entrde 
into a new analytical approach. A crutch for the needy, a platform for the 
confident. The steps reviewed in this chapter do not purport to be the final 
product; they need further testing and refinement. But they do represent a concrete 
basis from which to support this new form of analysis.
A method of this kind, with a large body of theoretical underpinning to be 
understood and assimilated, has an overriding need for a method for performing it. 
Over the years the present author has noticed how often students who were coming 
into contact with this new approach for the first time would bewail the lack of a 
clear and concrete starting point There is in existence at the London School of 
Economics a large body of literature, in the form of student reports, dissertations 
and the LEGOL/NORMA working papers themselves, which is available for guiding 
those who want to use these methods. However this literature pales in comparison 
with the material available on many other specification methods, especially where 
these are tied in with software support. The complexity of specification methods 
so often necessitates a clear exposition of the steps that the analyst must take, if the 
beginner is not to be lost by the wayside. The expert in a particular technique has 
no such need, and more often than not, will soon be developing his own special 
order of performing the various tasks and be finding ways of cutting comers. 
However, when there is a good deal of theory which we cannot assume to be
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automatically understood by someone at first encounter, then the principles of the 
analysis must be supported by a clear method for performing the work.
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Principles for Performing Semantic Analysis
This chapter aims to aid analysts in the application of NORMA as a systems 
specification language and seeks to provide guidance in performing semantic 
analysis. Given the hydra-headed nature of the problem of applying a semantic 
theory, outlining a set of principles perhaps offers more scope than seeking to lay 
out rules. Rules tell us how to behave in particular circumstances, whereas 
principles require observance at all times, and especially when there may not be any 
relevant rules to follow. However given the aim of developing an interpreter for 
NORMA which can check the semantic consistency of data held in its surrogate 
table, there is an overriding need to develop a set of such rules. These would 
have the form of any other system represented in NORMA: a semantic schema for 
the area of discourse, in this case the world of the metadata or schema itself, and 
rules written in LEGOL which prescribe the behaviour of the elements in the 
schema. What results is a prescription at the metaphysical level of any schema 
written in this form: a schema for schemas.
If the theory of behaviour that underlies NORMA is sufficiently rigorous to 
encompass any world we might choose to represent, then this ‘super-schema* 
promises to be the alchemist’s stone for information systems builders: a set of 
regulations that ensures that the systems built using such tools conform to a very 
precise and well tried body of semantic constraints that will guarantee to stand the 
test of time. Unfortunately we do not pretend to be able to deliver such a prize 
with this work but instead hope to demonstrate the feasibility of such a quest, and 
these rules have been gleaned from the understanding gained during the application 
of semantic analysis to the problems discussed in the case studies, as well as many 
others.
As with any other task of semantic analysis we endeavour to subject the 
terms used in the area of discourse to the rigours of NORMA as the specification 
language. In this case this means targeting the very terms that NORMA employs 
as primitives to specify information systems and seeking to develop an ontology
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chart and a set of norms (or rules) which prescribe the way in which these elements 
of discourse may be used in the process of performing semantic analysis. 
Effectively this is a semantic analysis of semantic analysis. On the basis of the 
experience gained and using the outline of the specification language NORMA given 
in Chapter 4, it has been possible to provide in the following pages the ontology 
chart and twenty or more rules.
Figure 9.1 ontology chart for NORMA meta-schema
In Figure 9.1 we illustrate in the form of an ontology chart the semantic 
schema for this metaschema. Whilst not complete, it permits sufficient of the rules 
for this metalevel to be prescribed to show the path of future development. On the 
basis of this schema the rules for semantic schemas may be written.
As with legislation in general each individual rule does not apply exclusively 
of the other rules that exist. Instead the situation is that all the rules apply 
together. For the most part they are rules of definition which delineate the terms 
used, but in a way which permits the metaphysical assumptions of NORMA to be 
imposed upon the schema. Each constraint indicates a parameter for the analyst
combination
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when seeking to apply semantic analysis. More constraints imply less ‘artistic’ 
solutions but a greater likelihood of semantic normalisation: both the expert and 
the relative novice should come up with the same solution if the rules are applied 
in a consistent fashion. A further ambition is that partial solutions to a big 
problem should be capable of integration.
Further to this is the hope that the determination of rules in such a manner 
should allow the computer-based interpreter for NORMA to perform many of these 
checks on the data which is entered. In this way the burden of ensuring that the 
constraints of the specification language have been complied with falls less on the 
shoulders of the analyst and instead is taken up by the computer.
1 Affordances
At the most basic level we posit the root agent, Society in general, and Society has 
a vast range of behaviours available to it. At the most generic level these are 
affordances. This first rule is a generic/specific rule that relates all the various 
kinds of behaviour to the affordance.
Affordance <— ability; agent; beginning; communication act;
combination (orwhile; while; whilenot);
dependency; determiner, determiner, ending; 
entailment; incumbency; label; mood; norm; 
particular; realisation; responsibility; role; 
rolename; sign type; sign token; surrogate 
number, takes; -; +; @+;@-
Everything that applies in the schema to the affordance in general applies also to 
these specifics. Note that the reverse is not true: the characteristics of each of these 
specific kinds of affordances are peculiar to that kind.
2 Agent
agent <- affordance whilfc takes(affordance responsibility)
1 emphasis denotes operators in LEGOL
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Agents are key to the whole basis of NORMA in that they are the hooks from 
which the formal system knits into the world of informal social intercourse. This 
simple rule spells out the requirement for taking responsibility in order for an 
affordance to be treated as an agent. In the metaschema it is appropriate to spell 
out who the agents are, to enable the further development of the specification.
In rejecting the view of the world as a ready-made objective reality and 
replacing it instead, following the approach of Gibson (1977), with one where there 
are many agents who have differing ways of perceiving and experiencing, we can 
use the notion of responsibility to anchor the representation. In practice what this 
means is that the agents will usually be found to the left of our ontology charts 
because it is they who realise the affordances to the right. Agents take 
responsibility for their particular way of dividing up the world, and for the 
affordances that they realise, and it is this capacity that separates an agent from any 
other affordance.
Any group of persons or team or collective body can be an agent, but the 
largest agents become whole jurisdictions covering complete classes of people, 
which under the jurisdiction perform their duties, carry their responsibilities and 
enjoy their rights. A group agent owes its coherence and capacity to carry 
collective responsibility to its internal norms for making its members (in that role) 
conform to collective/joint intentions.
3 Realisation
A realisation <— affordance while((antecedent while particular)
while (antecedent while agent))
B realisation <— affordance while (antecedent while realisation)
Realisations materialise when an agent determines the existence of a particular 
entity. The affordance must have for at least one antecedent an agent to realise 
the behaviour, since other types of affordances cannot "behave" as such. Equally 
the realisation of behaviours by agents means that particulars must be the
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antecedents and not universals. The universal implies a pattern of behaviour but 
not actual behaviour. The while operator functions as a time constraint on the 
realisation: a realisation exists while the agent exists, and while the particularity of 
the antecedent maintains. Notice also in Figure 9.1 that the line of ontology is 
separate from the rest of the chart. This because we need to distinguish between 
what behaviour may exist (ie. the rest of the chart) and what does exist (what is 
realised). This rule shows how affordances may become realisations: it is the link 
between the possible and the here-and-now in any domain.
Rule 3B permits the antecedent to be a modified agent, hence John is an 
agent, but John with a cup is an agent (modified). Both are realisations: first under 
3A and the second under rule 3B. John with a cup can go on to realise the 
affordance of drinking.
This category of rules guarantees that anything that is recorded as having 
existed has to have a clear lineage of realisation. Entities do not exist for 
themselves but have to be realised by responsible agents. This ensures that the 
validity of data can always be traced back to whoever has realised and taken 
responsibility for the manifestation.
4 Ability
ability(affordance) <— affordance
A simple rule which allows every affordance to be associated with the ability to 
realise the behaviour. If we attribute to John the affordance ‘sings’ then it implies 
that he has the ability to warble even when he is not so doing. If he should suffer 
some permanent damage to his vocal chords then we should have to remove the 
affordance from its association with him. The network of possibilities reflects 
directly that of the ontology chart.
5 Authority
A @+(affordance) <— agent or norm
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B (©-(affordance) <— agent or norm 
C @+orwhile@-(realisation) <— agent while realisation
These rules restrict the range of types of affordances that may be given as 
authorities which determine the starts and finishes of realisations to just two: agents 
and norms. In the case of universals a norm is often specified. The person who 
judges whether a foul has been performed in a football match is the referee, and 
this is a norm which does not identify a particular person. In an actual Cup Final 
the identity of the referee is, and must be, apparent; the person or agent will be a 
realisation.
We always have a responsible agent to turn to whenever the formal system 
is used to record the start or finish of any actual behaviour in the informal system.
6 Antecedents
A maximum antecedents ^ number antecedent whilenotereater than 2
B particular <— affordance while (antecedent while particular)
C universal ^-affordance
while (antecedent while(particular orwhile universal))
Ontological antecedence underpins all realisations. Affordances are realised by their 
antecedents of which there may not be more than two. There is no special virtue 
in the number two for the maximum number of antecedents, neither is there any 
deep metaphysical significance in the choice; except that experience has shown that 
it is perfectly adequate for this purpose. Rule 6A merely sets this maximum figure.
6B requires that the ontological antecedents of any particular must be 
particulars themselves. A particular is ontologically always invested with other
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particulars that set it in its context. A particular Cup Final will be held in a 
particular stadium, played between particular teams and so forth.
This is not so for universals. A universal may have as antecedents other 
universals: as in the CRIS case where the affordance ‘citizenship* and its two 
antecedents ‘person* and ‘state’ were all universals. However the International 
Federation of Information Processing, a particular, had a number of 
universals—Working Groups, Technical Committees, Working Conferences—all of 
which were dependents of IFIP. 6C encapsulates this specification.
The ontology chart represents the semantic schema in a graphic manner, 
where the connecting lines between the affordances stand for ontological 
dependencies. This means that the affordance to the right can only exist whilst the 
one at the left hand end of the line(s) exists: instances of the realised affordances 
depend upon instances of their antecedents. Analysts must check carefully that this 
rule is adhered to when beginning to sketch out the schema in this way.
Perhaps it is appropriate at this point to introduce rules that link affordances 
to their fundamental roles in the ontological structure.
D antecedent <— affordance 1 while dependency (affordance 1
affordance2)
E dependent <— affordance2 while dependency(affordancel
affordance2)
In this way the semantics of two critical terms, antecedent and dependent, are 
demarcated, so that the validity of the considerable use that is made of them in the 
specification is secured.
F relation or relationship <— affordance while number of antecedent 
while 2
Where an affordance has two antecedents, as with ‘citizenship(person state)*, then 
this is defined as a relation or relationship, that is, the two antecedents must both 
be realisations for their joint affordance to be realised. We can distinguish
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between the use we make of the term relationship and that of relation, in the sense 
that the former might be restricted to cases where the antecedents are persons, 
whereas the latter be used where other affordances are involved in a joint 
affordance. In which case the rule for the relationship would be:
G relationship <— affordance while (number of antecedent
(while person) while 2))
curtailing the use of the term ‘relationship* only to those cases where ‘person* is 
the antecedent.
7 Parts
Another very simple rule deals with the ‘part’ affordance. In one sense this is just 
an extension of the rule of ontology. A part of some realisation can only exist 
while the realisation of which it is part exists.
part(affordance) <— affordance
Whereas with relational data models the assumption that the data held is atomic, ie. 
indivisible, no such restriction is enforced here. How can we know in advance that 
the entities we allocate a place to in the schema when it is first constructed will not 
prove to be divisible later. Dividing and sub-dividing spaces is common practice 
for those engaged in property management; the schema produced with NORMA 
methods will easily cope with such demands. The relational database will not.
8 Joint affordance or combination
combination <-affordancel while ((dependent while while orwhile
whilenot orwhile orwhile) 
while (antedentl while affordance) while (antecedent2 while 
affordance))
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When several behaviours (for an individual agent) are realised contemporaneously 
then we have a joint affordance or combination. Note the distinction between these 
and rules. Norms prescribe circumstances where the behaviour concerns several 
independent agents acting in concert, whereas with combinations we are still 
considering the individual agent alone, albeit where the agent is a complex one, 
such as large organisation or institution.
With combinations, or joint affordances, which are explained in more detail 
in Chapter 4, we use the LEGOL dyadic operators while, whilenot and orwhile. to 
combine individual affordances into more complex structures. The antecedents are 
merely affordances which are threaded together using the LEGOL syntax as 
operands in the expressions.
9 Signs
A sign type «— affordance 1 while represents(affordancel affordance2)
while (affordance 1 while universal)
B signification <— affordance2
while represents(affordancel affordance2)
C sign token <— affordance 1
while ((representsfaffordance 1 affordance2)) 
while (represents while realisation)))
D communication act <— affordance while (antecedent! while agent) 
while (antecedent2 while signtype))
A sign type is a kind of affordance which is used to stand for another. At the 
level of the type we are concerned with universals only and this is a limiting clause 
in 9A. For realisations the sign type becomes a sign token, actually employed as 
a sign in an exchange between agents. The token must be a particular, by rule 3A. 
The counterpart of the sign is its signification, the ‘meaning* of the sign. In rule
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9B this is attributed to the other affordance in the ‘represents* joint affordance: 
affordance2 is the signification of affordance 1.
Rule 9C specifies that in any realisation involving signs, the sign token, or 
realised sign type, carries the ‘meaning’ of the other affordance.
Finally rule 9D restricts the performance of communication acts to cases 
where the antecedents are agents and sign types/tokens. Agents will need to 
communicate with each other in order to accomplish their tasks and this will be 
achieved by using communication (or ‘speech* acts), such as order, request, 
acknowledge, inform, and so on. The existence of these communication acts 
provides another clue in seeking to identify the agents in any domain. If they can 
make use of speech acts and are thereby able to change the set of expectations, 
obligations and commitments that comprises our social reality, then we may be sure 
that they are agents in the sense of being able to take responsibility2. Here we are 
interested in the pragmatic level, in the use of these communication acts to convey 
intentions of our agents to each other. We do not concern ourselves with the 
messages by which this interchange is effected.
For signs, the ontological dependency functions also. A sign is created by 
an agent capable of acting semiologically, and this sign will be interpreted by 
another agent who will be disposed to act in response to the sign. However an 
agent can realise a sign when its signifier may not exist: a blueprint for a new 
piece of machinery exists before the machine it signifies has come into existence; 
a halt sign on a disused railway track may survive long after the railway system 
has ceased to disturb that neck of the woods.
10 Norms
A agent <— antecedent(norm)
B norm <— (entailment(affordancel affordance2))
2 We do not think of machines as agents in this sense: we cannot hold the computer responsible for having overcharged 
a customer, just as in the past we would not blame the telephone for a mistake in the ordering of goods by phone.
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In NORMA the invariants of behaviour for groups of agents are referred to as 
norms, as opposed to affordances where only single agents are concerned. Given 
this understanding, 10A specifies that norms must have agents as antecedents: only 
agents can realise behavioural norms. 10B, however, prescribes the norm structure 
itself. We have chosen the term ‘entailment’ as a generic for the two specifics ’ 
(if... then) and *—»*(whenever). These two operators are used to construct assemblies 
of behaviour and, in effect, denote where one affordance entails another.
This profile of a norm can be used to indicate how the norm might be 
entered into the surrogate table. The two antecedents, affordance 1 and affordance2, 
are the antecedents of the operator. Whenever affordance 1 and affordance2 are 
jointly realised then the particular norm has been realised also. The label of the 
norm affordance will be the name of the norm itself, say 9B. In the case of 
informal norms, such as greeting a person encountered in the corridor, then there 
may be no name as such. The uniqueness of the norm is guaranteed by the two 
antecedents, and the surrogate number will serve to enable the manipulation of the 
surrogate for the norm.
11 Determinant
determinant «- affordance while ((antecedent#l while determiner)
while (antecedent#2 (while particular))
Where determiners are used to discriminate amongst affordances, the two 
antecedents must be determiners and the particular which is being determined. For 
example where the weight of a person is reckoned at 88 kilograms, then this 
determinant (88 kgs) has as its antecedents the particular person and the 
affordance/determiner of weight. There would have to be a norm that specifies the 
standard of weight in metric units. Rule 11 ensures that the accompanying 
information must be supplied when attributing determinants.
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12 Roles
A role <— affordance while (antecedent while dependency)
B rolename <— affordance while (antecedent while role)
C incumbency <— affordance (while (antecedentl while role)
while (antecedent2 while (antecedent while (dependency 
while (antecedent while role)))))
One of the strongest aspects of NORMA is the way that roles are handled. Just 
as in the spoken language where the use of roles permits a delicacy, an accuracy 
and an economy of expression, so too with the specification language NORMA, but 
never in a way which prejudices the ontological structures and the resistance and 
durability over time of the schema.
Rule 12A begins by establishing the role as an affordance which depends 
ontologically on a dependency. For instance the role of ‘spouse* in marriage 
depends upon the dependency between marriage and person. Should this 
dependency cease then so would the role.
The ‘rolename’ in rule 12B is the particular label given to the role. The 
semantic pattern does not alter just because the rolename changes, hence it is 
ontologically separate.
In rule 12C we desire to pin down the occupiers of the roles and restrict 
them in an appropriate fashion. Thus one antecedent of ‘incumbency* is always the 
role itself, such as ‘spouse*. The second antecedent is restricted to being an 
antecedent of the dependency on which the role depends. Therefore the dependency 
would be between ‘marriage’ and ‘person*, of which ‘person’ is the antecedent, and 
this dependency is the ontological antecedent of ‘spouse*. In such a manner we can 
constrain the incumbents of roles to those affordances which participate in the role- 
generating dependencies. This would mean that we could not include in the 
surrogate table an entry which registered a robot as a spouse! This would be
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excluded because it failed to conform to the prevailing specification at the level of 
the metaschema.
13 Individual
individual <— affordance 1 (while particular)
while (determinant while (antecedent while affordance 1))
An important metaphysical category is that of the individual. So often we need to 
be able to refer to individuals in our everyday affairs. The ability to discern 
individuals is not taken for granted by NORMA and instead is seen as an 
affordance of some realisations only. This rule states that an individual must be 
a particular (and not a universal) and must participate in a determinant affordance 
with some determiner. At this most fundamental level we are concerned with the 
ability of an affordance to be individuated. Having established that, say, persons 
are individuals then we can proceed to include individuals in relationships, and 
prescribe behaviour for them. Hence a rule could be written to deny the right of 
an individual to be an antecedent of two marriages concurrently (where the ontology 
is MARRIAGE (PERSON#l PERSON#2). We can write that PERSON#l may not 
be involved in two marriages, without needing to identify that person; the 
individuation is sufficient.
14 Agreement
agreement <— affordance 1 while (((antecedent 1 while agent# 1)
while (antecedent while agent#2)) 
while (@ +while@ -affordance 1 (while antecedent 1 while 
antcedent2)))
This rule illustrates how NORMA can mould quite generalised and even mundane 
concepts into underlying prescriptions for any schema. Agreement has a notion of 
two parties involved in some concordat in which each party has some degree of 
control. If either party withdraws then the agreement ceases to exist, or at least the
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ending of the agreement is posited. The rule states economically this concept 
specifying that the antecedents must be agents, and not just any type of affordance, 
and that both of these agents have jointly the authority to determine the start and 
finish of the agreement. With a rule such as this, the NORMA interpreter could 
check the validity of any affordance deemed to be a type of agreement: contracts, 
arrangements, deals, treaties and the like, and ensure that the underlying 
requirements are being met in each case.
Rules and Principles
Although a complete set of such rules would furnish the analyst with the tools to 
complete a semantically normalised analysis for any information system, it may 
prove to be beyond the powers of researchers in this field. A distinction was 
made in the opening paragraph of this chapter between rules and principles, and 
unfortunately this distinction is necessary even within this analysis. There are 
aspects of the work of semantic analysis that are not easily transmutable into formal 
rules, or at any rate the utility of the result may be questionable. Our aim is to 
develop tools which can aid the analyst in performing this task. Rendering in a 
formal language that which may be better explained in natural language does not 
necessarily add to knowledge. However, where the rules that are expressed in the 
formal language can then be incorporated into an interpreter for NORMA, and will 
serve to perform consistency checks on all data entered, this job is more than 
justified.
In view of this position, we outline a few of these principles which serve 
to support the work of the analyst.
Principle 1
Analyse all terms used to represent phenomena in the user's world as candidate 
affordances for the schema, without changing the words. Alternatively:
Given A"x" and Ax
analyst must use "x" to refer to x
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A principle crucial to NORMA is that the user community is central to the design 
process. This is made easier than in most methods because concern with the 
computer can be completely suppressed. The principle of user centrality leads us 
to insist on employing only the user’s vocabulary instead of playing Humpty- 
Dumpty, where the analyst not the user decides the meaning of terms, as nearly all 
analysts and programmers do when forced to use current methods. Therefore the 
names of affordances are restricted to be semantically unitary words or expressions 
in the normal discourse of the business. It should be reasonably easy to develop 
a thesaurus containing information that will enable the computer to create a 
preliminary analysis of the vocabulary being studied in the form of default 
classifications that the analyst can amend as he thinks fit. As we accumulate 
reliable fragments of ontological structure through the analysis of many cases, the 
thesaurus will become enriched by their addition. The analyst will have the benefit, 
as he studies an expression, of the consolidated experience of his predecessors, and 
the gradual perfection of these analyses through criticism. We shall have less need 
to reinvent every wheel.
Principle 2
The object system can be decomposed into substantive, communication and control 
sub-systems, o f which the substantive system is the most important. The primary 
classification is by semiological level (Stamper 1985):
substantive items are the primary concern of the business, 
communication (or procedural) items convey information about the 
substantive ones,
control items are information about the maintenance of the system, rewards 
and punishments.
How to distinguish substantive, communication and control? Our initial focal system 
is the substantive system and to concentrate upon it, for convenience, we may make 
two assumptions:
a) that everybody in our substantive system knows what they have to do: 
they do not need supplying with information in order to carry out their 
functions;
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b) that everybody in our substantive system does what they should do: they 
need neither rewards nor coercion to ensure that they conform with the 
requirements of the substantive system.
Before analysts despair at the naivety of these assumptions, permit a moment’s 
reflection to consider how conveniently this stratagem allows us to concentrate upon 
the norms and affordances of the substantive system, free from the cluttering detail 
of the communication (or message) system and the control system. Both these 
latter play crucial roles in the functioning of any system but in this fashion they can 
be analysed separately from the substantive system.
Traditional analytical approaches emphasise the movements of messages and 
the storage and retrieval of records, as for example in dataflow analysis (de Marco 
1979) and deal with an organisation as though it were a gigantic ‘information 
plumbing’ system. They work in terms of flows of data or data structures that will 
be held in storage devices. They rely upon an informal treatment of semantics and 
are unable to say very much about what the messages refer to. Insofar as they deal 
with the contents of messages they deal with them syntactically as arrangements of 
sub-messages and fields and data elements. To escape from the nightmare we have 
to go behind the information plumbing paradigm to deal with the business rather 
than with the bureaucracy overlaid upon it.
The substantive system gives the content of the messages, whereas the 
communication system concerns itself with the form and addressing of the message. 
Since the particular method employed in achieving the business goals may change 
from time to time, our prime aim is the specification of this substantive system. 
Having once specified this, we can build the specification for the communication 
and control sub-systems.
It is worthwhile in passing to note that the metaphysical assumptions that 
underpin NORMA secure attention to the substantive. The expressions that are 
written in the language are reflections of actual behaviour in the here-and-now, and 
the messages and records that refer to this behaviour are treated as signs. Having 
a plank of semiotics as part of the theoretical platform guarantees this distinction 
in a natural manner.
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Principle 3
Specific members o f a generic!specific hierarchy can realise affordances available 
to the generic members. Alternatively:
Afy while (a:b:c:d:e —» f) —> Aay:Aby:Acy:Ady:Aey
Because the generic/specific norm is so fundamental to the specification of any 
system, it is perhaps worthy of particular mention. While the norm exists that 
indicates the generic/specific hierarchy (a:b:c:d:e —» f) , each affordance attributed 
to the generic affordance (f) is inherited by each of the specifics 
((a:b:c:d:e)—anything that T  can do so can ‘a \  *b\ ‘c’, ‘d’ and ‘e*. Strictly 
speaking there is no need to spell out this as a principle, since what it achieves is 
catered for by the use of norms. Here it is only a special case because so much 
emphasis is placed on ‘inheritance’ in the "semantic data models" developed in the 
1980’s, and outlined in Chapter 3. Affordances attributed to any specifics do not 
automatically apply to other specifics nor to the generic. If T  is ‘fruit’ and ‘a* 
is ‘apple’ then the characteristics of fruit may be assigned to apples, but this does 
not imply that all fruit is green.
Principle 4.
All affordances which are realised (i.e. realisations) have a determinate existence 
during which they, as invariants, conform to the authority. When this invariance 
ceases, according to the judgment o f the authority, then that existence ceases. 
Starts and finishes in the schema refer to the existence markers for realisations as 
far as the formal system (of signs) is concerned. For the agent themselves, 
existences of realisations is denoted by beginnings and endings.
We have expressed the notion of existence as a key principle for the 
NORMA specification language. As agents realise affordances, the existence of the 
realisation starts, and in the record we may enter a date/time for the START field. 
When a realisation exists, its the START field will have an entry but the FINISH 
field will not.
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SURROGATE #.....
LABEL.......... borrows
ANTECEDENT 1 copy xyzl23 (of Cider with Rosie)
ANTECEDENT 2 A. Lender
AUTHORITY START..library assistant 
AUTHORITY FINISH.
MOODSTART assertive
MOODSTART.......
START...........1/4/1989
FINISH..........
Here we have the record of the start of a ‘borrows* realisation, which has two 
realisations as antecedents: a realised person, with the label (or in this case, name) 
of ‘A. Lender’ and a realised copy, with a label ‘xyzl23*. When A. Lender returns 
the book to the library the date/time for the FINISH field can be entered.
Starts and finishes represent the formal boundaries in time that agents 
recognise for the existences of realisations. Examples abound of special terms that 
are used to refer to these boundaries, for example for person we have birth and 
death, whereas for marriage we have wedding for start, but death, divorce or 
annulment as various ways of finishing a marriage.
The beginnings of the ‘borrows* realisation will originate with the persons 
that decide to use the library at some stage in their intentional behaviour. These 
persons might place the ending with the point when they leave the library building, 
when the book is cancelled from their library record, or at some other stage. Starts 
and finishes concern the markers for the formal sign system that is used for 
recording and tracking the library behaviour.
One could draw an analogy with a downhill ski-race. The start and finish 
markers on the slope represent the formal definition of the race (still to be 
interpreted by the race officials). For the individual skiers, the race may begin when 
they are warming up, putting on their skis, and so on. The ending of the race for 
them may be at a considerable distance from the finishing poles and could be when 
they are finally back in the dressing room having a shower. Beginnings and 
endings relate to some mechanism inside the agent and reflect the intentional 
aspects of their actions.
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Rules and stability of schema
In the opening chapter of this work it was stated that one main strand in the
research was the quest for tools which could ensure stability of schemas in 
databases and computer systems. This endeavour has been undertaken in different 
ways by other researchers, in particular Marche (1990) and Ades (1987), who have 
been associated with the work of the LEGOL/NORMA project. Marche’s work has 
been of particular interest in attempting to develop a tool for the measuring of 
database stability over time. One of his discoveries has been the extent to which
the same terms come to have different meanings in different parts of large
organisations, and to which the meaning changes with the passing of the years. An 
example of this, mentioned in Chapter 3, was that of the term ‘building’ when 
employed in a large Canadian telecommunications company. At least three major 
departments of the company used different meanings. These were the accounts 
department, the maintenance department and the real estate department. What is 
clear is that the usages developed in each case served the purpose for which it was 
intended. Problems arose only when the various departments needed to cooperate 
and in their cooperation this term was central.
Conclusions
A body of rules and principles is what is used to guide the behaviour of a very 
large number of business and social activities. Articulating the rules and principles 
which guide the activities of the experienced semantic analyst should be easier than 
trying to do the same for a data analyst The former has an explicit body of 
semantic theory upon which he carries out his trade; the latter has little theory but 
usually a lot of practical experience. What has been presented in this chapter is an 
outline of guidelines for the performing of semantic analysis which should make 
explicit what is permissible in the construction of semantic schemas. It fall short 
in two ways: it is lamentably incomplete and lacks many rules yet to provide a full 
specification, and it is based upon the experience of semantic analysis of a very 
limited number of persons. There has been a hitherto gruesome logical short 
circuit: the lack of clear explicit rules for doing semantic analysis restricts the
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number of possible exponents of the cult. This part of our work, inadequate though 
it may be, seeks to break this vicious circle.
In addition to explicating the rules, we have attempted to expound general 
principles which should be applicable at all times in the performing of the analysis. 
Occasionally analysts will need to refer to these principles, or to the philosophy on 
which they arc based, to resolve the dilemmas that tend to recur when disentangling 
semantic ambiguities. Shifting the paradigm from that of an objective reality to one 
where the agents involved choose to structure the world they inhabit in the way 
that best suits their purpose appears to be the most difficult obstacle to overcome. 
Once achieved, experience has shown that analysts can quickly accumulate a 
reasonable corpus of skill in handling these semantic questions.
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Problems in performing semantic analysis
Continuous exposure to analysts seeking to acquire confidence with semantic 
analysis has enabled us to come to a good understanding of what errors are 
commonly made; such information will be vital for training in the method. In this 
chapter we examine the work of a few analysts with a view to highlighting some 
of these ‘classic* deficiencies.
Role as affordance
Straub examines the problem of scholarship allocation in a university (Straub 1988) 
and there are a number of versions of the ontology chart which indicate the 
evolution of the analysis. In Chart 1 (Appendix H) we find a common error has 
been incorporated —that of the specification of a role as a separate affordance. An 
‘officer* affordance is presented as something jointly afforded by ‘office’ and
in s ti tu t ion
ffice
s c h o l a r s h i p s
e t c
(responsibility)
n c u m b e n c y(officer)
p e r s o n
Figure 10.1 ‘office’ corrected
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‘person*. When the person ceases the role of ‘officer’ ceases also, would run the 
logical consequence of this representation. This would suggest that the position in 
some administration ceases to exist if the person occupying it currently, or 
previously, should come to some untimely end. This runs counter to experience. 
The notion of an "establishment" in the British Civil Service includes the idea of 
a number of posts for particular parts of the service, regardless of whether the posts 
are currently filled. Similarly, in an army we speak of a regiment being "under 
strength" suggesting that there are fewer soldiers than there should be. In this sense 
the slot or post in the structure exists independently of the person filling it.
Instead the notion of ‘office* for NORMA is a very general and fundamental 
one (see Figure 10.1). Here the term is exactly parallel to that of ‘role*, used in 
the SPS example in Chapter 5. An administrative structure is seen to be composed 
of parts, which are the building bricks of the organisation and these parts in the 
scholarship case are known as "offices". Each officer will have a particular set of 
tasks to perform and may be referred to in this way, i.e. the Scholarship Officer. 
An instance of a person filling the post is handled by ‘incumbency’ jointly afforded 
by person and office, as illustrated in the case studies.
Ontological dependence of personal states
As persons we are capable of a wide range of sensations and feelings, and we need
person
lardship
Figure 10.2 ‘hardship’ corrected
to handle these from time to time in a schema. The scholarship case covers the 
question of students experiencing hardship financially. In Chart 1 (Appendix H) 
‘hardship* is shown as a joint antecedent of ‘suffers* together with ‘person*, without
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any antecedent of its own. What does this imply: that hardship is something that 
exists for itself outside of the person who experiences it. This is a curious 
conception, where feelings and human sensations are given identities and existences 
of their own, detached from the persons that give them life. The NORMA 
philosophy does not support this representation and requires that sensations and 
feelings depend upon persons for their existence. Therefore ‘hardship* would be 
an affordance of ‘person* (Figure 10.2). In experiencing hardship a person would 
realise, that is determine, the existence of an instance of it, on their own authority. 
The interesting question is how does an external agent, such as a university 
committee, establish the existence of hardship in a more ‘objective* manner? On 
the basis of past cases, criteria would be used such as income, personal 
circumstances and so on, to permit comparison and evaluation of applications for 
funds. Such criteria do not impute that the applicants themselves are not 
undergoing hardship. Two sets of authorities will produce their own findings: the 
students involved and the committee.
Antecedents necessitated
In the same area of Chart 1 (Appendix H) we find the section that deals with 
‘assistance’ (Figure 10.3).
person
Figure 10.3 ‘assistance’ corrected
Straub has presented ‘assistance* as having no antecedent as such and presumably 
intends it to be viewed as ontologically independent of the affordances specified. 
This would imply that assistance is something that exists for itself, outside of the
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agencies that may provide it. On the contrary, however, the notion of assistance 
generally carries with it the intervention of one party to the benefit of a second 
party who needs it. This would suggest two antecedents to ‘assistance*: one party 
being the person receiving and another party providing it  The second party would 
quite often be an agent, in the NORMA sense —capable of responsibility, although 
it is perfectly possible for an object to provide assistance.
Realising an instance of assistance would create two roles: that of ‘assister* 
and that of ‘assisted*. Putting together these two notions of hardship and assistance, 
Straub has correctly joined them in a relationship of ‘relieves*. Thus relief can be 
realised only once the hardship and the assistance have been instantiated first In 
this way the formulation is ontologically sound, since the notion of relief requires 
first the existence of some problem for the person concerned, and then secondly the 
alleviation of it.
Ontology of communication acts
In the second chart for the scholarship problem, certain changes have been made. 
‘Assistance* and ‘person* jointly afford ‘requires*. What does this imply? In order 
to realise an instance of requiring, the person and the assistance have to be in 
existence already. We must conclude that this is inaccurate, since the need for the 
assistance would have disappeared if this were so. The affordance of ‘relieves’ is 
then dependent upon requires. Here we have a confusion: relief is the effect of 
assistance upon hardship as shown in the preceding paragraph. This error is 
compounded by making the sign for relieves {‘relieves*} dependent upon the 
affordance itself. In other words the sign for an affordance may only be 
instantiated when the referent, or actual behaviour, is realised. Since signs are 
crucial in conjecturing possible worlds, this is a grave error. For the most part 
these mistakes arise from an incomplete understanding of the ontology of 
communication acts.
Requesting and suggesting are examples of such acts. As seen in Chapter 
4, communication acts involve agents using signs to effect changes in the world of 
social and legal expectations and obligations. To request assistance, a person must
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p e r s o n u g g e s t s
e q u e s t s
^ 'a s s i s t a n c e . '
' a s s i s t a n c e ' /
s s i s t a n c e
Figure 10.4 suggesting and requesting
employ a sign which refers to the assistance desired, in some act of requesting. 
The sign itself does not amount to the commission of the act. Quite strict rules 
exist which ensure that if the act is performed in the manner specified by social 
convention or legal ruling, then certain consequences follow. Both acts of 
suggesting and requesting assistance would use signs referring to this assistance in 
a semiological fashion. Neither act is dependent upon an instance of assistance, 
which may not occur, but upon an instance of a sign type which can always be 
reproduced.
Overlooking the clue of a role name
In Chart 3 (Appendix H) the affordance of ‘legal_person’ is introduced as the 
antecedent of ‘assistance*. This seems to be missing the point of the scholarship 
arrangements. If the institution is spending so much effort in seeking out those 
students in need and attempting to resolve such problems, then surely the institution 
itself should be an antecedent of ‘assistance*. Branching from this ‘legal_person* 
is the affordance of ‘provision*, and here again the question must be posed: what 
is being provided? Provision suggests both a provider and something being 
provided, depending upon whether we refer to the act of provision or the role name
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for what is provided. In either case there is a joint affordance. In the figure, A 
illustrates the version given in Chart 3, whereas B shows the correction. Notice the 
introduction of the very general term ‘resources’, which permits both the normal 
monetary form of assistance, and more miscellaneous possibilities: finding 
accommodation, passing on contacts, and other kinds of help. What is important 
is that such resources do not depend upon the provider to exist, they are there in 
any case. Solution A does not allow the specifying of the resources and implies 
that the demise of the legal person concerned would mean the finish of the 
resources. Role names permit the economic manipulation of the data held in such 
a schema: placing ‘provider’ in the context part of a query restricts the search to 
just those legal persons who hold (or held) this tide.
l e g a l _ p e r s o n - ---------provision A
legal—person#^ -^(provider) B
j>prov id es
■"(provision)
r e s o u r c e s
Figure 10.5 provision compared 
Confusing procedure with substance
One of the most commonly recurring problems is found in ‘applies*, as in Chart 6 
(Appendix H). Because it is such an everyday notion it is perhaps worth dwelling 
on it a moment. The difficulty comes from treating the term as some affordance 
of direct experience, rather than in a semiological fashion. In one sense the act of 
applying might appear to be substantive enough: obtaining the necessary forms,
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completing them in accordance with the specifications (using block capitals, for 
example) and dispatching the letter to the correct address, assuming we are dealing 
with a postal application. Behind all this activity is the real point of the matter 
—making a request for some action from another party— perhaps to grant you 
some funds, a place at university, a job in an office. The form filling is simply 
part of the procedure, which could be altered if needed. When the form is used 
as part of the communication act, the expectations of those involved necessarily 
change. The applicant expects some consideration to be given to the request and 
the institution receiving the request expects certain things in return. If we treat 
‘applies* as a communication act, we can separate the sign type, the application 
form, from the action which is performed using the sign. Hence the sign refers to 
some state of affairs which does not (yet) exist but which the agent intends should.
r e q u e s t s
[a p p lie s ]
p e r s o n #
a s s i s t a n c ei »
s s i s t a n c e
in s ti tu tio n #
Figure 10.6 ‘applies’: a communication act
Here the goal is the realisation of an instance of assistance. The person 
seeking assistance would employ a sign which refers to this possibility in the course 
of the act of requesting. Using the term ‘applies’ tends to lay the emphasis upon 
the procedural aspects instead of the substantive. Possibly we might use the term 
‘requests’ to indicate more clearly the nature of this affordance.
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Analysing the communication act of ‘refuses* can be undertaken after the 
foregoing request or claim has been treated. Refusing, as a social act with 
meaning, can only have any significance if it is performed following a request of 
some kind. The parties to the refusal must be already related by this preceding act. 
Consequently the ontology of ‘refuses* builds upon the structure of the foregoing 
act —rather as in the CRIS case in Chapter 7, accepting an offer to contribute can 
be analytically constructed over the schema for ‘invites*. Once again the 
temptation is to relate the two affordances of direct experience, instead of 
incorporating a semiological antecedent into the ontology for the communication act.
Ontology of a status and its bestower
Chart 6 (Appendix H) poses another tricky problem in the guise of the notion 
‘graduate_of*. With antecedents of ‘person* and ‘educational institution’ this might
figure 10.7 person as graduate
d ip lo m a #  
b a c h e lo r  d e g re e  
e tc .
q u a lif ic a tio n #
p e rs o n
e d u c . in s titu t.#
(g ra d u a te )
Lwards
N o te : <§>+ — ► 
norm  controlling  
g rad u ate  status
o ld s
seem at first sight to be reasonable. Applying the rule of ontology to ‘person’ 
would result in the finish of the instance of ‘graduate_of* should the person 
concerned cease to exist. This formulation might have the semblance of 
correctness, but are we suggesting that the closure of an educational institution 
means that its alumni are now orphans? Surely once you have graduated from a
Chapter 10: Problems in performing semantic analysis
university or college you remain a graduate of it for as long as you survive. What 
we have is the institution which is the agent which determines whether you are a 
graduate or not; neither is it necessary for you to be one of its students, since an 
institution may bestow degrees for honorary purposes to persons who have never 
entered its portals, except to receive the certificate. The holding of the degree 
depends not ontologically but normatively upon the awarding of the degree. This 
arrangement permits the case of stripping the holder of the degree, ie. when ‘award* 
finishes, ‘holds* finishes also.
Simplifying the complex
The difficult, but interesting, problem of complying with the stipulations of the 1986 
Financial Services Act has occupied not only the minds of several major institutions 
in the City of London, but also at least two students from the LSE. Whereas 
Dhillon (1989) began the work of analysing the regulations of the Association of 
Futures Brokers and Dealers (those concerning compliance with this legislation) and 
worked on producing the first cut of a semantic schema, Shah (1990) was more 
interested in attempting to construct a working computer system from this analysis. 
Even Shah, however, was forced to investigate the semantic problems and adjust the 
schema.
In Shah’s version there are a number of improvements which can be 
suggested and which would serve to produce a more concise and understandable 
ontology chart. This is particularly important when we consider that the chart is 
meant to be a device for communicating with other analysts and the user on the 
subject of the specification. As it stands (see Appendix E) Shah’s chart is of 
impenetrable complexity and could be understood only by the initiated. With one 
or two small alterations it can be easily simplified.
Handling roles
In this case there are a very large number of roles which persons hold in a 
company structure. Each of these roles is of interest to the regulatory bodies, in 
that the incumbents are potential sources of ‘insider information* and thus records
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must be kept on who holds, or has held, a particular role. Shah has partly done 
the work of grouping the roles together having placed, for example, Director, 
Manager, Parmer, Compliance Officer, Finance Officer, Secretary and Customer 
Interests Officer, all under one generic/specific group. His rationale for this appears 
to be that the rule by which changes in these incumbencies must be notified is the 
same one for all. Since each tuple in the surrogate table for each universal of role 
will in any case have to have the appropriate authority specified, we could arrange 
all the roles into one generic/specific relationship, thus reducing the number of 
complicating lines on the chart at a stroke. There will be simply one generic of 
‘role* with many specifics.
Grouping into a ‘new’ category
Another way of simplifying the chart is to take all the various events which trigger 
a notification and place them in a new generic/specific relationship: ‘event*. While 
this might be criticised by the letter of our law (principle 2), in that we introduce 
a new term, the term ‘event* is fairly natural for this purpose and does not appear 
to violate the domain terminology. For the most part such events include:
1 starts or finishes (changes) in the incumbency of any of the roles;
2 starts or finishes in the roles;
3 starts or finishes in ownership of the firm and its subsidiaries;
4 starts or finishes in the business carried on by the firm;
5 starts or finishes in the firm itself;
6 starts or finishes in petitions or resolutions leading either of the two
foregoing;
7 starts or finishes in the location of the registered office of the firm.
In every case of these events occurring within a firm in the regulated financial 
service sector, there is an obligation upon the firm to notify the change to the 
market’s regulatory body —in this particular case the Association of Futures Brokers 
and Dealers. Once again grouping these events together vastly reduces the clutter 
of detail on the ontology chart. In effect what we are doing is to raise the level
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of abstraction just a shade higher than it was pitched in order to be able to see 
more clearly the relationships that prevail.
Explicit introduction of norms
Specific norms govern the existence delimiters of all the entities in an ontology 
chart. For the affordances mentioned above these norms are to be found in the 
Notification Regulations themselves. Each of the norms can be attributed the name 
of the subsection in which it appears, although informal norms never have names 
since they do not figure in any formal system where the name, taken typically as 
identification, would be used for manipulation. These rules govern the existences 
of the items listed in the previous section.
Inserting these norms on the ontology chart might be justified when the 
elements are few, but when there is a great deal of complexity, simplifying the 
representation should be our watchword. In the surrogate tables each norm will 
have its place in the authority start or authority finish column for the tuples for 
each universal.
Incorporating normative relationships into the ontology
The work of Thonissen (1990) is interesting in ranging widely over many issues in 
the LEGOL/NORMA methods. His treatment of the CRIS case builds on analyses 
performed by others and adds features of his own. One feature that should be 
noted is the use in the chart (see Appendix I) of the representation device of 
making the role an antecedent. For example,
—an antecedent of ‘ownership* (copyright, author) is ‘author*
—an antecedent of ‘representation (learned society, member)* is ‘member* 
of IFIP;
The effect of this on the ontology chart is to permit more information about the 
relationships to be represented economically, and more importantly reduces the 
spider’s web somewhat. There has been little written in the research group about 
the consequences of incorporating this feature into the normal methods, but it seems 
to have been widely adopted.
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Unfortunately there is no rose without a thorn.
What happens is that this practice enforces the embodiment of behavioural 
norms into the schema. Consider for a moment the copyright question. At a 
commonsense level we might accept the formulation provided, but surely we should 
progress beyond that. By specifying that one of the antecedents of the ownership 
of copyright must be ‘author’, we are effectively excluding other possibilities. Take 
the possibility of the author being commissioned to write a piece for a third party. 
Is not this what journalists do? Who owns the copyright of an article for The 
Times, Times Newspapers or the journalist concerned? And how could we represent 
the change of ownership of copyright, when the author decides to sell it? With one 
antecedent anchored to the affordance ‘author’ the market is rather restricted.
Similar problems arise from the ‘representation* ontology. As it stands in 
Thonissen’s chart, the National Representative (a role in ‘representation’) must be 
a member of the learned society. In general this would follow as a matter of 
course, to represent a body on a second, one should be at least a member of the 
first body. But the course of experience can weave strange patterns. Think of an 
instance, common in diplomatic circles, where for some reason normal 
representatives cannot carry out their usual duties, and their work is in part taken 
over by third parties. The Swedish diplomat in Iran who occasionally acted for 
British interests did not number among the subjects of Her Majesty.
In the work of Ades (1987) (see Appendix F), much is done to refine a 
schema for the administration of the University of Qatar. However in the sample 
extracted for illustration (p.20), albeit a small section, there are a number of 
problems. The ‘studentship’ relationship between, a person and a university poses 
no problems, yet together with ‘course’ affords ‘takes’. What does this mean? It 
could imply that only a person who is a student may take a course, in which case 
it would fall under the criticism levelled about role antecedents above. Less likely 
is the interpretation of the abstract notion itself of studentship entering into some 
relationship with a course, yet we are not to know. Equally obscure is the 
affordance of ‘group offered* with its antecedents of ‘course* and ‘semester*. In 
this case there are the separate matters of ‘offers’ and ‘group*. Offered is a term
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we would normally employ as a communication act, which we cover elsewhere. 
Group is understandable enough but where it relates to either ‘course* or ‘semester* 
is not clear. How the two fit together is even more perplexing.
Firstly the ontology of ‘group* needs to be established, and then membership 
of it by persons. Secondly, the offering of a course presumably should be handled 
in the usual fashion for communication acts, and thus the cancellation of the offer 
can be dealt with as a withdrawal of the offer. Interestingly enough, another student, 
Lupolo (1987), working upon the same problem at the same time does in fact make 
this separate. In her chart (Appendix G) the institution, through its schools, affords 
groups, of which persons can have membership, and offers courses.
Conclusion
This critical review of the work of other analysts is not intended as unfriendly 
criticism, but instead as a constructive attempt to build up not only a modus 
operand/, where the work of one analyst is open to scrutiny by another, but also, 
and as a direct result of this, as a way of accumulating a vast library of well tried 
and tested bits of analysis. Since we are aiming at specifying at the highest level 
—of behaviour— then wherever groups of people are doing the same things, then 
the ontology should be the same.
We are under no illusion that the application of semantic analysis in a 
rigorous fashion entails considerable effort and practice initially. The greater the 
number of constraints the more understanding required. But gradually the growth 
in the critical mass of material available and of analysts using the method should 
facilitate the initiation into the method. What we discovered is that, despite the 
apparent plethora of specification techniques in NORMA and their attendant 
notational questions, there are relatively few structures required for an economical 
representation of quite complicated scenarios.
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Thesis Conclusions
There are many methods currendy used for analysing businesses for the purposes 
of information systems development: different ways of slicing through the organism 
in order to understand better how it functions. Semantic analysis, in espousing an 
explicit theory—a theory of meaning which is especially appropriate to social and 
business affairs—provides what is in effect a powerful knowledge elicitation 
technique. By basing the whole information edifice upon the responsibility of the 
various agents who are protagonists in the business, the analyst can always pinpoint 
those able to resolve any uncertainties and disputes over meaning.
The surrogate table and the norms formed with the terms defined therein 
together give a tangible form to this structure for the recording of the knowledge 
in the business. The method sets parameters of time, space, agents concerned in 
the realisation, agents responsible for determining its existence and the mood, for 
each and every item considered. These permit the analyst to operate with a high 
degree of sureness that uncovering the values for each parameter for every element 
in the analysis will guarantee a very deep understanding of the problem. Looking 
through the results of the CRIS case we can find who is responsible for each small 
item in the business of running conferences in that learned society.
Increasingly the cross-national and cross-cultural growth of information 
systems incurs problems of semantic ambiguity and understanding. Semantic 
analysis has the tools not only to ferret out these problems, but also to handle them 
quite naturally once discovered. The different understanding about who might have 
responsibility for referring students with behavioral problems to the psychological 
service soon comes to light when the analytical tool used is persistently posing that 
very question. And if more than one view is held, then this is naturally brought 
into the light for discussion. Different solutions (meanings) may co-exist, as long 
as there is an agreed norm for handling the questions of which prevails when.
The method does not rest upon a presupposition of an a priori assumption 
that there is only one correct view of the organisation. Nor is it necessary to have
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just one view at the end of the process. More often than not different 
understandings can work together to produce a richer texture of organisational life. 
A conference whose papers are decided by just one referee will be a decidedly dull 
affair, a school psychological service that posits only one explanation for attendance 
problems at school will carry little weight with the workers at the ‘chalk face*.
When using this method, difficulties in communication which lie submerged 
in the daily hurly-burly of organisational life can be forced to the surface. Once 
an organisation has a specification of the semantics of the terms it uses to do 
business, it has a blueprint which can be used for a whole variety of purposes: 
induction of new employees, high-level policy reviewing or for the development 
of new computer based systems.
In clarifying the understanding of what the business does, scope is still left 
for handling the different understandings that may prevail in different sections of 
the organisation, which only have to be reconciled when the two have to converse. 
Two different schools can happily survive with totally different definitions about 
what constitutes a student with a ‘behaviour problem*. Only when the two need 
to interpret each other’s signification of the term does it become necessary to 
negotiate the conflicting meanings: as when the transfer of students from the one 
to the other is being discussed, or more to the point, when a centralised formal 
system such as a bureaucratic or database system is being developed. At this point 
the capacity of the modelling language to portray these varied conceptions becomes 
critical, and it is generally here where the constrictions of what are viewed as the 
computer system straitjacket make themselves felt.
Performing semantic analysis: findings
Throughout this research there has been a firm commitment to the efficacy of the 
method and its superiority over its rivals. A great handicap for those seeking to 
use semantic analysis has been the lack of accessible material that describes how 
to do it. What little there is does not offer the novice a method, but sketches 
briefly how some principles might be applied. In seeking to remedy these defects, 
the present author has attempted to provide more fully worked examples of analysis.
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Perhaps the greatest difficulty has been the lack of a method for carrying out 
the task. Chapter 8 demonstrates the sequence of passes at the target problem 
which appeared to provide the most natural evolution.
Undoubtedly the first practical problem is to obtain some text which 
describes the work of the organisation: just as the practitioner of the occult needs 
samples of the hair, nails and skin of the victim in order to commence his dastardly 
work, so the semantic analyst requires an equally representative body of material 
from his chosen target! Whilst in highly formalised organisations this material may 
be found in the rulebook, regulations, manuals and clerical code, in more informal 
work situations such material may be entirely absent So it was with the Schools 
Psychological Service (Chapter 7). Almost every item of text had to be coaxed 
from the mouths of the protagonists: psychologists, support teachers, school head 
teachers and heads of year, even to the point of interviewing a student with 
behavioral problems. Once this material is in place then work can begin.
As the text is subjected to analysis the questions begin to arise, and some 
answers may be supplied from the knowledge of the analyst, but so often recourse 
is needed to those involved. To discover who is the authority that decides whether 
a paper is or is not a conference paper, and then at what point it commences so to 
be, one needs to solicit the opinions of main actors on that stage. Often it may be 
that the questions have never occurred to them before and so the answers are not 
ready to hand. Custom and practice carve a deep furrow for the members of a 
social grouping; to the point where interrogation of the kind suggested by the 
analytical framework is counter-productive.
Many of these matters are not new for those involved in information systems 
analysis and design. The problems of obtaining empirical data are common to all 
involved in research of any kind. Whether this analytical approach can obviate 
these inconveniences is unlikely.
Advantages are to be found in the standard format for the data expressed 
chiefly in the form of the surrogate table. With the constant requirement for the 
same blanks to be filled in for every single affordance the analysts at least has a 
clear perspective of the task in hand. Other analysis and design methods and other
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data storage approaches have a multiplicity of recording formats to be addressed. 
This uniformity is a blessed relief, and is conducive to shortening the learning 
period. Associated with this is the benefit of the table as a vehicle for 
communication amongst analysts. A massive amount of analytical detail is available 
in a readable way, once, that is, the novice semantic analyst has learnt to read the 
table. For even greater economy of expression the ontology chart offers a simpler 
means of representation. Each node has implicit in it the information held in the 
surrogate table.
Combining data and schema
Undoubtedly a considerable bonus of the method is realised in the ability to 
combine schema and data. Whereas in the relational data model, for example, it 
is impossible to record items of data until the relational schema itself has been 
completed, in semantic analysis the structure of the surrogate table is already known 
in advance. As the analyst begins to enter the surrogates for the universals, the 
particulars of any of those universal may also be recorded. Once the surrogate for 
"person* has been completed, including the antecedent, authorities and so on, details 
of particular persons can be added. For the analyst who has limited access to first 
hand sources such a facility is a great boon. The data entry does not have to be 
left until a later date, after the grand schema has been unfolded, and the scent of 
the quarry has gone cold. Using the mood fields, mistakes can be rectified by 
initially entering surrogates in the hypothetical mood and then, after further 
investigation, either retracting them or changing the mood to assertion.
In practice these facilities offer the analyst(s) an audit trail of analysis. 
Every essay at defining a fragment of a schema may be recorded, in precisely the 
same form as the polished, final version. The starts and finishes and mood changes 
allow the genesis of each section of analysis to be traced and scrutinised.
Plethora of rules
A major drawback, in one sense, is the complexity and extent of rules that govern 
the specification using NORMA. An infinity of rules seems to extend before the
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analyst who ventures out for the first time on this task. And in one way this is 
certainly a drawback, entailing the analyst in no small a commitment to permeate 
the philosophical outlook and learn its plethora of rules (indicated in Chapter 8).
However, looked at from another perspective this weight of formality is a 
distinct blessing. In analytical methods that are short on constraints, too much is 
left to the informal side, to the analyst, who, with his wealth of experience can 
soon conjure up a working solution. The beginner analyst, however, has little 
support from the method itself and is left to flounder.
Parallels may be drawn between arguments over the relative difficulties of 
English, with its modest cumulus of grammar and syntax, compared with the likes 
of French or Italian (or for that matter other latinate languages), with their 
mountains of formal rules to be scaled by the novice linguist. Where formality 
reigns, diligent attention to the syntax can yield surprisingly good results: where the 
logic resides in informal structures the road to success may be even more arduous 
and in all probability less well signposted.
That is not to suggest that we are lacking in analytical methods which are 
suffused with rules of form and structure. What cuts out NORMA from the rest 
is the superiority of the philosophical stance that lies behind the formality.
Without any doubt at all, NORMA can be said to be a ‘difficult* 
specification method. Difficult not primarily because of the number of rules which 
circumscribe it, but because of the shift in assumptions which it represents and 
embodies. For analysts used to traditional approaches to data and information, the 
ontology charts resemble so many dataflow diagrams. For them the terminology 
of affordance, realisation etc. is confusing and intimidatory. Rational argument on 
the necessity of new terms for new concepts does not remove the underlying 
paradigm that they have imbibed over the course of their educational and 
professional careers and on which they have built hitherto satisfactory working 
systems.
The most likely supporters of the NORMA approach will be found in the 
ranks of two main groups. One group will be novice analysts, those used to no 
particular approach as yet, and who may embrace new methods without feeling
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committed "ideologically" to data analysis and its cousins. Often students who have 
taken up courses where these new methods have been exposed have not always 
been aware that they are many miles from the traditional approaches. The other 
group, whose ranks are growing by the day, consists of those who are disillusioned 
with the results gained from the use of orthodox methods, who are disappointed 
with the returns from the large sums invested in new technology and contemptuous 
of the meagre payoff. These people are less likely to include analysts and systems 
designers amongst their number, for the reason of emotional commitment to the 
intellectual investment they have made in standard approaches. They are more 
likely to be people who are concerned with the highest level of business, the 
managers and principals, as opposed to the technicians and systems people. It is 
to this group that the best appeal can be made with methods based on NORMA.
Directions for research
Undoubtedly the development of an interpreter which can take in statements 
expressed in NORMA and manipulate them using LEGOL will be a great step 
forward. It should be possible to move towards an animation, not just of the 
organisation’s data as at present, but also of the organisation’s norms. In effect the 
system should be able to represent in an interactive fashion the workings of the 
organisation so that a wide range of queries and scenarios can be investigated.
Such a system will permit the schemas and ontology charts produced by 
semantic analysts to be directly tested. What will be needed then is the speeding 
up of the process of analysis itself, and here we are working to develop computer 
based support. The need is for a tool that can check that the structures that the 
analyst defines conform with the underlying metaschema. In this way it should be 
impossible to extract results from the stored data which are nonsensical. For 
example the system should not add together the weights of two persons whose 
existences never overlapped, when the existence parameters would permit only the 
addition of the two numbers. Achieving this goal will enable the burden of 
consistency checking to be lifted from the shoulders of the analysts and handed over 
to the computer.
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Further research might permit help to be provided to the analyst when 
seeking to specify a problem domain. Fong (1990) has developed a small system 
for her MSc project which gives help to the analyst when performing semantic 
analysis on text. The system provides facilities for text editing and parsing along 
the lines of the semantic grammar of NORMA. Its output is a semantic schema 
for the problem area. A separate graphics facility is needed to generate an ontology 
chart both during and after the analysis. The importance of the chart as a visual 
and graphical representation of the relatively abstract schema cannot be 
overestimated.
It would be useful to have recourse to sections of analysis previously tested, 
using a kind of thesaurus facility. When a given term is marked the system could 
offer the user to select from a variety of possible ‘mini-schemas’ which encompass 
the term. Given that the specification is of behaviour patterns, which tend to be 
fairly enduring, rather than of organisational procedure which changes from place 
to place and over time, the chances are that the mini-schemas will prove to be 
reusable. For example the section of an ontology chart that deals with posts, 
incumbents, and applications to fill the posts is likely to be very similar across 
many different businesses and organisations. What is needed is research into 
discovering whether there are considerable sections of reusable analysis and how 
they can be shared and developed. So often with existing database schemas, the 
possibilities for reusing schemas are limited, partly because organisations are ‘cagey’ 
about revealing their inner workings, and partly because with procedural based 
specification the chances of the analysis being reused is limited.
Given that there are, and will continue to be, many systems analysts and 
designers who will continue to use existing relational and other database models and 
who use orthodox specification methods rather than those outlined in this research, 
it is important to consider how semantic analysis and the semantic schemas can 
be married into the existing tools and techniques. Ades (1987) is researching into 
the possible relationship between semantic analysis and the relational model, and it 
would be an important step forward to develop a method for translating the 
semantic model into a relational one in a controlled manner, clearly indicating what
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compromises have to be made. Similarly it would be useful while this new 
approach is being established to have a way of bridging the passage from 
established information systems analysis and design methods to these. This would 
mean that the break with what are becoming old-fashioned and inadequate tools 
would be less traumatic.
What this research has achieved
Here we set out what we believe to be a number of the achievements of this 
research work:
Clarification of method
This research has accomplished a clarification of what exactly constitutes semantic 
analysis. Such literature as was available in the LEGOL/NORMA papers concerned 
the application of the semantic grammars of the LEGOL languages which preceded 
NORMA. With regard to NORMA the only major contributions concerned the 
outlining of the syntax of the language without any systematic application of it. 
By setting out in a transparent fashion the key elements of the language, this 
research makes it possible and more likely that new cohorts of practitioners may 
be tempted to give it a try.
Exemplification of method
Having clarified the essential elements of the language this work has shown how 
the language can be put into practice. The technique has been exemplified on 
many case studies, of which only three have been illustrated. This process of 
indicating how the technique can be applied to a case is necessary if we are to 
show the practical usability. Unfortunately the overriding concern for pushing 
ahead the work of developing NORMA has in the past not permitted attention to 
be given to explaining just precisely what performing semantic analysis looks like 
in practice.
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Development of more precise rules
Another important contribution has been the setting out of more precise rules for 
the constraints; the sketching out of a metaschema. Although more work is needed 
here to express the full range of metaphysical relationships that underlie any 
semantic schema in NORMA, a start has been made. This work will allow the 
building of a computer system to support the analyst.
Developing a way to perform the analysis
With the large range of constraints and fundamental assumptions associated with 
NORMA, the need for a method of applying them was paramount. In this work 
we have attempted to set out a rational agenda of work comprised in the performing 
of semantic analysis, and in an easily accessible manner. A simple set of ten 
stages in the work spans the range of tasks that are required. At no stage has 
there existed such a straightforward introduction, rather, the tendency has been to 
shy away from such an objective by pointing to the possibility of beginning the 
analysis in a number of ways. In the view of the present author a tangible and 
practical method to begin with is more valuable to the novice than the knowledge 
that there are a myriad possible ways of commencing.
Review of common errors
As a further contribution this work has examined a few of the examples of semantic 
analysis performed by students and others, and identified a few ‘classic* errors. The 
importance of this is to focus on what are likely to be common mistakes that spring 
from an inadequate grasp of the language, and if corrected can lead to better results 
quite quickly. Matters of ontology and roles pervade almost every possible problem 
domain imaginable. If we can put users of the method on the right track early on 
in the process then we can avoid a significant part of the problems associated with 
the ‘learning curve*.
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APPENDIX A: Text of the CRIS Conference Design 
Specification Introduction
IFIP is the International Federation of Information Processing and is a federation 
of the national data processing societies of about 40 countries. IFIP has about 12 
technical Committees and the member societies are allowed to appoint a so-called 
National Representative to each Technical Committee whose work they consider of 
interest.
Each Technical Committee has two or more Working Groups. One of the activities 
which these working groups are encouraged to organize is Working Conferences 
which are small invited conferences on some subject of relevance to the formally 
approved scope and aims of the Working Group.
An IFIP working conference is required by IFIP procedures to have an Organizing 
Committee normally based in the country in which the conference is to be held, and 
a Program Committee which should be international.
In 1982, Working Group 8.1 organized a Working Conference in the Netherlands 
on the topic "Information Systems Design Methodologies: a Comparative Review". 
Each submitter was invited to show how his methodology would handle a test case 
based on conference organization.
The requirement is for the design to support the Business Activities listed in Figure 
B.l.
1. Arrange technical program
1.1 Sending out call for papers to prepared list
1.2 Registering letters of intent received in response to call
1.3 Registering contributed papers on receipt
1.4 Distributing papers to referees
1.5 Collecting referees reports and selecting papers for inclusion in 
program
1.6 Grouping selected papers into sessions and selecting chairman for 
each session
2. Local arrangements
2.1 Prepare list of invitees
2.2 Issue priority invitations to National Representatives and to members 
of Technical Committee’s Working Groups
2.3 Ensuring authors of selected papers receive an invitation
2.4 Ensuring authors of rejected papers receive an invitation
2.5 Avoid sending duplicate invitations to any individual
2.6 Registering acceptances of invitations
2.7 Generating final list of attendees
The Constituent Elements of IFIP
22 0
person#
’rusteeship
Council#
meeting#- -session# presentati
#IFIP
■Working Conference#^ -committee#
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Working Group#"
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Figure I the parts of IFIP
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APPENDIX B: Case Data for the CRIS Case
SURROGATE TYPE SORT LABEL ANTI ANT2 @+
nation u a nation Society Society Society
person u a person Society Society Society
language u a language Society Society Society
state u a state nation Society Society
recognised u a language state state state
Switzerland P state Switzerland Swiss Swiss Swiss
Danish P nation Danish Society Society Society
Dutch P nation Dutch Society Society Society
English P nation English Society Society Society
French P nation French Society Society Society
German P nation German Society Society Society
Welsh P nation Welsh Society Society Society
Italian P nation Italian Society Society Society
5 F Republic P state 5 F Republic French nation French French
Norwegian P nation Norwegian Society Society Society
START
1300/01/01
1000/01/01
1000/01/01
1860
1958
FINISH
Belgian P nation Belgian Society
FDR P state FDR German
Netherlands P state Netherlands Dutch
Denmark P state Denmark Society
Rep of Italy P state Rep of Italy Italian
British P nation British Society
Norway P state Norway Norwegian
ctzshipS u a ctzshipS person
learned soc. u a learned soc. state
DP Society u a DP Society state
org. unit u a org. unit IFIP
GA u a GA IFIP
TC u a TC Tech Assembly
membership u a membership person
WG u a WG TC
WC u a WC IFIP
committee u a committee WC
OC u a OC WC
state
TC
Society Society
German German
Dutch Dutch
Danish Danish
Italian Italian
Society Society
Norwegian Norwegian
Ant2 Ant2
Anti Anti
Anti Anti
Anti Anti
Anti Anti
GA GA
Ant2 Ant2
GA GA
GA.TC GA,TC
WC WC
WC WC
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1946/01/01
1596
1860
PC u a PC WC
referees panel u a referees panel WC
meeting u a meeting WC
paper u a paper state
membership u a membership person
Chair u office Chair org. unit
presentation u a presentation session
discussion u a discussion presentation
PTT u a PIT state
place u a place Society
address u a address PTT
represents u a represents address
work u a work state
abstract u work abstract state
versionT u a versionT versionP
language u language language French
language u language language English
Council u a Council IFIP
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WC WC
WC WC
OC(WC) OC(WC)
Anti Anti
referees panel @Ant2 @Ant2
org. unit org. unit
Chair(session) Chair(session)
paper PC(WC) PC(WC)
Anti Anti
Society Society
PTT PTT
place PIT PTT
Anti Anti
Anti Anti
language @Antl @Antl
Society Society
Society Society
IFIP IFIP
1200
1300
Trusteeship u office Trusteeship IFIP
tel. no. u a tel. no. PTT
Task Group u a Task Group WG
field u a field IFIP
area u a area subject
subject u a subject field
topic u a topic area
letter of int. u a letter of int. person
accepts u a accepts person
attends u a attends person
authorship u a authorship person
based in u a based in committee
call f . papers u a call f. papers WC
company u a company state
legal person u a legal person state
medium u a medium state
copy u a copy versionT
contributes u a contributes legal person
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IFIP IFIP
PIT PTT
TC TC
learned soc. learned soc.
GA GA
GA:WG GA:WG
PC(WC) PC(WC)
Anti Anti
letter of intent WC:Chair(PC) WC:Chair(PC)
session OC OC
work Anti Anti
state WC WC
OC OC
Anti Anti
Anti Anti
Anti Anti
medium PC PC
work PC PC
diskette u a diskette state
corporate body u a corporate body state
expertise u a expertise person
has u a has person
incumbency u a incumbency person
invites u a invites WC
located at u a located at person
membership u a membership learned soc.
represen ts(state) u a represents(state) learned soc.
national u a national learned soc.
membership3 u a membership3 corporate body
revision u a revision version#2
on u a on WC
participation! u a participation! person
reviews u a reviews paper#2
selected u selected paper
sent to u a sent to copy
sent to u a sent to copy
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Anti Anti
Anti Anti
topic Anti Anti
copy Anti Anti
office @Ant2 @Ant2
call f. papers WC WC
place Anti Anti
learned soc. Antl,Ant2 Antl,Ant2
state Ant2 Ant2
state state
person Antl,Ant2 Antl,Ant2
version# 1 PC PC
subject GA GA
meeting OC OC
paper# 1 PC PC
PC PC
person OC OC
WC person person
1956
treats u a treats paper
sponsorship 1 u a sponsorship 1 corporate body
sponsorship2 u a sponsorship2 WG
SUIT# ty sort label anti
A. Bertztiss P person A. Bertztiss Society
A. Finkelstein P person A.Finkelstein Society
AA Dorodnicyn P person AA Dorodnicyn Society
Alex V Stuart P person Alex V Stuart Society
B. Gunadi P person B. Gunadi Society
Bill Ollie P person BUI Ollie Society
BL Sendov P person BL Sendov Society
E.Falkenberg P person E.Falkenberg Society
F. Bodart P person F. Bodart Society
G Glaser P person G Glaser Society
HW Le Roux P person HW Le Roux Society
J Fourot P person J Fourot Society
J. Bubenko P person J. Bubenko Society
J. Dietz P person J. Dietz Society
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topic PC PC
WC Antl,Ant2 Antl,Ant2
WC Anti, An t2 Antl,Ant2
ant2 auth+ auth-
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
Society Society
finish
J. Hagelstein P person J. Hagelstein Society
L. Penedo P person L. Penedo Society
L. Bhabuta P person L. Bhabuta Society
M.Z. Hanani P person M.Z. Hanani Society
0  Longe P person 0  Longe Society
OM Dalton P person OM Dalton Society
P-X Guo P person P-X Guo Society
PA Bobillier P person PA Bobillier Society
R Piloty P person R Piloty Society
R Stamper P person R Stamper Society
G. Bracchi P person G. Bracchi Society
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN Italian
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN B. Gunadi
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN AJFinkelstein
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN E.Falkenberg
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN J. Dietz
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN J. Bubenko
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN J. Hagelstein
G. Brace hi 
UK
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
G. Brace hi
B. Gunadi
A. Finkelstein
E. Falkenberg
J. Dietz
J Bubenko
J. Hagelstein
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
Society
G. Bracchi
B. Gunadi
A. Finkelstein
E. Falkenberg
J. Dietz
J Bubenko
J. Hagelstein
1934/05/09
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN L. Bhabuta
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN MJZ. Hanani
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN Peter Jones
ctzshipN P ctzshipN ctzshipN A. Bertztiss
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS A Goldsworthy
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS AJinkelstein
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS Alex V Stuart
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS BL Sendov
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS E.Falkenberg
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS F. Bodart
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS G Glaser
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS GJ Morris
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS HW Le Roux
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS J. Bubenko
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS J. Dietz
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS J. Hagelstein
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS L Penedo
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS L. Bhabuta
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L. Bhabuta L. Bhabuta
M.Z. Hanani M.Z. Hanani
Welsh Peter Jones Peter Jones
American A Bertiss A. Bertiss
Australia A Goldsworthy A Goldsworthy
UK UK UK
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
Belgium Belgium Belgium
USA USA USA
UK UK UK
South Africa South Africa South Africa
Sweden Sweden Sweden
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
Belgium Belgium Belgium
Portugal Portugal Portugal
UK UK UK
1944/12/12
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS OM Dalton
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS P-X Guo
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS PA Bobiliier
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS Peter Jones
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS R Hirschheim
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS R Piloty
ctzshipS P ctzshipS ctzshipS R Stamper
Ai7. Cyb Econ P learned soc. AP.Cyb Econ France
BCS P DP Society BCS UK
Genootschap In P DP Society Genootschap In Netherlands
data processing P field data processing IFIP
TC2 P TC TC2 Tech Assembly
TC7 P TC TC7 Tech Assembly
TC8 P TC TC8 Tech Assembly
Soc.Comm/IS P TC Soc.Comm/IS IFIP
WG2.1 (Algol) P WG WG2.1 (Algol) TC2
WG2.2 P WG WG2.2 TC2
WG2.3 P WG WG2.3 TC2
Rep of Ireland Rep of Ireland Rep of Ireland
China Rep of China Rep of China
Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland
UK UK UK 1944/12/12
USA USA USA
FRG FRG FRG
UK UK UK 1934/09/05
Fr. Co. Law. Fr. Co. Law
Royal Charter Royal Charter 1984
Netherlands Netherlands
IFIP IFIP
GA GA
GA GA 1972
GA GA 1974/75
TC8/9 TC8/9 1987
GA.TC2 GA prop by TC2 1983
GA.TC2 GA.TC2 1965
GA.TC2 GA.TC2 1969
WG2.4 P WG WG2.4 TC2
WG2.5 P WG WG2.5 TC2
WG2.6 P WG WG2.6 TC2
WG7.1 P WG WG7.1 TC7
WG8.1 P WG WG8.1 TC8
WG8.3 (DSS) P WG WG8.3 (DSS) TC8
WG8.4 P WG WG8.4 TC8
CRIS82 P WC CRIS82 TC8
CRIS88 P WC CRIS88 IFIP
meeting P meeting meeting CRIS88
session 1 P session session 1 CRIS88
session2 P session session2 CRIS88
OC88 P OC OC88 CRIS88
session3 P session session3 CRIS88
discussion 1 P discussion discussion 1 presentation 1
BTelecom P PTT BTelecom UK
GPO P PTT GPO UK
NL PO P PTT NL PO Netherlands
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paper1
GA.TC2 GA.TC2 1973
GA.TC2 GA.TC2 1974
GA.TC2 GA.TC2 1974 1985
GA.TC7 GA.TC7 1972
GA.TC8 GA.TC7 1976
GA.TC8 GA prop by TC8 1981
GA.TC8 GA.TC8 1985
GA.TC8 GA.TC8 1981 1982
GA.TC8 GA.TC8 1986 1989
CRIS88 CRIS 88 1988/09/21/10:00 1988/09/21/17:00
Chair(sessionl) Chair(sessionl) 1988/09/20/10:00 1988/09/20/17:00
Chair(session2) Chair(session2) 1988/09/21/10:00 1988/09/21/17:00
CRIS88 CRIS88
Chair(session3) Chair(session3) 1988/09/22/10:00 1988/09/22/15:00
PC88 PC88 1988/09/21/14:00 1988/09/21/15:00
Anti Anti 1976
UK UK 1840
Netherlands Netherlands
SIP P PTT SIP Italy
in Peckham P place in Peckham Society
in Hengelo P place in Hengelo Society
10, The Gardens P address 10, The Gardens, 
SE11
GPO
F.S.straat 6 P address F.S.straat 6 Netherlands Post
represents P represents represents F.S.straat 6
represents P represents represents 10, The Gardens, 
SE11
eligiblity dt eligibility eligibility R Stamper
priority dr priority eligibility
priority dr priority priority eligiblity
version P versionP version "MEASUR”
Council(1985) P Council Council(1985) IFIP
39(2)23993400 P tel. no. 39(2)23993400 SIP
ISDM P topic ISDM methodology
A&D P area A&D IFIP
"MEASUR" P paper "MEASUR” UK
Rep of Italy Rep of Italy
Society Society
Society Society
GPO GPO
NL PO NL PO
in Hengelo NL PO NL PO
in Peckham GPO GPO
CRIS88 PC88 PC88
PC PC
CRIS88 PC PC
UK UK
IFIP IFIP
SIP SIP
IFIP EFIP
GA GA
UK UK
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1970
1888
1976
1976
1888
1988/04/01
1988/04/01
1988/02/01
1985/01/01 1985/12/31
1985
1988/02/01
attends P attends attends J Backhouse
attendee r attendee attends
authorship P authorship authorship J Backhouse
version3 P versionT version3 "MEASUR"
call f. papers 1 P call f. papers call f. papers 1 CRIS82
call f. papers2 P call f. papers call f. papers2 CRIS88
contacted on P contacted on contacted on G. Bracchi
contributes P contributes contributes R Stamper
"MEASUR" 1 P versionT "MEASUR'T "MEASUR"
copyl P copy copyl version3
employee r employee employment
employer r employer employment
expertise P expertise expertise R Stamper
held in P held in held in CRIS82
held in P held in held in CRIS88
incumbency P incumbency incumbency AA Dorodnicyn
incumbency P incumbency incumbency Alex V Stuart
incumbency P incumbency incumbency AW Goldsworthy
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session2 OC88 OC88 1988/09/21/10:00 1988/09/21/17:00
person OC OC
"MEASUR" PC88 PC88 1988/02/01
English PC88 PC88 1988/09/01
CRIS82 CRIS82 1981 1981
CRIS88 CRIS88 1987/03/01 1987/03/30
39(2)2399400 G. Bracchi G. Bracchi 1988
"MEASUR” R Stamper,PC88 R Stamper,PC88
1988/04/01
diskette 1 PC88 PC88 1988/09/01
person @Antl @Antl
corporate body @Ant2 @Ant2
ISDM R Stamper R Stamper 1970/01/01
Netherlands CRIS82 CRIS82 1982 1982
UK CRIS88 CRIS88 1988/09/19 1988/09/21
Trustee(Cncl) IFIP IFIP 1984 1987
Trustee(Cncl) IFIP IFIP 1985 1988
Pres-Elect(Cncl) IFIP IFIP 1985 1986
incumbency P incumbency incumbency BL Sendov
incumbency P incumbency incumbency G Glaser
incumbency P incumbency incumbency GJ Morris
incumbency P incumbency incumbency P-X Guo
incumbent r incumbent incumbency
invites P invites invites CRIS82
invites P invites invites CRIS88
location r location located at
member r member membership 1
member r member membership2
methodology P area methodology analysis and 
design
represents P represents represents BCS
Nat Rep r N a t i o n a l
Representative
membership5
new version r new version revision
TC8 Chair P office TC8 Chau- IFIP
old version r old version revision
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Vice-Pres(Cncl) 
Vice Pres(Cncl) 
Vice-Pres (Cncl) 
Trustee (Cncl) 
person
call f. papers 1 
call f. papers2 
place
corporate body 
person
IFIP
IFIP
IFIP
IFIP
IFIP
CRIS82
CRIS88
PTT
@Antl
(a) Anti
GA.TC
IFIP
IFIP
IFIP
IFIP
IFIP
CRIS82
CRIS88
PTT
@Antl
@Antl
GA.TC
1984
1985 
1985 
1985
1981
1981/03/01
1987
1988 
1986 
1988
1981
1981/01/31
UK
person
IFIP
@Antl
IFIP
@Antl
version#2
version#!
@Antl 
TC8 
(a) Anti
@Antl 
TC8 
(a) Anti
1974
on P on on CRIS82
participantl r participantl participation 1
participant r participant2 participadon2
participation P participation 1 participation R Stamper
presentation P presentation presentation session2
PC88 P PC PC88 CRIS88
referee r referee membership4
rejected dr rejected paper
report r report reviews
responsibility r responsibility incumbency
selected P selected selected "MEASUR"
sent to P sent to sent to copyl
Temp Asp IS P WC Temp Aspects IS TC8
treats P treats treats "MEASUR"
subjectl r subjectl reviews
subject r subject treats
sponsor r sponsor sponsorship 1
sponsor r sponsor sponsors hip2
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ISDM WG8.1 WG8.1 1982 1982
person (a) Anti (a) Anti
person @Antl (a) Anti
meeting 1988/09/19/10:00 1988/09/21/17:00 PC88 PC88
Chair(session) Chair(session) 1988/09/21/14:00 1988/21/09/15:00
CRISS88 CRIS88 1986 1988
person (a) Anti @Antl
PC PC
paper#2 @Antl @Antl
office
PC88 PC88 1988/04/01
CRIS88 J Backhouse J Backhouse
TC8 TC8 1986 1989
ISDM CRIS88 CRIS88 1988/05/01
Ant2(reviews) PC PC
topic PC PC
corporate body @Antl @Antl
WG Anti Anti
APPENDIX C: An INCA surrogate table
Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start
PTT state - state state 1972
BTelecom UK - UK - 1980
SIP Italy - Italy -
Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start
tel. no. PTT - PTT PTT 1980
076331192 SIP - SIP SIP 1970
014057686 BT - BT BT
Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start
contact on person tel. no. PTT PTT 1987
contact on Mario Rossi 076331192 SIP SIP 1989
contact on R. Bulwer 014057686 BT BT
Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start
province region - state state 1932
Rieti Lazio - Italy Italy
Milano Lombardia - Italy Italy
Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start
code state - state state 1946
RI Italy - state state 1946
MI Italy - state state
Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start
represents code province state state 1946
represents RI Rieti Italy Italy 1946
represents MI Milano Italy Italy
Finish
Finish
Finish
Finish
Finish
Finish
Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth-
region state - state state
Lazio Italy - Italy Italy
Lombardia Italy • Italy Italy
Surr# Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth-
87654 flat # Via Roma - Italy Italy
87655 #4,100 87654 - Poste It. Poste
87656 #4,110 87654 - Poste It. Poste
Surr# Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth-
58 firstname person - state state
59 Mario 53 - Italy Italy
61 Maria 55 - UK UK
Surr # Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth-
64 surname person state state
65 Rossi 53 Italy Italy
67 Potter 67 UK UK
Surr # Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth-
67 Potter 67 - UK UK
1067 Garibaldi 67 - UK UK
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Start Finish
1860 
1860
Start yFinish
1-5-1987
1-5-1987 31-8-1988
1-9-1988
Start Finish
13-6-1922
31-2-1934
Start Finish
13-6-1922
31-2-1934
Start Finish
31-2-1934 31-2-1987
1-1-1988
APPENDIX D: An SPS surrogate table
Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start Finish
Barking and United Kingdom - DES DES 1964
Dagenham
Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start Finish
responsible for team# area# SPS SPS 1984
Label Anti Ant2 Auth+ Auth- Start Finish
school United Kingdom - DES DES
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School
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School
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Figure 11.1 economy of expression using a generic/specific norm
APPENDIX E: Notification rules Ontology Chart (Shah 1990)
A G E N T (?)
An O n to lo g y  C h a r t  F o r  1 he  N o tifica tio n  R u les  O f  T h e  AF1.H) 
S IG N A L
G IV E S 
w y  N O T IC E  
R ule 4 .912a
"sien"
ST A TE # UK
G IV E S  
N O T IC E  
R ule 4 .512
G IV E S 
► N O T IC E  
R ule 4 .612
G IV E S  
N O T IC E  
R ule 
4 .312 /4 .412
*
"SIGN" /  sign
S U B S ID IA R Y
H O L D IN G  -  
C O M PA N Y O W NS
H O LD S
>A SS O C IA T IO N # 
S R O #
ST R U C T U R E
RU LES
N O RM S
FIRM #
R O L E #, B U SIN E SS i  - 
1 IN V E ST M E N T ] K .B .C .DE ,F ,G ,H
G IV E S 
„ /  N O T IC E  • 
R ule 4 .212 \
V
"C A R R IE S  
O N "
C O M M IT T E E
G IV ES 
N O T IC E  
R ule 4 .912b
'  V
R O LE##A FB D
\  C O U N C IL  N O T IF IC A T IO N  R U L E S 
A D D R E SS#
C O N TR
O LL ER
sign
^  ‘ r n v F s \  \  G IV ES
' ^ o t i c e \  V  n o t i c e
R ule i f ] 1 2 a \ +^ V u l e  4 ,1 12b R O L E _ # \ 
"L O C A T E D ^  /  U .K .L  
AT" - - r
sign
PT T#
PE RSO N # A \ +:-
’IN C U M B E N C Y "
N A M E  #
'IN C U M B E N C Y "^F IR S T N A M E
S U R N A M E •"IN C U M B E N C Y ”
K E Y A D IR E C T O R  
B M A N A G E R  
C PA R T N E R  
D C O M P L IA N C E  
O FFIC E R  
F. FIN A N C E  O FFIC E R
F  S E C R E T A R Y  I
G  PE R S O N  W IT H  A U T H O R IT Y  J  
T O  SIG N  K
H  PE R S O N  R E S P O N S IB L E  L
FO R  C U ST O M E R  
IN T ER EST S
A D M IN IS T R A T IV E  1
R E C E IV E R  2
A D M IN IS T R A T O R  3
T R U S T E E
JU D IC IA L  FA C T O R  4
IN D IV ID U A L
P A R T N E R S H IP
U N IN C O R P O R A T E D
A S SO C IA T IO N
C O M PA N Y
S R O #
S E L F ­
R E G U L A T IN G
O R G A N IS A T IO N
APPENDIX F: Student Course Data Model (Ades 1987)
3 . 4  P o s t - S e m a n t i c  A n a l y s i s  Da ta  Mode l
T h i s  p a r t  o u t l i n e s  t h e  Da ta  Mode l  as i t  emerged a f t e r  t he  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  S e m a n t i c  A n a l y s i s .  We c o n c e n t r a t e  on two 
c r i t i c a l  c o m p o n e n t s :  STUDENT COURSE and PERSON DIARY.
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C,Roo
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^ITW&tA
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APPENDIX G: Ontology Chart for Course Database 
(Lupolo 1987)
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APPENDIX H: Ontology Charts (Straub 1988)
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S t a t e alendar_year Month- -Week
Institution #  University 
of London
School
Division
Academic_year
Office
\
Incumancy rgamsationa 
Unit
Employment
Membership
Studentship
Person
\
'requests'
suffers 
/
Hardship requires /
relieves
'relieves'
Amount £Assistance
—Day
j-Court_of_Governors 
-Cttee_of_the_CoG k Standing_Cttee 
-Academic_Board 
-Cttee_of_the_AB # SSC 
-Panels #UAP 
^fPAP
eports
eeting 
\
Incumbancy participates 
/
Legal_Person Provision Quality
Quantity
2 4 6
Ontology Chart 6
Week Day Hour Minute
State -Calendar_year —  Month
ession
-Academic_year 
Federal -Court_of_Governors 
-Cttee_of_the_CoG # Standing Cttee 
—Academic_Board 
Cttee_of_the_AB# SSC 
-Sub-Committee 
—Panel #UAP 
tfPAP
re p o rts /i
University
# University of 
London
Membership 
School# LSE
Division
Department
Ins titu tion
Organisationa 
Unit
Educational
Ins titu tion
Office
Incumancy \ „  . ^ MinutesRole \  /
Meeting
Employment
Studentship
Studentship'
I s
enquires
partic ipa tes 
Incumbancyaccepts
Membership
appliesHardship /Person
enquires
requires applies
re jec ts
refuses
relievesoffers \
relieves'
provides
>s^ A ssis tance
Legal_Person Amount £
manages
247
APPENDIX I: 
Ontology Chart
(Thonissen 1990)
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